diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
123 files changed, 4059 insertions, 2044 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 4816fc74f81e..285f284dfcac 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ endchoice config LSM string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs" + depends on SECURITY default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening index fd1238753cad..86f8768c63d4 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening @@ -82,10 +82,13 @@ choice endchoice -config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK +config CC_HAS_SANCOV_STACK_DEPTH_CALLBACK + def_bool $(cc-option,-fsanitize-coverage-stack-depth-callback-min=1) + +config KSTACK_ERASE bool "Poison kernel stack before returning from syscalls" - depends on GCC_PLUGINS - depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK + depends on HAVE_ARCH_KSTACK_ERASE + depends on GCC_PLUGINS || CC_HAS_SANCOV_STACK_DEPTH_CALLBACK help This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before returning from system calls. This has the effect of leaving @@ -103,6 +106,10 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before deploying it. +config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + def_bool KSTACK_ERASE + depends on GCC_PLUGINS + help This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at: * https://grsecurity.net/ * https://pax.grsecurity.net/ @@ -117,37 +124,37 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK_VERBOSE instrumented. This is useful for comparing coverage between builds. -config STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE - int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by STACKLEAK" +config KSTACK_ERASE_TRACK_MIN_SIZE + int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by KSTACK_ERASE" default 100 range 0 4096 - depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + depends on KSTACK_ERASE help - The STACKLEAK gcc plugin instruments the kernel code for tracking + The KSTACK_ERASE option instruments the kernel code for tracking the lowest border of the kernel stack (and for some other purposes). - It inserts the stackleak_track_stack() call for the functions with - a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter. + It inserts the __sanitizer_cov_stack_depth() call for the functions + with a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter. If unsure, leave the default value 100. -config STACKLEAK_METRICS - bool "Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system" - depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK +config KSTACK_ERASE_METRICS + bool "Show KSTACK_ERASE metrics in the /proc file system" + depends on KSTACK_ERASE depends on PROC_FS help - If this is set, STACKLEAK metrics for every task are available in - the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/<pid>/stack_depth + If this is set, KSTACK_ERASE metrics for every task are available + in the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/<pid>/stack_depth shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and previous syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it - can be useful for estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for - your workloads. + can be useful for estimating the KSTACK_ERASE performance impact + for your workloads. -config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE +config KSTACK_ERASE_RUNTIME_DISABLE bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing" - depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK + depends on KSTACK_ERASE help This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with - CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK. + CONFIG_KSTACK_ERASE. config INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on allocation by default" @@ -248,6 +255,16 @@ config LIST_HARDENED If unsure, say N. +config RUST_BITMAP_HARDENED + bool "Check integrity of bitmap Rust API" + depends on RUST + help + Enables additional assertions in the Rust Bitmap API to catch + arguments that are not guaranteed to result in an immediate access + fault. + + If unsure, say N. + config BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION bool "Trigger a BUG when data corruption is detected" select LIST_HARDENED diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index 22ff4c8bd8ce..4601230ba442 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += lsm_syscalls.o obj-$(CONFIG_MMU) += min_addr.o # Object file lists -obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o lsm_notifier.o lsm_init.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS) += inode.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/ diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig index 64cc3044a42c..1e3bd44643da 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig +++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig @@ -59,8 +59,7 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_INTROSPECT_POLICY config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH bool "Enable introspection of sha256 hashes for loaded profiles" depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_INTROSPECT_POLICY - select CRYPTO - select CRYPTO_SHA256 + select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256 default y help This option selects whether introspection of loaded policy diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile index b9c5879dd599..12fb419714c0 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/Makefile +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o task.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \ path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \ resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o net.o \ - policy_compat.o + policy_compat.o af_unix.o apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_KUNIT_TEST) += apparmor_policy_unpack_test.o @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h # to # #define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "local inet" quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN $@ -cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\ +cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *const address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\ sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \ 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\ echo "};" >> $@ ;\ @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\ # to # [1] = "stream", quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN $@ -cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\ +cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *const sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\ sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \ -e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\ echo "};" >> $@ diff --git a/security/apparmor/af_unix.c b/security/apparmor/af_unix.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ac0f4be791ec --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/af_unix.c @@ -0,0 +1,799 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor af_unix fine grained mediation + * + * Copyright 2023 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <net/tcp_states.h> + +#include "include/audit.h" +#include "include/af_unix.h" +#include "include/apparmor.h" +#include "include/file.h" +#include "include/label.h" +#include "include/path.h" +#include "include/policy.h" +#include "include/cred.h" + + +static inline struct sock *aa_unix_sk(struct unix_sock *u) +{ + return &u->sk; +} + +static int unix_fs_perm(const char *op, u32 mask, const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path) +{ + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!path); + + if (unconfined(label) || !label_mediates(label, AA_CLASS_FILE)) + return 0; + + mask &= NET_FS_PERMS; + /* if !u->path.dentry socket is being shutdown - implicit delegation + * until obj delegation is supported + */ + if (path->dentry) { + /* the sunpath may not be valid for this ns so use the path */ + struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode; + vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_idmap(path->mnt), inode); + struct path_cond cond = { + .uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid), + .mode = inode->i_mode, + }; + + return aa_path_perm(op, subj_cred, label, path, + PATH_SOCK_COND, mask, &cond); + } /* else implicitly delegated */ + + return 0; +} + +/* match_addr special constants */ +#define ABSTRACT_ADDR "\x00" /* abstract socket addr */ +#define ANONYMOUS_ADDR "\x01" /* anonymous endpoint, no addr */ +#define DISCONNECTED_ADDR "\x02" /* addr is another namespace */ +#define SHUTDOWN_ADDR "\x03" /* path addr is shutdown and cleared */ +#define FS_ADDR "/" /* path addr in fs */ + +static aa_state_t match_addr(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t state, + struct sockaddr_un *addr, int addrlen) +{ + if (addr) + /* include leading \0 */ + state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, state, addr->sun_path, + unix_addr_len(addrlen)); + else + state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, state, ANONYMOUS_ADDR, 1); + /* todo: could change to out of band for cleaner separation */ + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state); + + return state; +} + +static aa_state_t match_to_local(struct aa_policydb *policy, + aa_state_t state, u32 request, + int type, int protocol, + struct sockaddr_un *addr, int addrlen, + struct aa_perms **p, + const char **info) +{ + state = aa_match_to_prot(policy, state, request, PF_UNIX, type, + protocol, NULL, info); + if (state) { + state = match_addr(policy->dfa, state, addr, addrlen); + if (state) { + /* todo: local label matching */ + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(policy->dfa, state); + if (!state) + *info = "failed local label match"; + } else { + *info = "failed local address match"; + } + } + + return state; +} + +struct sockaddr_un *aa_sunaddr(const struct unix_sock *u, int *addrlen) +{ + struct unix_address *addr; + + /* memory barrier is sufficient see note in net/unix/af_unix.c */ + addr = smp_load_acquire(&u->addr); + if (addr) { + *addrlen = addr->len; + return addr->name; + } + *addrlen = 0; + return NULL; +} + +static aa_state_t match_to_sk(struct aa_policydb *policy, + aa_state_t state, u32 request, + struct unix_sock *u, struct aa_perms **p, + const char **info) +{ + int addrlen; + struct sockaddr_un *addr = aa_sunaddr(u, &addrlen); + + return match_to_local(policy, state, request, u->sk.sk_type, + u->sk.sk_protocol, addr, addrlen, p, info); +} + +#define CMD_ADDR 1 +#define CMD_LISTEN 2 +#define CMD_OPT 4 + +static aa_state_t match_to_cmd(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t state, + u32 request, struct unix_sock *u, + char cmd, struct aa_perms **p, + const char **info) +{ + AA_BUG(!p); + + state = match_to_sk(policy, state, request, u, p, info); + if (state && !*p) { + state = aa_dfa_match_len(policy->dfa, state, &cmd, 1); + if (!state) + *info = "failed cmd selection match"; + } + + return state; +} + +static aa_state_t match_to_peer(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t state, + u32 request, struct unix_sock *u, + struct sockaddr_un *peer_addr, int peer_addrlen, + struct aa_perms **p, const char **info) +{ + AA_BUG(!p); + + state = match_to_cmd(policy, state, request, u, CMD_ADDR, p, info); + if (state && !*p) { + state = match_addr(policy->dfa, state, peer_addr, peer_addrlen); + if (!state) + *info = "failed peer address match"; + } + + return state; +} + +static aa_state_t match_label(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct aa_ruleset *rule, aa_state_t state, + u32 request, struct aa_profile *peer, + struct aa_perms *p, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) +{ + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(!peer); + + ad->peer = &peer->label; + + if (state && !p) { + state = aa_dfa_match(rule->policy->dfa, state, + peer->base.hname); + if (!state) + ad->info = "failed peer label match"; + + } + + return aa_do_perms(profile, rule->policy, state, request, p, ad); +} + + +/* unix sock creation comes before we know if the socket will be an fs + * socket + * v6 - semantics are handled by mapping in profile load + * v7 - semantics require sock create for tasks creating an fs socket. + * v8 - same as v7 + */ +static int profile_create_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, int family, + int type, int protocol, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) +{ + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; + aa_state_t state; + + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile)); + + state = RULE_MEDIATES_v9NET(rules); + if (state) { + state = aa_match_to_prot(rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_CREATE, + PF_UNIX, type, protocol, NULL, + &ad->info); + + return aa_do_perms(profile, rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_CREATE, + NULL, ad); + } + + return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, ad, AA_MAY_CREATE, family, type, + protocol); +} + +static int profile_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, + u32 request, struct sock *sk, const struct path *path) +{ + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; + struct aa_perms *p = NULL; + aa_state_t state; + + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(!sk); + AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile)); + + state = RULE_MEDIATES_v9NET(rules); + if (state) { + if (is_unix_fs(sk)) + return unix_fs_perm(ad->op, request, ad->subj_cred, + &profile->label, + &unix_sk(sk)->path); + + state = match_to_sk(rules->policy, state, request, unix_sk(sk), + &p, &ad->info); + + return aa_do_perms(profile, rules->policy, state, request, p, + ad); + } + + return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, request, sk); +} + +static int profile_bind_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct sock *sk, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) +{ + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; + struct aa_perms *p = NULL; + aa_state_t state; + + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(!sk); + AA_BUG(!ad); + AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile)); + + state = RULE_MEDIATES_v9NET(rules); + if (state) { + if (is_unix_addr_fs(ad->net.addr, ad->net.addrlen)) + /* under v7-9 fs hook handles bind */ + return 0; + /* bind for abstract socket */ + state = match_to_local(rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_BIND, + sk->sk_type, sk->sk_protocol, + unix_addr(ad->net.addr), + ad->net.addrlen, + &p, &ad->info); + + return aa_do_perms(profile, rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_BIND, + p, ad); + } + + return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, AA_MAY_BIND, sk); +} + +static int profile_listen_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct sock *sk, + int backlog, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) +{ + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; + struct aa_perms *p = NULL; + aa_state_t state; + + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(!sk); + AA_BUG(!ad); + AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile)); + + state = RULE_MEDIATES_v9NET(rules); + if (state) { + __be16 b = cpu_to_be16(backlog); + + if (is_unix_fs(sk)) + return unix_fs_perm(ad->op, AA_MAY_LISTEN, + ad->subj_cred, &profile->label, + &unix_sk(sk)->path); + + state = match_to_cmd(rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_LISTEN, + unix_sk(sk), CMD_LISTEN, &p, &ad->info); + if (state && !p) { + state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state, + (char *) &b, 2); + if (!state) + ad->info = "failed listen backlog match"; + } + return aa_do_perms(profile, rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_LISTEN, + p, ad); + } + + return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sk); +} + +static