x86/bugs: Use VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS in VMX as well

TSA mitigation:

  d8010d4ba43e ("x86/bugs: Add a Transient Scheduler Attacks mitigation")

introduced VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS for guests on AMD CPUs. Currently on Intel
CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS is being used for guests which has a much broader scope
(kernel->user also).

Make mitigations on Intel consistent with TSA. This would help handling the
guest-only mitigations better in future.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
[sean: make CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM mutually exclusive with the MMIO mitigation]
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251113233746.1703361-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

2 files changed, 10 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 6a526ae1fe99..2847e11fbab5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
 
 /*
  * Controls CPU Fill buffer clear before VMenter. This is a subset of
- * X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF, and should only be enabled when KVM-only
+ * X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM, and should only be enabled when KVM-only
  * mitigation is required.
  */
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cpu_buf_vm_clear);
@@ -489,8 +489,8 @@ static enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
 	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_AUTO : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
 
 /*
- * Set if any of MDS/TAA/MMIO/RFDS are going to enable VERW clearing
- * through X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF on kernel and guest entry.
+ * Set if any of MDS/TAA/MMIO/RFDS are going to enable VERW clearing on exit to
+ * userspace *and* on entry to KVM guests.
  */
 static bool verw_clear_cpu_buf_mitigation_selected __ro_after_init;
 
@@ -536,6 +536,7 @@ static void __init mds_apply_mitigation(void)
 	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL ||
 	    mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV) {
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM);
 		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY) &&
 		    (mds_nosmt || smt_mitigations == SMT_MITIGATIONS_ON))
 			cpu_smt_disable(false);
@@ -647,6 +648,7 @@ static void __init taa_apply_mitigation(void)
 		 * present on host, enable the mitigation for UCODE_NEEDED as well.
 		 */
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM);
 
 		if (taa_nosmt || smt_mitigations == SMT_MITIGATIONS_ON)
 			cpu_smt_disable(false);
@@ -748,6 +750,7 @@ static void __init mmio_apply_mitigation(void)
 	 */
 	if (verw_clear_cpu_buf_mitigation_selected) {
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM);
 		static_branch_disable(&cpu_buf_vm_clear);
 	} else {
 		static_branch_enable(&cpu_buf_vm_clear);
@@ -839,8 +842,10 @@ static void __init rfds_update_mitigation(void)
 
 static void __init rfds_apply_mitigation(void)
 {
-	if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW)
+	if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW) {
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM);
+	}
 }
 
 static __init int rfds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
index b59062a52a35..b66b43c9b244 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
 	mov VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX
 
 	/* Clobbers EFLAGS.ZF */
-	CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
+	VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
 
 	/* Check @flags to see if VMLAUNCH or VMRESUME is needed. */
 	testl $VMX_RUN_VMRESUME, WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_SP)