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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2025-12-03 11:08:03 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2025-12-03 11:08:03 -0800
commit777f8171602d5954cac024b66afa1b5b030641a4 (patch)
tree85a8cc4e5a4bea33c1f6ce7713d8fddc399c1aa4 /kernel
parent204a920f284e7264aa6dcd5876cbb1e03a7e4ebc (diff)
parent738c9738e690f5cea24a3ad6fd2d9a323cf614f6 (diff)
Merge tag 'integrity-v6.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar: "Bug fixes: - defer credentials checking from the bprm_check_security hook to the bprm_creds_from_file security hook - properly ignore IMA policy rules based on undefined SELinux labels IMA policy rule extensions: - extend IMA to limit including file hashes in the audit logs (dont_audit action) - define a new filesystem subtype policy option (fs_subtype) Misc: - extend IMA to support in-kernel module decompression by deferring the IMA signature verification in kernel_read_file() to after the kernel module is decompressed" * tag 'integrity-v6.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: ima: Handle error code returned by ima_filter_rule_match() ima: Access decompressed kernel module to verify appended signature ima: add fs_subtype condition for distinguishing FUSE instances ima: add dont_audit action to suppress audit actions ima: Attach CREDS_CHECK IMA hook to bprm_creds_from_file LSM hook
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/module/main.c17
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/module/main.c b/kernel/module/main.c
index c66b26184936..7b3ec2fa6e7c 100644
--- a/kernel/module/main.c
+++ b/kernel/module/main.c
@@ -3675,24 +3675,35 @@ static int idempotent_wait_for_completion(struct idempotent *u)
static int init_module_from_file(struct file *f, const char __user * uargs, int flags)
{
+ bool compressed = !!(flags & MODULE_INIT_COMPRESSED_FILE);
struct load_info info = { };
void *buf = NULL;
int len;
+ int err;
- len = kernel_read_file(f, 0, &buf, INT_MAX, NULL, READING_MODULE);
+ len = kernel_read_file(f, 0, &buf, INT_MAX, NULL,
+ compressed ? READING_MODULE_COMPRESSED :
+ READING_MODULE);
if (len < 0) {
mod_stat_inc(&failed_kreads);
return len;
}
- if (flags & MODULE_INIT_COMPRESSED_FILE) {
- int err = module_decompress(&info, buf, len);
+ if (compressed) {
+ err = module_decompress(&info, buf, len);
vfree(buf); /* compressed data is no longer needed */
if (err) {
mod_stat_inc(&failed_decompress);
mod_stat_add_long(len, &invalid_decompress_bytes);
return err;
}
+ err = security_kernel_post_read_file(f, (char *)info.hdr, info.len,
+ READING_MODULE);
+ if (err) {
+ mod_stat_inc(&failed_kreads);
+ free_copy(&info, flags);
+ return err;
+ }
} else {
info.hdr = buf;
info.len = len;