int profile_accept_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct sock *sk, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) +{ + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; + struct aa_perms *p = NULL; + aa_state_t state; + + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(!sk); + AA_BUG(!ad); + AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile)); + + state = RULE_MEDIATES_v9NET(rules); + if (state) { + if (is_unix_fs(sk)) + return unix_fs_perm(ad->op, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, + ad->subj_cred, &profile->label, + &unix_sk(sk)->path); + + state = match_to_sk(rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, + unix_sk(sk), &p, &ad->info); + + return aa_do_perms(profile, rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, + p, ad); + } + + return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sk); +} + +static int profile_opt_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, + struct sock *sk, int optname, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) +{ + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; + struct aa_perms *p = NULL; + aa_state_t state; + + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(!sk); + AA_BUG(!ad); + AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile)); + + state = RULE_MEDIATES_v9NET(rules); + if (state) { + __be16 b = cpu_to_be16(optname); + if (is_unix_fs(sk)) + return unix_fs_perm(ad->op, request, + ad->subj_cred, &profile->label, + &unix_sk(sk)->path); + + state = match_to_cmd(rules->policy, state, request, unix_sk(sk), + CMD_OPT, &p, &ad->info); + if (state && !p) { + state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state, + (char *) &b, 2); + if (!state) + ad->info = "failed sockopt match"; + } + return aa_do_perms(profile, rules->policy, state, request, p, + ad); + } + + return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, request, sk); +} + +/* null peer_label is allowed, in which case the peer_sk label is used */ +static int profile_peer_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, + struct sock *sk, const struct path *path, + struct sockaddr_un *peer_addr, + int peer_addrlen, const struct path *peer_path, + struct aa_label *peer_label, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) +{ + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; + struct aa_perms *p = NULL; + aa_state_t state; + + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile)); + AA_BUG(!sk); + AA_BUG(!peer_label); + AA_BUG(!ad); + + state = RULE_MEDIATES_v9NET(rules); + if (state) { + struct aa_profile *peerp; + + if (peer_path) + return unix_fs_perm(ad->op, request, ad->subj_cred, + &profile->label, peer_path); + else if (path) + return unix_fs_perm(ad->op, request, ad->subj_cred, + &profile->label, path); + state = match_to_peer(rules->policy, state, request, + unix_sk(sk), + peer_addr, peer_addrlen, &p, &ad->info); + + return fn_for_each_in_ns(peer_label, peerp, + match_label(profile, rules, state, request, + peerp, p, ad)); + } + + return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, request, sk); +} + +/* -------------------------------- */ + +int aa_unix_create_perm(struct aa_label *label, int family, int type, + int protocol) +{ + if (!unconfined(label)) { + struct aa_profile *profile; + DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(ad, OP_CREATE, current_cred(), NULL, family, + type, protocol); + + return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + profile_create_perm(profile, family, type, + protocol, &ad)); + } + + return 0; +} + +static int aa_unix_label_sk_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, + const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk, + const struct path *path) +{ + if (!unconfined(label)) { + struct aa_profile *profile; + DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, subj_cred, sk); + + return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + profile_sk_perm(profile, &ad, request, sk, + path)); + } + return 0; +} + +/* revalidation, get/set attr, shutdown */ +int aa_unix_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock) +{ + struct aa_label *label; + int error; + + label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); + error = aa_unix_label_sk_perm(current_cred(), label, op, + request, sock->sk, + is_unix_fs(sock->sk) ? &unix_sk(sock->sk)->path : NULL); + end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return error; +} + +static int valid_addr(struct sockaddr *addr, int addr_len) +{ + struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr = unix_addr(addr); + + /* addr_len == offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) is autobind */ + if (addr_len < offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) || + addr_len > sizeof(*sunaddr)) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; +} + +int aa_unix_bind_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, + int addrlen) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + struct aa_label *label; + int error = 0; + + error = valid_addr(addr, addrlen); + if (error) + return error; + + label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); + /* fs bind is handled by mknod */ + if (!unconfined(label)) { + DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, OP_BIND, current_cred(), sock->sk); + + ad.net.addr = unix_addr(addr); + ad.net.addrlen = addrlen; + + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + profile_bind_perm(profile, sock->sk, &ad)); + } + end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return error; +} + +/* + * unix connections are covered by the + * - unix_stream_connect (stream) and unix_may_send hooks (dgram) + * - fs connect is handled by open + * This is just here to document this is not needed for af_unix + * +int aa_unix_connect_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, + int addrlen) +{ + return 0; +} +*/ + +int aa_unix_listen_perm(struct socket *sock, int backlog) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + struct aa_label *label; + int error = 0; + + label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); + if (!unconfined(label)) { + DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, OP_LISTEN, current_cred(), sock->sk); + + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + profile_listen_perm(profile, sock->sk, + backlog, &ad)); + } + end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return error; +} + + +/* ability of sock to connect, not peer address binding */ +int aa_unix_accept_perm(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + struct aa_label *label; + int error = 0; + + label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); + if (!unconfined(label)) { + DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, OP_ACCEPT, current_cred(), sock->sk); + + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + profile_accept_perm(profile, sock->sk, &ad)); + } + end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return error; +} + + +/* + * dgram handled by unix_may_sendmsg, right to send on stream done at connect + * could do per msg unix_stream here, but connect + socket transfer is + * sufficient. This is just here to document this is not needed for af_unix + * + * sendmsg, recvmsg +int aa_unix_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, + struct msghdr *msg, int size) +{ + return 0; +} +*/ + +int aa_unix_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, + int level, int optname) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + struct aa_label *label; + int error = 0; + + label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); + if (!unconfined(label)) { + DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, current_cred(), sock->sk); + + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + profile_opt_perm(profile, request, sock->sk, + optname, &ad)); + } + end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return error; +} + +static int unix_peer_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, + struct sock *sk, const struct path *path, + struct sockaddr_un *peer_addr, int peer_addrlen, + const struct path *peer_path, struct aa_label *peer_label) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, subj_cred, sk); + + ad.net.peer.addr = peer_addr; + ad.net.peer.addrlen = peer_addrlen; + + return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + profile_peer_perm(profile, request, sk, path, + peer_addr, peer_addrlen, peer_path, + peer_label, &ad)); +} + +/** + * + * Requires: lock held on both @sk and @peer_sk + * called by unix_stream_connect, unix_may_send + */ +int aa_unix_peer_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, + struct sock *sk, struct sock *peer_sk, + struct aa_label *peer_label) +{ + struct unix_sock *peeru = unix_sk(peer_sk); + struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk); + int plen; + struct sockaddr_un *paddr = aa_sunaddr(unix_sk(peer_sk), &plen); + + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!sk); + AA_BUG(!peer_sk); + AA_BUG(!peer_label); + + return unix_peer_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, sk, + is_unix_fs(sk) ? &u->path : NULL, + paddr, plen, + is_unix_fs(peer_sk) ? &peeru->path : NULL, + peer_label); +} + +/* sk_plabel for comparison only */ +static void update_sk_ctx(struct sock *sk, struct aa_label *label, + struct aa_label *plabel) +{ + struct aa_label *l, *old; + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); + bool update_sk; + + rcu_read_lock(); + update_sk = (plabel && + (plabel != rcu_access_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate) || + !aa_label_is_subset(plabel, rcu_dereference(ctx->peer)))) || + !__aa_subj_label_is_cached(label, rcu_dereference(ctx->label)); + rcu_read_unlock(); + if (!update_sk) + return; + + spin_lock(&unix_sk(sk)->lock); + old = rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->label, + lockdep_is_held(&unix_sk(sk)->lock)); + l = aa_label_merge(old, label, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (l) { + if (l != old) { + rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, l); + aa_put_label(old); + } else + aa_put_label(l); + } + if (plabel && rcu_access_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate) != plabel) { + old = rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->peer, lockdep_is_held(&unix_sk(sk)->lock)); + + if (old == plabel) { + rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate, plabel); + } else if (aa_label_is_subset(plabel, old)) { + rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate, plabel); + rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer, aa_get_label(plabel)); + aa_put_label(old); + } /* else race or a subset - don't update */ + } + spin_unlock(&unix_sk(sk)->lock); +} + +static void update_peer_ctx(struct sock *sk, struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx, + struct aa_label *label) +{ + struct aa_label *l, *old; + + spin_lock(&unix_sk(sk)->lock); + old = rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->peer, + lockdep_is_held(&unix_sk(sk)->lock)); + l = aa_label_merge(old, label, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (l) { + if (l != old) { + rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer, l); + aa_put_label(old); + } else + aa_put_label(l); + } + spin_unlock(&unix_sk(sk)->lock); +} + +/* This fn is only checked if something has changed in the security + * boundaries. Otherwise cached info off file is sufficient + */ +int aa_unix_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, + const char *op, u32 request, struct file *file) +{ + struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data; + struct sockaddr_un *addr, *peer_addr; + int addrlen, peer_addrlen; + struct aa_label *plabel = NULL; + struct sock *peer_sk = NULL; + u32 sk_req = request & ~NET_PEER_MASK; + struct path path; + bool is_sk_fs; + int error = 0; + + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(sock->sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX); + + /* investigate only using lock via unix_peer_get() + * addr only needs the memory barrier, but need to investigate + * path + */ + unix_state_lock(sock->sk); + peer_sk = unix_peer(sock->sk); + if (peer_sk) + sock_hold(peer_sk); + + is_sk_fs = is_unix_fs(sock->sk); + addr = aa_sunaddr(unix_sk(sock->sk), &addrlen); + path = unix_sk(sock->sk)->path; + unix_state_unlock(sock->sk); + + if (is_sk_fs && peer_sk) + sk_req = request; + if (sk_req) { + error = aa_unix_label_sk_perm(subj_cred, label, op, + sk_req, sock->sk, + is_sk_fs ? &path : NULL); + } + if (!peer_sk) + goto out; + + peer_addr = aa_sunaddr(unix_sk(peer_sk), &peer_addrlen); + + struct path peer_path; + + peer_path = unix_sk(peer_sk)->path; + if (!is_sk_fs && is_unix_fs(peer_sk)) { + last_error(error, + unix_fs_perm(op, request, subj_cred, label, + is_unix_fs(peer_sk) ? &peer_path : NULL)); + } else if (!is_sk_fs) { + struct aa_label *plabel; + struct aa_sk_ctx *pctx = aa_sock(peer_sk); + + rcu_read_lock(); + plabel = aa_get_label_rcu(&pctx->label); + rcu_read_unlock(); + /* no fs check of aa_unix_peer_perm because conditions above + * ensure they will never be done + */ + last_error(error, + xcheck(unix_peer_perm(subj_cred, label, op, + MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, sock->sk, + is_sk_fs ? &path : NULL, + peer_addr, peer_addrlen, + is_unix_fs(peer_sk) ? + &peer_path : NULL, + plabel), + unix_peer_perm(file->f_cred, plabel, op, + MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, peer_sk, + is_unix_fs(peer_sk) ? + &peer_path : NULL, + addr, addrlen, + is_sk_fs ? &path : NULL, + label))); + if (!error && !__aa_subj_label_is_cached(plabel, label)) + update_peer_ctx(peer_sk, pctx, label); + } + sock_put(peer_sk); + +out: + + /* update peer cache to latest successful perm check */ + if (error == 0) + update_sk_ctx(sock->sk, label, plabel); + aa_put_label(plabel); + + return error; +} + diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index 0aef34b9609b..e4114aa1e04f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ * The interface is split into two main components based on their function * a securityfs component: * used for static files that are always available, and which allows - * userspace to specificy the location of the security filesystem. + * userspace to specify the location of the security filesystem. * * fns and data are prefixed with * aa_sfs_ @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static struct file_system_type aafs_ops = { /** * __aafs_setup_d_inode - basic inode setup for apparmorfs * @dir: parent directory for the dentry - * @dentry: dentry we are seting the inode up for + * @dentry: dentry we are setting the inode up for * @mode: permissions the file should have * @data: data to store on inode.i_private, available in open() * @link: if symlink, symlink target string @@ -355,17 +355,17 @@ static void aafs_remove(struct dentry *dentry) if (!dentry || IS_ERR(dentry)) return; + /* ->d_parent is stable as rename is not supported */ dir = d_inode(dentry->d_parent); - inode_lock(dir); - if (simple_positive(dentry)) { + dentry = start_removing_dentry(dentry->d_parent, dentry); + if (!IS_ERR(dentry) && simple_positive(dentry)) { if (d_is_dir(dentry)) simple_rmdir(dir, dentry); else simple_unlink(dir, dentry); d_delete(dentry); - dput(dentry); } - inode_unlock(dir); + end_removing(dentry); simple_release_fs(&aafs_mnt, &aafs_count); } @@ -612,8 +612,7 @@ static const struct file_operations aa_fs_ns_revision_fops = { static void profile_query_cb(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, const char *match_str, size_t match_len) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; struct aa_perms tmp = { }; aa_state_t state = DFA_NOMATCH; @@ -626,11 +625,20 @@ static void profile_query_cb(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, if (state) { struct path_cond cond = { }; - tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(rules->file, state, &cond)); + tmp = *(aa_lookup_condperms(current_fsuid(), + rules->file, state, &cond)); } } else if (rules->policy->dfa) { if (!RULE_MEDIATES(rules, *match_str)) return; /* no change to current perms */ + /* old user space does not correctly detect dbus mediation + * support so we may get dbus policy and requests when + * the abi doesn't support it. This can cause mediation + * regressions, so explicitly test for this situation. + */ + if (*match_str == AA_CLASS_DBUS && + !RULE_MEDIATES_v9NET(rules)) + return; /* no change to current perms */ state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, rules->policy->start[0], match_str, match_len); @@ -997,7 +1005,7 @@ static int aa_sfs_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) switch (fs_file->v_type) { case AA_SFS_TYPE_BOOLEAN: - seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", fs_file->v.boolean ? "yes" : "no"); + seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", str_yes_no(fs_file->v.boolean)); break; case AA_SFS_TYPE_STRING: seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", fs_file->v.string); @@ -1006,7 +1014,7 @@ static int aa_sfs_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) seq_printf(seq, "%#08lx\n", fs_file->v.u64); break; default: - /* Ignore unpritable entry types. */ + /* Ignore unprintable entry types. */ break; } @@ -1152,7 +1160,7 @@ static int seq_ns_stacked_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) struct aa_label *label; label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); - seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", label->size > 1 ? "yes" : "no"); + seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", str_yes_no(label->size > 1)); end_current_label_crit_section(label); return 0; @@ -1175,7 +1183,7 @@ static int seq_ns_nsstacked_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) } } - seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", count > 1 ? "yes" : "no"); + seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", str_yes_no(count > 1)); end_current_label_crit_section(label); return 0; @@ -2244,7 +2252,7 @@ static void *p_next(struct seq_file *f, void *p, loff_t *pos) /** * p_stop - stop depth first traversal * @f: seq_file we are filling - * @p: the last profile writen + * @p: the last profile written * * Release all locking done by p_start/p_next on namespace tree */ @@ -2332,6 +2340,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_attach[] = { static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_domain[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hat", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hatv", 1), + AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("unconfined_allowed_children", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_onexec", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_profile", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("stack", 1), @@ -2340,6 +2349,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_domain[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("computed_longest_left", 1), AA_SFS_DIR("attach_conditions", aa_sfs_entry_attach), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("disconnected.path", 1), + AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("kill.signal", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("version", "1.2"), { } }; @@ -2364,7 +2374,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_policy[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("set_load", 1), /* number of out of band transitions supported */ AA_SFS_FILE_U64("outofband", MAX_OOB_SUPPORTED), - AA_SFS_FILE_U64("permstable32_version", 1), + AA_SFS_FILE_U64("permstable32_version", 3), AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("permstable32", PERMS32STR), AA_SFS_FILE_U64("state32", 1), AA_SFS_DIR("unconfined_restrictions", aa_sfs_entry_unconfined), @@ -2384,6 +2394,11 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_ns[] = { { } }; +static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_dbus[] = { + AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", "acquire send receive"), + { } +}; + static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_query_label[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("perms", "allow deny audit quiet"), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("data", 1), @@ -2406,6 +2421,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = { AA_SFS_DIR("domain", aa_sfs_entry_domain), AA_SFS_DIR("file", aa_sfs_entry_file), AA_SFS_DIR("network_v8", aa_sfs_entry_network), + AA_SFS_DIR("network_v9", aa_sfs_entry_networkv9), AA_SFS_DIR("mount", aa_sfs_entry_mount), AA_SFS_DIR("namespaces", aa_sfs_entry_ns), AA_SFS_FILE_U64("capability", VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK), @@ -2413,6 +2429,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = { AA_SFS_DIR("caps", aa_sfs_entry_caps), AA_SFS_DIR("ptrace", aa_sfs_entry_ptrace), AA_SFS_DIR("signal", aa_sfs_entry_signal), + AA_SFS_DIR("dbus", aa_sfs_entry_dbus), AA_SFS_DIR("query", aa_sfs_entry_query), AA_SFS_DIR("io_uring", aa_sfs_entry_io_uring), { } @@ -2632,7 +2649,7 @@ static const struct inode_operations policy_link_iops = { * * Returns: error on failure */ -static int __init aa_create_aafs(void) +int __init aa_create_aafs(void) { struct dentry *dent; int error; @@ -2711,5 +2728,3 @@ error: AA_ERROR("Error creating AppArmor securityfs\n"); return error; } - -fs_initcall(aa_create_aafs); diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c index 73087d76f649..ac89602aa2d9 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, aa_audit_msg(type, ad, cb); if (ad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL) - (void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL, + (void)send_sig_info(profile->signal, NULL, ad->common.type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK && ad->common.u.tsk ? ad->common.u.tsk : current); diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c index 7ca489ee1054..b9ea6bc45c1a 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/capability.c +++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", AA_SFS_CAPS_MASK), + AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("extended", 1), { } }; @@ -68,8 +69,7 @@ static int audit_caps(struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, struct aa_profile *profile { const u64 AUDIT_CACHE_TIMEOUT_NS = 1000*1000*1000; /* 1 second */ - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; struct audit_cache *ent; int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; @@ -121,10 +121,32 @@ static int audit_caps(struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, struct aa_profile *profile static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, unsigned int opts, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; + aa_state_t state; int error; + state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, ad->class); + if (state) { + struct aa_perms perms = { }; + u32 request; + + /* caps broken into 256 x 32 bit permission chunks */ + state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa, state, cap >> 5); + request = 1 << (cap & 0x1f); + perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state); + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); + + if (opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) { + if (perms.complain & request) + ad->info = "optional: no audit"; + else + ad = NULL; + } + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, + audit_cb); + } + + /* fallback to old caps mediation that doesn't support conditionals */ if (cap_raised(rules->caps.allow, cap) && !cap_raised(rules->caps.denied, cap)) error = 0; @@ -168,3 +190,34 @@ int aa_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, return error; } + +kernel_cap_t aa_profile_capget(struct aa_profile *profile) +{ + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; + aa_state_t state; + + state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_CAP); + if (state) { + kernel_cap_t caps = CAP_EMPTY_SET; + int i; + + /* caps broken into up to 256, 32 bit permission chunks */ + for (i = 0; i < (CAP_LAST_CAP >> 5); i++) { + struct aa_perms perms = { }; + aa_state_t tmp; + + tmp = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa, state, i); + perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, tmp); + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); + caps.val |= ((u64)(perms.allow)) << (i * 5); + caps.val |= ((u64)(perms.complain)) << (i * 5); + } + return caps; + } + + /* fallback to old caps */ + if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) + return CAP_FULL_SET; + + return rules->caps.allow; +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/crypto.c b/security/apparmor/crypto.c index aad486b2fca6..d8a7bde94d79 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/crypto.c +++ b/security/apparmor/crypto.c @@ -11,113 +11,51 @@ * it should be. */ -#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/sha2.h> #include "include/apparmor.h" #include "include/crypto.h" -static unsigned int apparmor_hash_size; - -static struct crypto_shash *apparmor_tfm; - unsigned int aa_hash_size(void) { - return apparmor_hash_size; + return SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; } char *aa_calc_hash(void *data, size_t len) { - SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, apparmor_tfm); char *hash; - int error; - - if (!apparmor_tfm) - return NULL; - hash = kzalloc(apparmor_hash_size, GFP_KERNEL); + hash = kzalloc(SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); if (!hash) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - desc->tfm = apparmor_tfm; - - error = crypto_shash_init(desc); - if (error) - goto fail; - error = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *) data, len); - if (error) - goto fail; - error = crypto_shash_final(desc, hash); - if (error) - goto fail; - + sha256(data, len, hash); return hash; - -fail: - kfree(hash); - - return ERR_PTR(error); } int aa_calc_profile_hash(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 version, void *start, size_t len) { - SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, apparmor_tfm); - int error; + struct sha256_ctx sctx; __le32 le32_version = cpu_to_le32(version); if (!aa_g_hash_policy) return 0; - if (!apparmor_tfm) - return 0; - - profile->hash = kzalloc(apparmor_hash_size, GFP_KERNEL); + profile->hash = kzalloc(SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); if (!profile->hash) return -ENOMEM; - desc->tfm = apparmor_tfm; - - error = crypto_shash_init(desc); - if (error) - goto fail; - error = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *) &le32_version, 4); - if (error) - goto fail; - error = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *) start, len); - if (error) - goto fail; - error = crypto_shash_final(desc, profile->hash); - if (error) - goto fail; - + sha256_init(&sctx); + sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&le32_version, 4); + sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)start, len); + sha256_final(&sctx, profile->hash); return 0; - -fail: - kfree(profile->hash); - profile->hash = NULL; - - return error; } -static int __init init_profile_hash(void) +int __init init_profile_hash(void) { - struct crypto_shash *tfm; - - if (!apparmor_initialized) - return 0; - - tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { - int error = PTR_ERR(tfm); - AA_ERROR("failed to setup profile sha256 hashing: %d\n", error); - return error; - } - apparmor_tfm = tfm; - apparmor_hash_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(apparmor_tfm); - - aa_info_message("AppArmor sha256 policy hashing enabled"); - + if (apparmor_initialized) + aa_info_message("AppArmor sha256 policy hashing enabled"); return 0; } - -late_initcall(init_profile_hash); diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index 5939bd9a9b9b..267da82afb14 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -28,6 +28,12 @@ #include "include/policy.h" #include "include/policy_ns.h" +static const char * const CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR = "conflicting profile attachments"; +static const char * const CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR_IX = + "conflicting profile attachments - ix fallback"; +static const char * const CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR_UX = + "conflicting profile attachments - ux fallback"; + /** * may_change_ptraced_domain - check if can change profile on ptraced task * @to_cred: cred of task changing domain @@ -87,8 +93,7 @@ static inline aa_state_t match_component(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_profile *tp, bool stack, aa_state_t state) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; const char *ns_name; if (stack) @@ -125,8 +130,7 @@ static int label_compound_match(struct aa_profile *profile, aa_state_t state, bool subns, u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; struct aa_profile *tp; struct label_it i; struct path_cond cond = { }; @@ -154,7 +158,8 @@ next: if (!state) goto fail; } - *perms = *(aa_lookup_fperms(rules->file, state, &cond)); + *perms = *(aa_lookup_condperms(current_fsuid(), rules->file, state, + &cond)); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, perms); if ((perms->allow & request) != request) return -EACCES; @@ -187,8 +192,7 @@ static int label_components_match(struct aa_profile *profile, aa_state_t start, bool subns, u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; struct aa_profile *tp; struct label_it i; struct aa_perms tmp; @@ -209,7 +213,8 @@ static int label_components_match(struct aa_profile *profile, return 0; next: - tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(rules->file, state, &cond)); + tmp = *(aa_lookup_condperms(current_fsuid(), rules->file, state, + &cond)); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp); aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp); label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) { @@ -218,7 +223,8 @@ next: state = match_component(profile, tp, stack, start); if (!state) goto fail; - tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(rules->file, state, &cond)); + tmp = *(aa_lookup_condperms(current_fsuid(), rules->file, state, + &cond)); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp); aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp); } @@ -323,7 +329,7 @@ static int aa_xattrs_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&nop_mnt_idmap, d, attach->xattrs[i], &value, value_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (size >= 0) { - u32 index, perm; + struct aa_perms *perms; /* * Check the xattr presence before value. This ensure @@ -335,9 +341,8 @@ static int aa_xattrs_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, /* Check xattr value */ state = aa_dfa_match_len(attach->xmatch->dfa, state, value, size); - index = ACCEPT_TABLE(attach->xmatch->dfa)[state]; - perm = attach->xmatch->perms[index].allow; - if (!(perm & MAY_EXEC)) { + perms = aa_lookup_perms(attach->xmatch, state); + if (!(perms->allow & MAY_EXEC)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } @@ -415,15 +420,14 @@ restart: if (attach->xmatch->dfa) { unsigned int count; aa_state_t state; - u32 index, perm; + struct aa_perms *perms; state = aa_dfa_leftmatch(attach->xmatch->dfa, attach->xmatch->start[AA_CLASS_XMATCH], name, &count); - index = ACCEPT_TABLE(attach->xmatch->dfa)[state]; - perm = attach->xmatch->perms[index].allow; + perms = aa_lookup_perms(attach->xmatch, state); /* any accepting state means a valid match. */ - if (perm & MAY_EXEC) { + if (perms->allow & MAY_EXEC) { int ret = 0; if (count < candidate_len) @@ -484,7 +488,7 @@ restart: if (!candidate || conflict) { if (conflict) - *info = "conflicting profile attachments"; + *info = CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR; rcu_read_unlock(); return NULL; } @@ -508,15 +512,16 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name) * @name: returns: name tested to find label (NOT NULL) * * Returns: refcounted label, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL) + * @name will always be set with the last name tried */ struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex, const char **name) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; struct aa_label *label = NULL; u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK; int index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK; + const char *next; AA_BUG(!name); @@ -524,25 +529,27 @@ struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex, /* TODO: move lookup parsing to unpack time so this is a straight * index into the resultant label */ - for (*name = rules->file->trans.table[index]; !label && *name; - *name = next_name(xtype, *name)) { + for (next = rules->file->trans.table[index]; next; + next = next_name(xtype, next)) { + const char *lookup = (*next == '&') ? next + 1 : next; + *name = next; if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) { - struct aa_profile *new_profile; - /* release by caller */ - new_profile = aa_find_child(profile, *name); - if (new_profile) - label = &new_profile->label; + /* TODO: switich to parse to get stack of child */ + struct aa_profile *new = aa_find_child(profile, lookup); + + if (new) + /* release by caller */ + return &new->label; continue; } - label = aa_label_parse(&profile->label, *name, GFP_KERNEL, + label = aa_label_parse(&profile->label, lookup, GFP_KERNEL, true, false); - if (IS_ERR(label)) - label = NULL; + if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(label)) + /* release by caller */ + return label; } - /* released by caller */ - - return label; + return NULL; } /** @@ -564,12 +571,12 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile, const char **lookupname, const char **info) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); struct aa_label *new = NULL; + struct aa_label *stack = NULL; struct aa_ns *ns = profile->ns; u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK; - const char *stack = NULL; + /* Used for info checks during fallback handling */ + const char *old_info = NULL; switch (xtype) { case AA_X_NONE: @@ -578,13 +585,14 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile, break; case AA_X_TABLE: /* TODO: fix when perm mapping done at unload */ - stack = rules->file->trans.table[xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK]; - if (*stack != '&') { - /* released by caller */ - new = x_table_lookup(profile, xindex, lookupname); - stack = NULL; + /* released by caller + * if null for both stack and direct want to try fallback + */ + new = x_table_lookup(profile, xindex, lookupname); + if (!new || **lookupname != '&') break; - } + stack = new; + new = NULL; fallthrough; /* to X_NAME */ case AA_X_NAME: if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) @@ -599,17 +607,38 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile, break; } + /* fallback transition check */ if (!new) { if (xindex & AA_X_INHERIT) { /* (p|c|n)ix - don't change profile but do * use the newest version */ - *info = "ix fallback"; + if (*info == CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR) { + *info = CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR_IX; + } else { + old_info = *info; + *info = "ix fallback"; + } /* no profile && no error */ new = aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label); } else if (xindex & AA_X_UNCONFINED) { new = aa_get_newest_label(ns_unconfined(profile->ns)); - *info = "ux fallback"; + if (*info == CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR) { + *info = CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR_UX; + } else { + old_info = *info; + *info = "ux fallback"; + } + } + /* We set old_info on the code paths above where overwriting + * could have happened, so now check if info was set by + * find_attach as well (i.e. whether we actually overwrote) + * and warn accordingly. + */ + if (old_info && old_info != CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR) { + pr_warn_ratelimited( + "AppArmor: find_attach (from profile %s) audit info \"%s\" dropped", + profile->base.hname, old_info); } } @@ -617,12 +646,12 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile, /* base the stack on post domain transition */ struct aa_label *base = new; - new = aa_label_parse(base, stack, GFP_KERNEL, true, false); - if (IS_ERR(new)) - new = NULL; + new = aa_label_merge(base, stack, GFP_KERNEL); + /* null on error */ aa_put_label(base); } + aa_put_label(stack); /* released by caller */ return new; } @@ -633,8 +662,7 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(const struct cred *subj_cred, char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond, bool *secure_exec) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; struct aa_label *new = NULL; struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL; const char *info = NULL, *name = NULL, *target = NULL; @@ -652,7 +680,7 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(const struct cred *subj_cred, if (error) { if (profile_unconfined(profile) || (profile->label.flags & FLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR)) { - AA_DEBUG("name lookup ix on error"); + AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN, "name lookup ix on error"); error = 0; new = aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label); } @@ -663,11 +691,27 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(const struct cred *subj_cred, if (profile_unconfined(profile)) { new = find_attach(bprm, profile->ns, &profile->ns->base.profiles, name, &info); + /* info set -> something unusual that we should report + * Currently this is only conflicting attachments, but other + * infos added in the future should also be logged by default + * and only excluded on a case-by-case basis + */ + if (info) { + /* Because perms is never used again after this audit + * we don't need to care about clobbering it + */ + perms.audit |= MAY_EXEC; + perms.allow |= MAY_EXEC; + /* Don't cause error if auditing fails */ + (void) aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, + OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, name, target, new, cond->uid, + info, error); + } if (new) { - AA_DEBUG("unconfined attached to new label"); + AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN, "unconfined attached to new label"); return new; } - AA_DEBUG("unconfined exec no attachment"); + AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN, "unconfined exec no attachment"); return aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label); } @@ -678,9 +722,21 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(const struct cred *subj_cred, new = x_to_label(profile, bprm, name, perms.xindex, &target, &info); if (new && new->proxy == profile->label.proxy && info) { + /* Force audit on conflicting attachment fallback + * Because perms is never used again after this audit + * we don't need to care about clobbering it + */ + if (info == CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR_IX + || info == CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR_UX) + perms.audit |= MAY_EXEC; /* hack ix fallback - improve how this is detected */ goto audit; } else if (!new) { + if (info) { + pr_warn_ratelimited( + "AppArmor: %s (from profile %s) audit info \"%s\" dropped on missing transition", + __func__, profile->base.hname, info); + } info = "profile transition not found"; /* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure or complaint */ perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC; @@ -739,8 +795,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred, char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond, bool *secure_exec) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; aa_state_t state = rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE]; struct aa_perms perms = {}; const char *xname = NULL, *info = "change_profile onexec"; @@ -755,7 +810,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred, /* change_profile on exec already granted */ /* * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed - * even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results + * even when no_new_privs is set because this always results * in a further reduction of permissions. */ return 0; @@ -766,7 +821,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred, if (error) { if (profile_unconfined(profile) || (profile->label.flags & FLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR)) { - AA_DEBUG("name lookup ix on error"); + AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN, "name lookup ix on error"); error = 0; } xname = bprm->filename; @@ -926,7 +981,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stacked * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this - * aways results in a further reduction of permissions. + * always results in a further reduction of permissions. */ if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) && !unconfined(label) && @@ -1188,10 +1243,24 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags) if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) && !ctx->nnp) ctx->nnp = aa_get_label(label); + /* return -EPERM when unconfined doesn't have children to avoid + * changing the traditional error code for unconfined. + */ if (unconfined(label)) { - info = "unconfined can not change_hat"; - error = -EPERM; - goto fail; + struct label_it i; + bool empty = true; + + rcu_read_lock(); + label_for_each_in_ns(i, labels_ns(label), label, profile) { + empty &= list_empty(&profile->base.profiles); + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + + if (empty) { + info = "unconfined can not change_hat"; + error = -EPERM; + goto fail; + } } if (count) { @@ -1216,7 +1285,8 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags) if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) && !aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) { /* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */ - AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied"); + AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN, + "no_new_privs - change_hat denied"); error = -EPERM; goto out; } @@ -1237,7 +1307,8 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, int flags) if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) && !aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(previous, ctx->nnp)) { /* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */ - AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied"); + AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN, + "no_new_privs - change_hat denied"); error = -EPERM; goto out; } @@ -1282,8 +1353,7 @@ static int change_profile_perms_wrapper(const char *op, const char *name, struct aa_label *target, bool stack, u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; const char *info = NULL; int error = 0; @@ -1343,7 +1413,7 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags) if (!fqname || !*fqname) { aa_put_label(label); - AA_DEBUG("no profile name"); + AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN, "no profile name"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -1462,7 +1532,8 @@ check: if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(label) && !aa_label_is_unconfined_subset(new, ctx->nnp)) { /* not an apparmor denial per se, so don't log it */ - AA_DEBUG("no_new_privs - change_hat denied"); + AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN, + "no_new_privs - change_hat denied"); error = -EPERM; goto out; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c index d52a5b14dad4..c75820402878 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/file.c +++ b/security/apparmor/file.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/mount.h> +#include "include/af_unix.h" #include "include/apparmor.h" #include "include/audit.h" #include "include/cred.h" @@ -168,8 +169,9 @@ static int path_name(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_perms default_perms = {}; /** - * aa_lookup_fperms - convert dfa compressed perms to internal perms - * @file_rules: the aa_policydb to lookup perms for (NOT NULL) + * aa_lookup_condperms - convert dfa compressed perms to internal perms + * @subj_uid: uid to use for subject owner test + * @rules: the aa_policydb to lookup perms for (NOT NULL) * @state: state in dfa * @cond: conditions to consider (NOT NULL) * @@ -177,18 +179,21 @@ struct aa_perms default_perms = {}; * * Returns: a pointer to a file permission set */ -struct aa_perms *aa_lookup_fperms(struct aa_policydb *file_rules, - aa_state_t state, struct path_cond *cond) +struct aa_perms *aa_lookup_condperms(kuid_t subj_uid, struct aa_policydb *rules, + aa_state_t state, struct path_cond *cond) { - unsigned int index = ACCEPT_TABLE(file_rules->dfa)[state]; + unsigned int index = ACCEPT_TABLE(rules->dfa)[state]; - if (!(file_rules->perms)) + if (!(rules->perms)) return &default_perms; - if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), cond->uid)) - return &(file_rules->perms[index]); + if ((ACCEPT_TABLE2(rules->dfa)[state] & ACCEPT_FLAG_OWNER)) { + if (uid_eq(subj_uid, cond->uid)) + return &(rules->perms[index]); + return &(rules->perms[index + 1]); + } - return &(file_rules->perms[index + 1]); + return &(rules->perms[index]); } /** @@ -207,21 +212,22 @@ aa_state_t aa_str_perms(struct aa_policydb *file_rules, aa_state_t start, { aa_state_t state; state = aa_dfa_match(file_rules->dfa, start, name); - *perms = *(aa_lookup_fperms(file_rules, state, cond)); + *perms = *(aa_lookup_condperms(current_fsuid(), file_rules, state, + cond)); return state; } -static int __aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred, - struct aa_profile *profile, const char *name, - u32 request, struct path_cond *cond, int flags, - struct aa_perms *perms) +int __aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, const char *name, + u32 request, struct path_cond *cond, int flags, + struct aa_perms *perms) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; int e = 0; - if (profile_unconfined(profile)) + if (profile_unconfined(profile) || + ((flags & PATH_SOCK_COND) && !RULE_MEDIATES_v9NET(rules))) return 0; aa_str_perms(rules->file, rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE], name, cond, perms); @@ -316,8 +322,7 @@ static int profile_path_link(const struct cred *subj_cred, const struct path *target, char *buffer2, struct path_cond *cond) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; const char *lname, *tname = NULL; struct aa_perms lperms = {}, perms; const char *info = NULL; @@ -423,9 +428,11 @@ int aa_path_link(const struct cred *subj_cred, { struct path link = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt, .dentry = new_dentry }; struct path target = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt, .dentry = old_dentry }; + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(old_dentry); + vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_idmap(target.mnt), inode); struct path_cond cond = { - d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_uid, - d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode + .uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid), + .mode = inode->i_mode, }; char *buffer = NULL, *buffer2 = NULL; struct aa_profile *profile; @@ -534,22 +541,19 @@ static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file, u32 request, u32 denied) { - struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data; int error; - AA_BUG(!sock); - /* revalidation due to label out of date. No revocation at this time */ if (!denied && aa_label_is_subset(flabel, label)) return 0; /* TODO: improve to skip profiles cached in flabel */ - error = aa_sock_file_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, sock); + error = aa_sock_file_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, file); if (denied) { /* TODO: improve to skip profiles checked above */ /* check every profile in file label to is cached */ last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(subj_cred, flabel, op, - request, sock)); + request, file)); } if (!error) update_file_ctx(file_ctx(file), label, request); @@ -557,6 +561,35 @@ static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred, return error; } +/* for now separate fn to indicate semantics of the check */ +static bool __file_is_delegated(struct aa_label *obj_label) +{ + return unconfined(obj_label); +} + +static bool __unix_needs_revalidation(struct file *file, struct aa_label *label, + u32 request) +{ + struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data; + + lockdep_assert_in_rcu_read_lock(); + + if (!S_ISSOCK(file_inode(file)->i_mode)) + return false; + if (request & NET_PEER_MASK) + return false; + if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) { + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk); + + if (rcu_access_pointer(ctx->peer) != + rcu_access_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate)) + return true; + return !__aa_subj_label_is_cached(rcu_dereference(ctx->label), + label); + } + return false; +} + /** * aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file * @op: operation being checked @@ -594,17 +627,18 @@ int aa_file_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred, * delegation from unconfined tasks */ denied = request & ~fctx->allow; - if (unconfined(label) || unconfined(flabel) || - (!denied && aa_label_is_subset(flabel, label))) { + if (unconfined(label) || __file_is_delegated(flabel) || + __unix_needs_revalidation(file, label, request) || + (!denied && __aa_subj_label_is_cached(label, flabel))) { rcu_read_unlock(); goto done; } + /* slow path - revalidate access */ flabel = aa_get_newest_label(flabel); rcu_read_unlock(); - /* TODO: label cross check */ - if (file->f_path.mnt && path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry)) + if (path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry)) error = __file_path_perm(op, subj_cred, label, flabel, file, request, denied, in_atomic); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/af_unix.h b/security/apparmor/include/af_unix.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4a62e600d82b --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/af_unix.h @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor af_unix fine grained mediation + * + * Copyright 2023 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ +#ifndef __AA_AF_UNIX_H + +#include <net/af_unix.h> + +#include "label.h" + +#define unix_addr(A) ((struct sockaddr_un *)(A)) +#define unix_addr_len(L) ((L) - sizeof(sa_family_t)) +#define unix_peer(sk) (unix_sk(sk)->peer) +#define is_unix_addr_abstract_name(B) ((B)[0] == 0) +#define is_unix_addr_anon(A, L) ((A) && unix_addr_len(L) <= 0) +#define is_unix_addr_fs(A, L) (!is_unix_addr_anon(A, L) && \ + !is_unix_addr_abstract_name(unix_addr(A)->sun_path)) + +#define is_unix_anonymous(U) (!unix_sk(U)->addr) +#define is_unix_fs(U) (!is_unix_anonymous(U) && \ + unix_sk(U)->addr->name->sun_path[0]) +#define is_unix_connected(S) ((S)->state == SS_CONNECTED) + + +struct sockaddr_un *aa_sunaddr(const struct unix_sock *u, int *addrlen); +int aa_unix_peer_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, + struct sock *sk, struct sock *peer_sk, + struct aa_label *peer_label); +int aa_unix_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock); +int aa_unix_create_perm(struct aa_label *label, int family, int type, + int protocol); +int aa_unix_bind_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, + int addrlen); +int aa_unix_connect_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, + int addrlen); +int aa_unix_listen_perm(struct socket *sock, int backlog); +int aa_unix_accept_perm(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock); +int aa_unix_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, + struct msghdr *msg, int size); +int aa_unix_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, int level, + int optname); +int aa_unix_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, + const char *op, u32 request, struct file *file); + +#endif /* __AA_AF_UNIX_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h index f83934913b0f..cc6e3df1bc62 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL 10 #define AA_CLASS_XMATCH 11 #define AA_CLASS_NET 14 +#define AA_CLASS_NETV9 15 #define AA_CLASS_LABEL 16 #define AA_CLASS_POSIX_MQUEUE 17 #define AA_CLASS_MODULE 19 @@ -38,12 +39,13 @@ #define AA_CLASS_X 31 #define AA_CLASS_DBUS 32 +/* NOTE: if AA_CLASS_LAST > 63 need to update label->mediates */ #define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_DBUS /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */ extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; extern bool aa_g_audit_header; -extern bool aa_g_debug; +extern int aa_g_debug; extern bool aa_g_hash_policy; extern bool aa_g_export_binary; extern int aa_g_rawdata_compression_level; diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h index 1e94904f68d9..dd580594dfb7 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h @@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ enum aafs_prof_type { #define prof_dir(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_PROF_DIR]) #define prof_child_dir(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_PROF_PROFS]) +int aa_create_aafs(void); + void __aa_bump_ns_revision(struct aa_ns *ns); void __aafs_profile_rmdir(struct aa_profile *profile); void __aafs_profile_migrate_dents(struct aa_profile *old, diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index e27229349abb..1a71a94ea19c 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -138,9 +138,12 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data { }; struct { int type, protocol; - struct sock *peer_sk; void *addr; int addrlen; + struct { + void *addr; + int addrlen; + } peer; } net; }; }; diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h index d6dcc604ec0c..1ddcec2d1160 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ struct aa_caps { extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[]; +kernel_cap_t aa_profile_capget(struct aa_profile *profile); int aa_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h index 7265d2f81dd5..b028e4c13b6f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h @@ -114,10 +114,22 @@ static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_current_label(void) return aa_get_label(l); } -#define __end_current_label_crit_section(X) end_current_label_crit_section(X) +/** + * __end_current_label_crit_section - end crit section begun with __begin_... + * @label: label obtained from __begin_current_label_crit_section + * @needput: output: bool set by __begin_current_label_crit_section + * + * Returns: label to use for this crit section + */ +static inline void __end_current_label_crit_section(struct aa_label *label, + bool needput) +{ + if (unlikely(needput)) + aa_put_label(label); +} /** - * end_label_crit_section - put a reference found with begin_current_label.. + * end_current_label_crit_section - put a reference found with begin_current_label.. * @label: label reference to put * * Should only be used with a reference obtained with @@ -132,6 +144,7 @@ static inline void end_current_label_crit_section(struct aa_label *label) /** * __begin_current_label_crit_section - current's confining label + * @needput: store whether the label needs to be put when ending crit section * * Returns: up to date confining label or the ns unconfined label (NOT NULL) * @@ -142,13 +155,16 @@ static inline void end_current_label_crit_section(struct aa_label *label) * critical section between __begin_current_label_crit_section() .. * __end_current_label_crit_section() */ -static inline struct aa_label *__begin_current_label_crit_section(void) +static inline struct aa_label *__begin_current_label_crit_section(bool *needput) { struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label(); - if (label_is_stale(label)) - label = aa_get_newest_label(label); + if (label_is_stale(label)) { + *needput = true; + return aa_get_newest_label(label); + } + *needput = false; return label; } @@ -184,10 +200,11 @@ static inline struct aa_ns *aa_get_current_ns(void) { struct aa_label *label; struct aa_ns *ns; + bool needput; - label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); ns = aa_get_ns(labels_ns(label)); - __end_current_label_crit_section(label); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); return ns; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/crypto.h b/security/apparmor/include/crypto.h index 636a04e20d91..f3ffd388cc58 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/crypto.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/crypto.h @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include "policy.h" #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH +int init_profile_hash(void); unsigned int aa_hash_size(void); char *aa_calc_hash(void *data, size_t len); int aa_calc_profile_hash(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 version, void *start, diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h index 6e8f2aa66cd6..ef60f99bc5ae 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h @@ -77,12 +77,17 @@ int aa_audit_file(const struct cred *cred, const char *target, struct aa_label *tlabel, kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error); -struct aa_perms *aa_lookup_fperms(struct aa_policydb *file_rules, - aa_state_t state, struct path_cond *cond); +struct aa_perms *aa_lookup_condperms(kuid_t subj_uid, + struct aa_policydb *file_rules, + aa_state_t state, struct path_cond *cond); aa_state_t aa_str_perms(struct aa_policydb *file_rules, aa_state_t start, const char *name, struct path_cond *cond, struct aa_perms *perms); +int __aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, const char *name, + u32 request, struct path_cond *cond, int flags, + struct aa_perms *perms); int aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, int flags, u32 request, struct path_cond *cond); @@ -99,7 +104,7 @@ void aa_inherit_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files); /** - * aa_map_file_perms - map file flags to AppArmor permissions + * aa_map_file_to_perms - map file flags to AppArmor permissions * @file: open file to map flags to AppArmor permissions * * Returns: apparmor permission set for the file diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h index 74d17052f76b..323dd071afe9 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h @@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> +#define SIGUNKNOWN 0 +#define MAXMAPPED_SIG 35 + int aa_may_signal(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *sender, const struct cred *target_cred, struct aa_label *target, int sig); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/label.h b/security/apparmor/include/label.h index 93290ae300bb..c0812dbc1b5b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/label.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/label.h @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include "lib.h" struct aa_ns; +struct aa_ruleset; #define LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES 8 #define DEFINE_VEC(T, V) \ @@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ struct label_it { int i, j; }; -/* struct aa_label - lazy labeling struct +/* struct aa_label_base - base info of label * @count: ref count of active users * @node: rbtree position * @rcu: rcu callback struct @@ -118,7 +119,10 @@ struct label_it { * @flags: stale and other flags - values may change under label set lock * @secid: secid that references this label * @size: number of entries in @ent[] - * @ent: set of profiles for label, actual size determined by @size + * @mediates: bitmask for label_mediates + * profile: label vec when embedded in a profile FLAG_PROFILE is set + * rules: variable length rules in a profile FLAG_PROFILE is set + * vec: vector of profiles comprising the compound label */ struct aa_label { struct kref count; @@ -129,7 +133,18 @@ struct aa_label { long flags; u32 secid; int size; - struct aa_profile *vec[]; + u64 mediates; + union { + struct { + /* only used is the label is a profile, size of + * rules[] is determined by the profile + * profile[1] is poison or null as guard + */ + struct aa_profile *profile[2]; + DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(struct aa_ruleset *, rules); + }; + DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(struct aa_profile *, vec); + }; }; #define last_error(E, FN) \ @@ -231,20 +246,17 @@ int aa_label_next_confined(struct aa_label *l, int i); #define fn_for_each_not_in_set(L1, L2, P, FN) \ fn_for_each2_XXX((L1), (L2), P, FN, _not_in_set) -#define LABEL_MEDIATES(L, C) \ -({ \ - struct aa_profile *profile; \ - struct label_it i; \ - int ret = 0; \ - label_for_each(i, (L), profile) { \ - if (RULE_MEDIATES(&profile->rules, (C))) { \ - ret = 1; \ - break; \ - } \ - } \ - ret; \ -}) +static inline bool label_mediates(struct aa_label *L, unsigned char C) +{ + return (L)->mediates & (((u64) 1) << (C)); +} +static inline bool label_mediates_safe(struct aa_label *L, unsigned char C) +{ + if (C > AA_CLASS_LAST) + return false; + return label_mediates(L, C); +} void aa_labelset_destroy(struct aa_labelset *ls); void aa_labelset_init(struct aa_labelset *ls); @@ -417,6 +429,13 @@ static inline void aa_put_label(struct aa_label *l) kref_put(&l->count, aa_label_kref); } +/* wrapper fn to indicate semantics of the check */ +static inline bool __aa_subj_label_is_cached(struct aa_label *subj_label, + struct aa_label *obj_label) +{ + return aa_label_is_subset(obj_label, subj_label); +} + struct aa_proxy *aa_alloc_proxy(struct aa_label *l, gfp_t gfp); void aa_proxy_kref(struct kref *kref); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h index f11a0db7f51d..444197075fd6 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h @@ -19,22 +19,34 @@ extern struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa; /* - * DEBUG remains global (no per profile flag) since it is mostly used in sysctl - * which is not related to profile accesses. - */ - -#define DEBUG_ON (aa_g_debug) -/* * split individual debug cases out in preparation for finer grained * debug controls in the future. */ -#define AA_DEBUG_LABEL DEBUG_ON #define dbg_printk(__fmt, __args...) pr_debug(__fmt, ##__args) -#define AA_DEBUG(fmt, args...) \ + +#define DEBUG_NONE 0 +#define DEBUG_LABEL_ABS_ROOT 1 +#define DEBUG_LABEL 2 +#define DEBUG_DOMAIN 4 +#define DEBUG_POLICY 8 +#define DEBUG_INTERFACE 0x10 + +#define DEBUG_ALL 0x1f /* update if new DEBUG_X added */ +#define DEBUG_PARSE_ERROR (-1) + +#define DEBUG_ON (aa_g_debug != DEBUG_NONE) +#define DEBUG_ABS_ROOT (aa_g_debug & DEBUG_LABEL_ABS_ROOT) + +#define AA_DEBUG(opt, fmt, args...) \ do { \ - if (DEBUG_ON) \ - pr_debug_ratelimited("AppArmor: " fmt, ##args); \ + if (aa_g_debug & opt) \ + pr_warn_ratelimited("%s: " fmt, __func__, ##args); \ } while (0) +#define AA_DEBUG_LABEL(LAB, X, fmt, args...) \ +do { \ + if ((LAB)->flags & FLAG_DEBUG1) \ + AA_DEBUG(X, fmt, args); \ +} while (0) #define AA_WARN(X) WARN((X), "APPARMOR WARN %s: %s\n", __func__, #X) @@ -48,9 +60,16 @@ extern struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa; #define AA_BUG_FMT(X, fmt, args...) \ WARN((X), "AppArmor WARN %s: (" #X "): " fmt, __func__, ##args) #else -#define AA_BUG_FMT(X, fmt, args...) no_printk(fmt, ##args) +#define AA_BUG_FMT(X, fmt, args...) \ + do { \ + BUILD_BUG_ON_INVALID(X); \ + no_printk(fmt, ##args); \ + } while (0) #endif +int aa_parse_debug_params(const char *str); +int aa_print_debug_params(char *buffer); + #define AA_ERROR(fmt, args...) \ pr_err_ratelimited("AppArmor: " fmt, ##args) @@ -106,6 +125,7 @@ struct aa_str_table { }; void aa_free_str_table(struct aa_str_table *table); +bool aa_resize_str_table(struct aa_str_table *t, int newsize, gfp_t gfp); struct counted_str { struct kref count; @@ -151,7 +171,7 @@ struct aa_policy { /** * basename - find the last component of an hname - * @name: hname to find the base profile name component of (NOT NULL) + * @hname: hname to find the base profile name component of (NOT NULL) * * Returns: the tail (base profile name) name component of an hname */ @@ -281,7 +301,7 @@ __do_cleanup: \ } \ __done: \ if (!__new_) \ - AA_DEBUG("label build failed\n"); \ + AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_LABEL, "label build failed\n"); \ (__new_); \ }) diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h index 536ce3abd598..1fbe82f5021b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ #define DFA_START 1 -/** +/* * The format used for transition tables is based on the GNU flex table * file format (--tables-file option; see Table File Format in the flex * info pages and the flex sources for documentation). The magic number @@ -137,17 +137,15 @@ aa_state_t aa_dfa_matchn_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t start, void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref); -#define WB_HISTORY_SIZE 24 +/* This needs to be a power of 2 */ +#define WB_HISTORY_SIZE 32 struct match_workbuf { - unsigned int count; unsigned int pos; unsigned int len; - unsigned int size; /* power of 2, same as history size */ - unsigned int history[WB_HISTORY_SIZE]; + aa_state_t history[WB_HISTORY_SIZE]; }; #define DEFINE_MATCH_WB(N) \ struct match_workbuf N = { \ - .count = 0, \ .pos = 0, \ .len = 0, \ } diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h index c42ed8a73f1c..0d0b0ce42723 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h @@ -47,8 +47,9 @@ #define NET_PEER_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CONNECT | \ AA_MAY_ACCEPT) struct aa_sk_ctx { - struct aa_label *label; - struct aa_label *peer; + struct aa_label __rcu *label; + struct aa_label __rcu *peer; + struct aa_label __rcu *peer_lastupdate; /* ptr cmp only, no deref */ }; static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk) @@ -56,7 +57,7 @@ static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk) return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock; } -#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \ +#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, CRED, SK, F, T, P) \ struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \ .family = (F)}; \ DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME, \ @@ -65,24 +66,15 @@ static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk) AA_CLASS_NET, \ OP); \ NAME.common.u.net = &(NAME ## _net); \ + NAME.subj_cred = (CRED); \ NAME.net.type = (T); \ NAME.net.protocol = (P) -#define DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(NAME, OP, SK) \ - DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type, \ +#define DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(NAME, OP, CRED, SK) \ + DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, CRED, SK, (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type, \ (SK)->sk_protocol) -#define af_select(FAMILY, FN, DEF_FN) \ -({ \ - int __e; \ - switch ((FAMILY)) { \ - default: \ - __e = DEF_FN; \ - } \ - __e; \ -}) - struct aa_secmark { u8 audit; u8 deny; @@ -91,11 +83,19 @@ struct aa_secmark { }; extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[]; - +extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_networkv9[]; + +int aa_do_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_policydb *policy, + aa_state_t state, u32 request, struct aa_perms *p, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad); +/* passing in state returned by XXX_mediates_AF() */ +aa_state_t aa_match_to_prot(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t state, + u32 request, u16 af, int type, int protocol, + struct aa_perms **p, const char **info); void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va); int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, - u32 request, u16 family, int type); + u32 request, u16 family, int type, int protocol); int aa_af_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, int type, int protocol); @@ -105,13 +105,13 @@ static inline int aa_profile_af_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct sock *sk) { return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, ad, request, sk->sk_family, - sk->sk_type); + sk->sk_type, sk->sk_protocol); } int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk); int aa_sock_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, - struct socket *sock); + struct file *file); int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request, u32 secid, const struct sock *sk); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/path.h b/security/apparmor/include/path.h index 343189903dba..8bb915d48dc7 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/path.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/path.h @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ enum path_flags { PATH_IS_DIR = 0x1, /* path is a directory */ + PATH_SOCK_COND = 0x2, PATH_CONNECT_PATH = 0x4, /* connect disconnected paths to / */ PATH_CHROOT_REL = 0x8, /* do path lookup relative to chroot */ PATH_CHROOT_NSCONNECT = 0x10, /* connect paths that are at ns root */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h index bbaa7d39a39a..37a3781b99a0 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h @@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ extern struct aa_perms allperms; /** * aa_perms_accum_raw - accumulate perms with out masking off overlapping perms - * @accum - perms struct to accumulate into - * @addend - perms struct to add to @accum + * @accum: perms struct to accumulate into + * @addend: perms struct to add to @accum */ static inline void aa_perms_accum_raw(struct aa_perms *accum, struct aa_perms *addend) @@ -128,8 +128,8 @@ static inline void aa_perms_accum_raw(struct aa_perms *accum, /** * aa_perms_accum - accumulate perms, masking off overlapping perms - * @accum - perms struct to accumulate into - * @addend - perms struct to add to @accum + * @accum: perms struct to accumulate into + * @addend: perms struct to add to @accum */ static inline void aa_perms_accum(struct aa_perms *accum, struct aa_perms *addend) diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h index 757e3c232c57..4c50875c9d13 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h @@ -59,6 +59,11 @@ extern const char *const aa_profile_mode_names[]; #define on_list_rcu(X) (!list_empty(X) && (X)->prev != LIST_POISON2) +/* flags in the dfa accept2 table */ +enum dfa_accept_flags { + ACCEPT_FLAG_OWNER = 1, +}; + /* * FIXME: currently need a clean way to replace and remove profiles as a * set. It should be done at the namespace level. @@ -124,6 +129,7 @@ static inline void aa_put_pdb(struct aa_policydb *pdb) kref_put(&pdb->count, aa_pdb_free_kref); } +/* lookup perm that doesn't have and object conditional */ static inline struct aa_perms *aa_lookup_perms(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t state) { @@ -135,7 +141,6 @@ static inline struct aa_perms *aa_lookup_perms(struct aa_policydb *policy, return &(policy->perms[index]); } - /* struct aa_data - generic data structure * key: name for retrieving this data * size: size of data in bytes @@ -160,8 +165,6 @@ struct aa_data { * @secmark: secmark label match info */ struct aa_ruleset { - struct list_head list; - int size; /* TODO: merge policy and file */ @@ -175,6 +178,7 @@ struct aa_ruleset { struct aa_secmark *secmark; }; + /* struct aa_attachment - data and rules for a profiles attachment * @list: * @xmatch_str: human readable attachment string @@ -193,7 +197,6 @@ struct aa_attachment { /* struct aa_profile - basic confinement data * @base - base components of the profile (name, refcount, lists, lock ...) - * @label - label this profile is an extension of * @parent: parent of profile * @ns: namespace the profile is in * @rename: optional profile name that this profile renamed @@ -201,13 +204,20 @@ struct aa_attachment { * @audit: the auditing mode of the profile * @mode: the enforcement mode of the profile * @path_flags: flags controlling path generation behavior + * @signal: the signal that should be used when kill is used * @disconnected: what to prepend if attach_disconnected is specified * @attach: attachment rules for the profile * @rules: rules to be enforced * + * learning_cache: the accesses learned in complain mode + * raw_data: rawdata of the loaded profile policy + * hash: cryptographic hash of the profile * @dents: dentries for the profiles file entries in apparmorfs * @dirname: name of the profile dir in apparmorfs + * @dents: set of dentries associated with the profile * @data: hashtable for free-form policy aa_data + * @label - label this profile is an extension of + * @rules - label with the rule vec on its end * * The AppArmor profile contains the basic confinement data. Each profile * has a name, and exists in a namespace. The @name and @exec_match are @@ -231,16 +241,19 @@ struct aa_profile { enum audit_mode audit; long mode; u32 path_flags; + int signal; const char *disconnected; struct aa_attachment attach; - struct list_head rules; struct aa_loaddata *rawdata; unsigned char *hash; char *dirname; struct dentry *dents[AAFS_PROF_SIZEOF]; struct rhashtable *data; + + int n_rules; + /* special - variable length must be last entry in profile */ struct aa_label label; }; @@ -298,24 +311,38 @@ static inline aa_state_t RULE_MEDIATES(struct aa_ruleset *rules, rules->policy->start[0], &class, 1); } -static inline aa_state_t RULE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_ruleset *rules, u16 AF) +static inline aa_state_t RULE_MEDIATES_v9NET(struct aa_ruleset *rules) { - aa_state_t state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_NET); - __be16 be_af = cpu_to_be16(AF); + return RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_NETV9); +} + +static inline aa_state_t RULE_MEDIATES_NET(struct aa_ruleset *rules) +{ + /* can not use RULE_MEDIATE_v9AF here, because AF match fail + * can not be distiguished from class match fail, and we only + * fallback to checking older class on class match failure + */ + aa_state_t state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_NETV9); + /* fallback and check v7/8 if v9 is NOT mediated */ if (!state) - return DFA_NOMATCH; - return aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state, (char *) &be_af, 2); + state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_NET); + + return state; } -static inline aa_state_t ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(struct list_head *head, - unsigned char class) + +void aa_compute_profile_mediates(struct aa_profile *profile); +static inline bool profile_mediates(struct aa_profile *profile, + unsigned char class) { - struct aa_ruleset *rule; + return label_mediates(&profile->label, class); +} - /* TODO: change to list walk */ - rule = list_first_entry(head, typeof(*rule), list); - return RULE_MEDIATES(rule, class); +static inline bool profile_mediates_safe(struct aa_profile *profile, + unsigned char class) +{ + return label_mediates_safe(&profile->label, class); } /** diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h b/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h index cbf7a997ed84..c772668cdc62 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h @@ -1,9 +1,5 @@ #include <linux/signal.h> - -#define SIGUNKNOWN 0 -#define MAXMAPPED_SIG 35 -#define MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME (MAXMAPPED_SIG + 1) -#define SIGRT_BASE 128 +#include "signal.h" /* provide a mapping of arch signal to internal signal # for mediation * those that are always an alias SIGCLD for SIGCLHD and SIGPOLL for SIGIO diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/signal.h b/security/apparmor/include/signal.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..729763fa7ce6 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/signal.h @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation function definitions. + * + * Copyright 2023 Canonical Ltd. + */ + +#ifndef __AA_SIGNAL_H +#define __AA_SIGNAL_H + +#define SIGUNKNOWN 0 +#define MAXMAPPED_SIG 35 + +#define MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME (MAXMAPPED_SIG + 1) +#define SIGRT_BASE 128 + +#endif /* __AA_SIGNAL_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c index 0cdf4340b02d..df5712cea685 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c @@ -80,21 +80,20 @@ static int profile_signal_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct aa_label *peer, u32 request, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; struct aa_perms perms; aa_state_t state; - if (profile_unconfined(profile) || - !ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(&profile->rules, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL)) + if (profile_unconfined(profile)) return 0; ad->subj_cred = cred; ad->peer = peer; /* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */ - state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa, - rules->policy->start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL], - ad->signal); + state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL); + if (!state) + return 0; + state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa, state, ad->signal); aa_label_match(profile, rules, peer, state, false, request, &perms); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_signal_cb); diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c index 91483ecacc16..913678f199c3 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/label.c +++ b/security/apparmor/label.c @@ -198,21 +198,25 @@ static bool vec_is_stale(struct aa_profile **vec, int n) return false; } -static long accum_vec_flags(struct aa_profile **vec, int n) +static void accum_label_info(struct aa_label *new) { long u = FLAG_UNCONFINED; int i; - AA_BUG(!vec); + AA_BUG(!new); - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - u |= vec[i]->label.flags & (FLAG_DEBUG1 | FLAG_DEBUG2 | - FLAG_STALE); - if (!(u & vec[i]->label.flags & FLAG_UNCONFINED)) + /* size == 1 is a profile and flags must be set as part of creation */ + if (new->size == 1) + return; + + for (i = 0; i < new->size; i++) { + u |= new->vec[i]->label.flags & (FLAG_DEBUG1 | FLAG_DEBUG2 | + FLAG_STALE); + if (!(u & new->vec[i]->label.flags & FLAG_UNCONFINED)) u &= ~FLAG_UNCONFINED; + new->mediates |= new->vec[i]->label.mediates; } - - return u; + new->flags |= u; } static int sort_cmp(const void *a, const void *b) @@ -431,7 +435,7 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_alloc(int size, struct aa_proxy *proxy, gfp_t gfp) /* + 1 for null terminator entry on vec */ new = kzalloc(struct_size(new, vec, size + 1), gfp); - AA_DEBUG("%s (%p)\n", __func__, new); + AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_LABEL, "%s (%p)\n", __func__, new); if (!new) goto fail; @@ -645,6 +649,7 @@ static bool __label_replace(struct aa_label *old, struct aa_label *new) rb_replace_node(&old->node, &new->node, &ls->root); old->flags &= ~FLAG_IN_TREE; new->flags |= FLAG_IN_TREE; + accum_label_info(new); return true; } @@ -705,6 +710,7 @@ static struct aa_label *__label_insert(struct aa_labelset *ls, rb_link_node(&label->node, parent, new); rb_insert_color(&label->node, &ls->root); label->flags |= FLAG_IN_TREE; + accum_label_info(label); return aa_get_label(label); } @@ -1085,7 +1091,6 @@ static struct aa_label *label_merge_insert(struct aa_label *new, else if (k == b->size) return aa_get_label(b); } - new->flags |= accum_vec_flags(new->vec, new->size); ls = labels_set(new); write_lock_irqsave(&ls->lock, flags); label = __label_insert(labels_set(new), new, false); @@ -1456,7 +1461,7 @@ bool aa_update_label_name(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp) /* * cached label name is present and visible - * @label->hname only exists if label is namespace hierachical + * @label->hname only exists if label is namespace hierarchical */ static inline bool use_label_hname(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, int flags) @@ -1617,7 +1622,7 @@ int aa_label_snxprint(char *str, size_t size, struct aa_ns *ns, AA_BUG(!str && size != 0); AA_BUG(!label); - if (AA_DEBUG_LABEL && (flags & FLAG_ABS_ROOT)) { + if (DEBUG_ABS_ROOT && (flags & FLAG_ABS_ROOT)) { ns = root_ns; len = snprintf(str, size, "_"); update_for_len(total, len, size, str); @@ -1731,7 +1736,7 @@ void aa_label_xaudit(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct aa_ns *ns, display_mode(ns, label, flags)) { len = aa_label_asxprint(&name, ns, label, flags, gfp); if (len < 0) { - AA_DEBUG("label print error"); + AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_LABEL, "label print error"); return; } str = name; @@ -1759,7 +1764,7 @@ void aa_label_seq_xprint(struct seq_file *f, struct aa_ns *ns, len = aa_label_asxprint(&str, ns, label, flags, gfp); if (len < 0) { - AA_DEBUG("label print error"); + AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_LABEL, "label print error"); return; } seq_puts(f, str); @@ -1782,7 +1787,7 @@ void aa_label_xprintk(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, int flags, len = aa_label_asxprint(&str, ns, label, flags, gfp); if (len < 0) { - AA_DEBUG("label print error"); + AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_LABEL, "label print error"); return; } pr_info("%s", str); @@ -1865,7 +1870,7 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_strn_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str, AA_BUG(!str); str = skipn_spaces(str, n); - if (str == NULL || (AA_DEBUG_LABEL && *str == '_' && + if (str == NULL || (DEBUG_ABS_ROOT && *str == '_' && base != &root_ns->unconfined->label)) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c index 7db62213e352..82dbb97ad406 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lib.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c @@ -25,6 +25,120 @@ struct aa_perms allperms = { .allow = ALL_PERMS_MASK, .quiet = ALL_PERMS_MASK, .hide = ALL_PERMS_MASK }; +struct val_table_ent { + const char *str; + int value; +}; + +static struct val_table_ent debug_values_table[] = { + { "N", DEBUG_NONE }, + { "none", DEBUG_NONE }, + { "n", DEBUG_NONE }, + { "0", DEBUG_NONE }, + { "all", DEBUG_ALL }, + { "Y", DEBUG_ALL }, + { "y", DEBUG_ALL }, + { "1", DEBUG_ALL }, + { "abs_root", DEBUG_LABEL_ABS_ROOT }, + { "label", DEBUG_LABEL }, + { "domain", DEBUG_DOMAIN }, + { "policy", DEBUG_POLICY }, + { "interface", DEBUG_INTERFACE }, + { NULL, 0 } +}; + +static struct val_table_ent *val_table_find_ent(struct val_table_ent *table, + const char *name, size_t len) +{ + struct val_table_ent *entry; + + for (entry = table; entry->str != NULL; entry++) { + if (strncmp(entry->str, name, len) == 0 && + strlen(entry->str) == len) + return entry; + } + return NULL; +} + +int aa_parse_debug_params(const char *str) +{ + struct val_table_ent *ent; + const char *next; + int val = 0; + + do { + size_t n = strcspn(str, "\r\n,"); + + next = str + n; + ent = val_table_find_ent(debug_values_table, str, next - str); + if (ent) + val |= ent->value; + else + AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_INTERFACE, "unknown debug type '%.*s'", + (int)(next - str), str); + str = next + 1; + } while (*next != 0); + return val; +} + +/** + * val_mask_to_str - convert a perm mask to its short string + * @str: character buffer to store string in (at least 10 characters) + * @size: size of the @str buffer + * @table: NUL-terminated character buffer of permission characters (NOT NULL) + * @mask: permission mask to convert + */ +static int val_mask_to_str(char *str, size_t size, + const struct val_table_ent *table, u32 mask) +{ + const struct val_table_ent *ent; + int total = 0; + + for (ent = table; ent->str; ent++) { + if (ent->value && (ent->value & mask) == ent->value) { + int len = scnprintf(str, size, "%s%s", total ? "," : "", + ent->str); + size -= len; + str += len; + total += len; + mask &= ~ent->value; + } + } + + return total; +} + +int aa_print_debug_params(char *buffer) +{ + if (!aa_g_debug) + return sprintf(buffer, "N"); + return val_mask_to_str(buffer, PAGE_SIZE, debug_values_table, + aa_g_debug); +} + +bool aa_resize_str_table(struct aa_str_table *t, int newsize, gfp_t gfp) +{ + char **n; + int i; + + if (t->size == newsize) + return true; + n = kcalloc(newsize, sizeof(*n), gfp); + if (!n) + return false; + for (i = 0; i < min(t->size, newsize); i++) + n[i] = t->table[i]; + for (; i < t->size; i++) + kfree_sensitive(t->table[i]); + if (newsize > t->size) + memset(&n[t->size], 0, (newsize-t->size)*sizeof(*n)); + kfree_sensitive(t->table); + t->table = n; + t->size = newsize; + + return true; +} + /** * aa_free_str_table - free entries str table * @t: the string table to free (MAYBE NULL) diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 9b6c2f157f83..a87cd60ed206 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -26,11 +26,13 @@ #include <uapi/linux/mount.h> #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h> +#include "include/af_unix.h" #include "include/apparmor.h" #include "include/apparmorfs.h" #include "include/audit.h" #include "include/capability.h" #include "include/cred.h" +#include "include/crypto.h" #include "include/file.h" #include "include/ipc.h" #include "include/net.h" @@ -111,7 +113,7 @@ static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task) } static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, - unsigned long clone_flags) + u64 clone_flags) { struct aa_task_ctx *new = task_ctx(task); @@ -126,14 +128,15 @@ static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee; const struct cred *cred; int error; + bool needput; cred = get_task_cred(child); tracee = cred_label(cred); /* ref count on cred */ - tracer = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + tracer = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); error = aa_may_ptrace(current_cred(), tracer, cred, tracee, (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ : AA_PTRACE_TRACE); - __end_current_label_crit_section(tracer); + __end_current_label_crit_section(tracer, needput); put_cred(cred); return error; @@ -144,14 +147,15 @@ static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee; const struct cred *cred; int error; + bool needput; - tracee = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + tracee = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); cred = get_task_cred(parent); tracer = cred_label(cred); /* ref count on cred */ error = aa_may_ptrace(cred, tracer, current_cred(), tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE); put_cred(cred); - __end_current_label_crit_section(tracee); + __end_current_label_crit_section(tracee, needput); return error; } @@ -176,15 +180,11 @@ static int apparmor_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effec struct label_it i; label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules; - if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) - continue; - rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); - *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, - rules->caps.allow); - *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, - rules->caps.allow); + kernel_cap_t allowed; + + allowed = aa_profile_capget(profile); + *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, allowed); + *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, allowed); } } rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -221,12 +221,13 @@ static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask, { struct aa_label *label; int error = 0; + bool needput; - label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); if (!unconfined(label)) error = aa_path_perm(op, current_cred(), label, path, 0, mask, cond); - __end_current_label_crit_section(label); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); return error; } @@ -524,14 +525,15 @@ static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask, { struct aa_label *label; int error = 0; + bool needput; /* don't reaudit files closed during inheritance */ - if (file->f_path.dentry == aa_null.dentry) + if (unlikely(file->f_path.dentry == aa_null.dentry)) return -EACCES; - label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); error = aa_file_perm(op, current_cred(), label, file, mask, in_atomic); - __end_current_label_crit_section(label); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); return error; } @@ -633,7 +635,7 @@ static int profile_uring(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, AA_BUG(!profile); - rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); + rules = profile->label.rules[0]; state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_IO_URING); if (state) { struct aa_perms perms = { }; @@ -664,15 +666,16 @@ static int apparmor_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new) struct aa_profile *profile; struct aa_label *label; int error; + bool needput; DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_IO_URING, OP_URING_OVERRIDE); ad.uring.target = cred_label(new); - label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); error = fn_for_each(label, profile, profile_uring(profile, AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED, cred_label(new), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &ad)); - __end_current_label_crit_section(label); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); return error; } @@ -688,14 +691,15 @@ static int apparmor_uring_sqpoll(void) struct aa_profile *profile; struct aa_label *label; int error; + bool needput; DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_IO_URING, OP_URING_SQPOLL); - label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); error = fn_for_each(label, profile, profile_uring(profile, AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL, NULL, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &ad)); - __end_current_label_crit_section(label); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); return error; } @@ -706,6 +710,7 @@ static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, { struct aa_label *label; int error = 0; + bool needput; /* Discard magic */ if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL) @@ -713,7 +718,7 @@ static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK; - label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); if (!unconfined(label)) { if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) error = aa_remount(current_cred(), label, path, flags, @@ -732,7 +737,7 @@ static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, error = aa_new_mount(current_cred(), label, dev_name, path, type, flags, data); } - __end_current_label_crit_section(label); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); return error; } @@ -742,12 +747,13 @@ static int apparmor_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, { struct aa_label *label; int error = 0; + bool needput; - label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); if (!unconfined(label)) error = aa_move_mount(current_cred(), label, from_path, to_path); - __end_current_label_crit_section(label); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); return error; } @@ -756,11 +762,12 @@ static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) { struct aa_label *label; int error = 0; + bool needput; - label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); if (!unconfined(label)) error = aa_umount(current_cred(), label, mnt, flags); - __end_current_label_crit_section(label); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); return error; } @@ -984,10 +991,12 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm) static void apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop) { - struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + struct aa_label *label; + bool needput; + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); prop->apparmor.label = label; - __end_current_label_crit_section(label); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); } static void apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, @@ -1002,13 +1011,16 @@ static void apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) { - struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + struct aa_label *label; int error = 0; + bool needput; + + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); if (!unconfined(label)) error = aa_task_setrlimit(current_cred(), label, task, resource, new_rlim); - __end_current_label_crit_section(label); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); return error; } @@ -1019,6 +1031,7 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo const struct cred *tc; struct aa_label *cl, *tl; int error; + bool needput; tc = get_task_cred(target); tl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(tc); @@ -1030,9 +1043,9 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo error = aa_may_signal(cred, cl, tc, tl, sig); aa_put_label(cl); } else { - cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); error = aa_may_signal(current_cred(), cl, tc, tl, sig); - __end_current_label_crit_section(cl); + __end_current_label_crit_section(cl, needput); } aa_put_label(tl); put_cred(tc); @@ -1061,12 +1074,29 @@ static int apparmor_userns_create(const struct cred *cred) return error; } +static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp) +{ + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); + struct aa_label *label; + bool needput; + + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); + //spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock); + rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label)); + rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer, NULL); + rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate, NULL); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); + return 0; +} + static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) { struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); - aa_put_label(ctx->label); - aa_put_label(ctx->peer); + /* dead these won't be updated any more */ + aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->label, true)); + aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->peer, true)); + aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->peer_lastupdate, true)); } /** @@ -1080,13 +1110,153 @@ static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk); - if (new->label) - aa_put_label(new->label); - new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label); + /* not actually in use yet */ + if (rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label) != rcu_access_pointer(new->label)) { + aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(new->label, true)); + rcu_assign_pointer(new->label, aa_get_label_rcu(&ctx->label)); + } - if (new->peer) - aa_put_label(new->peer); - new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer); + if (rcu_access_pointer(ctx->peer) != rcu_access_pointer(new->peer)) { + aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(new->peer, true)); + rcu_assign_pointer(new->peer, aa_get_label_rcu(&ctx->peer)); + } + + if (rcu_access_pointer(ctx->peer_lastupdate) != rcu_access_pointer(new->peer_lastupdate)) { + aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(new->peer_lastupdate, true)); + rcu_assign_pointer(new->peer_lastupdate, + aa_get_label_rcu(&ctx->peer_lastupdate)); + } +} + +static int unix_connect_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct aa_label *label, + struct sock *sk, struct sock *peer_sk) +{ + struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx = aa_sock(peer_sk); + int error; + + error = aa_unix_peer_perm(cred, label, OP_CONNECT, + (AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE), + sk, peer_sk, + rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label, + lockdep_is_held(&unix_sk(peer_sk)->lock))); + if (!is_unix_fs(peer_sk)) { + last_error(error, + aa_unix_peer_perm(cred, + rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label, + lockdep_is_held(&unix_sk(peer_sk)->lock)), + OP_CONNECT, + (AA_MAY_ACCEPT | AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE), + peer_sk, sk, label)); + } + + return error; +} + +/* lockdep check in unix_connect_perm - push sks here to check */ +static void unix_connect_peers(struct aa_sk_ctx *sk_ctx, + struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx) +{ + /* Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC */ + struct aa_label *label = rcu_dereference_protected(sk_ctx->label, true); + + aa_get_label(label); + aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->peer, + true)); + rcu_assign_pointer(peer_ctx->peer, label); /* transfer cnt */ + + label = aa_get_label(rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label, + true)); + //spin_unlock(&peer_ctx->lock); + + //spin_lock(&sk_ctx->lock); + aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(sk_ctx->peer, + true)); + aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(sk_ctx->peer_lastupdate, + true)); + + rcu_assign_pointer(sk_ctx->peer, aa_get_label(label)); + rcu_assign_pointer(sk_ctx->peer_lastupdate, label); /* transfer cnt */ + //spin_unlock(&sk_ctx->lock); +} + +/** + * apparmor_unix_stream_connect - check perms before making unix domain conn + * @sk: sk attempting to connect + * @peer_sk: sk that is accepting the connection + * @newsk: new sk created for this connection + * peer is locked when this hook is called + * + * Return: + * 0 if connection is permitted + * error code on denial or failure + */ +static int apparmor_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sock *peer_sk, + struct sock *newsk) +{ + struct aa_sk_ctx *sk_ctx = aa_sock(sk); + struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx = aa_sock(peer_sk); + struct aa_sk_ctx *new_ctx = aa_sock(newsk); + struct aa_label *label; + int error; + bool needput; + + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); + error = unix_connect_perm(current_cred(), label, sk, peer_sk); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); + + if (error) + return error; + + /* newsk doesn't go through post_create, but does go through + * security_sk_alloc() + */ + rcu_assign_pointer(new_ctx->label, + aa_get_label(rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label, + true))); + + /* Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC */ + unix_connect_peers(sk_ctx, new_ctx); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * apparmor_unix_may_send - check perms before conn or sending unix dgrams + * @sock: socket sending the message + * @peer: socket message is being send to + * + * Performs bidirectional permission checks for Unix domain socket communication: + * 1. Verifies sender has AA_MAY_SEND to target socket + * 2. Verifies receiver has AA_MAY_RECEIVE from source socket + * + * sock and peer are locked when this hook is called + * called by: dgram_connect peer setup but path not copied to newsk + * + * Return: + * 0 if transmission is permitted + * error code on denial or failure + */ +static int apparmor_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *peer) +{ + struct aa_sk_ctx *peer_ctx = aa_sock(peer->sk); + struct aa_label *label; + int error; + bool needput; + + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); + error = xcheck(aa_unix_peer_perm(current_cred(), + label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, + sock->sk, peer->sk, + rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label, + true)), + aa_unix_peer_perm(peer->file ? peer->file->f_cred : NULL, + rcu_dereference_protected(peer_ctx->label, + true), + OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, peer->sk, + sock->sk, label)); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); + + return error; } static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) @@ -1096,13 +1266,19 @@ static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + if (kern) + return 0; + label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); - if (!(kern || unconfined(label))) - error = af_select(family, - create_perm(label, family, type, protocol), - aa_af_perm(current_cred(), label, - OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE, - family, type, protocol)); + if (!unconfined(label)) { + if (family == PF_UNIX) + error = aa_unix_create_perm(label, family, type, + protocol); + else + error = aa_af_perm(current_cred(), label, OP_CREATE, + AA_MAY_CREATE, family, type, + protocol); + } end_current_label_crit_section(label); return error; @@ -1135,14 +1311,58 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, if (sock->sk) { struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk); - aa_put_label(ctx->label); - ctx->label = aa_get_label(label); + /* still not live */ + aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(ctx->label, true)); + rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label)); } aa_put_label(label); return 0; } +static int apparmor_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, + struct socket *sockb) +{ + struct aa_sk_ctx *a_ctx = aa_sock(socka->sk); + struct aa_sk_ctx *b_ctx = aa_sock(sockb->sk); + struct aa_label *label; + + /* socks not live yet - initial values set in sk_alloc */ + label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); + if (rcu_access_pointer(a_ctx->label) != label) { + AA_BUG("a_ctx != label"); + aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(a_ctx->label, true)); + rcu_assign_pointer(a_ctx->label, aa_get_label(label)); + } + if (rcu_access_pointer(b_ctx->label) != label) { + AA_BUG("b_ctx != label"); + aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(b_ctx->label, true)); + rcu_assign_pointer(b_ctx->label, aa_get_label(label)); + } + + if (socka->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) { + /* unix socket pairs by-pass unix_stream_connect */ + unix_connect_peers(a_ctx, b_ctx); + } + end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket + * @sock: socket to bind the address to (must be non-NULL) + * @address: address that is being bound (must be non-NULL) + * @addrlen: length of @address + * + * Performs security checks before allowing a socket to bind to an address. + * Handles Unix domain sockets specially through aa_unix_bind_perm(). + * For other socket families, uses generic permission check via aa_sk_perm(). + * + * Return: + * 0 if binding is permitted + * error code on denial or invalid parameters + */ static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { @@ -1151,9 +1371,9 @@ static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, AA_BUG(!address); AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, - bind_perm(sock, address, addrlen), - aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk)); + if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) + return aa_unix_bind_perm(sock, address, addrlen); + return aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk); } static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, @@ -1164,9 +1384,10 @@ static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, AA_BUG(!address); AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, - connect_perm(sock, address, addrlen), - aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk)); + /* PF_UNIX goes through unix_stream_connect && unix_may_send */ + if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) + return 0; + return aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk); } static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) @@ -1175,9 +1396,9 @@ static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) AA_BUG(!sock->sk); AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, - listen_perm(sock, backlog), - aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk)); + if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) + return aa_unix_listen_perm(sock, backlog); + return aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk); } /* @@ -1191,9 +1412,9 @@ static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) AA_BUG(!newsock); AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, - accept_perm(sock, newsock), - aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk)); + if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) + return aa_unix_accept_perm(sock, newsock); + return aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk); } static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, @@ -1204,9 +1425,10 @@ static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, AA_BUG(!msg); AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, - msg_perm(op, request, sock, msg, size), - aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk)); + /* PF_UNIX goes through unix_may_send */ + if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) + return 0; + return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk); } static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, @@ -1228,9 +1450,9 @@ static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock) AA_BUG(!sock->sk); AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, - sock_perm(op, request, sock), - aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk)); + if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) + return aa_unix_sock_perm(op, request, sock); + return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk); } static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) @@ -1251,9 +1473,9 @@ static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, AA_BUG(!sock->sk); AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); - return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, - opt_perm(op, request, sock, level, optname), - aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk)); + if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) + return aa_unix_opt_perm(op, request, sock, level, optname); + return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk); } static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, @@ -1289,6 +1511,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); + int error; if (!skb->secmark) return 0; @@ -1297,23 +1520,31 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) * If reach here before socket_post_create hook is called, in which * case label is null, drop the packet. */ - if (!ctx->label) + if (!rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label)) return -EACCES; - return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, - skb->secmark, sk); + rcu_read_lock(); + error = apparmor_secmark_check(rcu_dereference(ctx->label), OP_RECVMSG, + AA_MAY_RECEIVE, skb->secmark, sk); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return error; } #endif -static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk) +static struct aa_label *sk_peer_get_label(struct sock *sk) { struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); + struct aa_label *label = ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT); - if (ctx->peer) - return ctx->peer; + if (rcu_access_pointer(ctx->peer)) + return aa_get_label_rcu(&ctx->peer); - return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT); + if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT); + + return label; } /** @@ -1335,19 +1566,19 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, struct aa_label *label; struct aa_label *peer; - label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); - peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk); + peer = sk_peer_get_label(sock->sk); if (IS_ERR(peer)) { error = PTR_ERR(peer); goto done; } + label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer, FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL); /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */ if (slen < 0) { error = -ENOMEM; - goto done; + goto done_put; } if (slen > len) { error = -ERANGE; @@ -1359,8 +1590,11 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, done_len: if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &slen, sizeof(slen))) error = -EFAULT; -done: + +done_put: end_current_label_crit_section(label); + aa_put_label(peer); +done: kfree(name); return error; } @@ -1396,8 +1630,9 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) { struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); - if (!ctx->label) - ctx->label = aa_get_current_label(); + /* setup - not live */ + if (!rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label)) + rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_current_label()); } #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK @@ -1405,12 +1640,17 @@ static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb struct request_sock *req) { struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); + int error; if (!skb->secmark) return 0; - return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, - skb->secmark, sk); + rcu_read_lock(); + error = apparmor_secmark_check(rcu_dereference(ctx->label), OP_CONNECT, + AA_MAY_CONNECT, skb->secmark, sk); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return error; } #endif @@ -1467,11 +1707,16 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, apparmor_unix_stream_connect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, apparmor_unix_may_send), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, apparmor_socket_socketpair), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen), @@ -1571,6 +1816,9 @@ static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = { .get = param_get_aalockpolicy }; +static int param_set_debug(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); +static int param_get_debug(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); + static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); @@ -1604,8 +1852,9 @@ module_param_named(rawdata_compression_level, aa_g_rawdata_compression_level, aacompressionlevel, 0400); /* Debug mode */ -bool aa_g_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES); -module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); +int aa_g_debug; +module_param_call(debug, param_set_debug, param_get_debug, + &aa_g_debug, 0600); /* Audit mode */ enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; @@ -1798,6 +2047,34 @@ static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer, return param_get_int(buffer, kp); } +static int param_get_debug(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) +{ + if (!apparmor_enabled) + return -EINVAL; + if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) + return -EPERM; + return aa_print_debug_params(buffer); +} + +static int param_set_debug(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) +{ + int i; + + if (!apparmor_enabled) + return -EINVAL; + if (!val) + return -EINVAL; + if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) + return -EPERM; + + i = aa_parse_debug_params(val); + if (i == DEBUG_PARSE_ERROR) + return -EINVAL; + + aa_g_debug = i; + return 0; +} + static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) { if (!apparmor_enabled) @@ -2006,7 +2283,7 @@ static int __init alloc_buffers(void) * two should be enough, with more CPUs it is possible that more * buffers will be used simultaneously. The preallocated pool may grow. * This preallocation has also the side-effect that AppArmor will be - * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremly high. + * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremely high. */ if (num_online_cpus() > 1) num = 4 + RESERVE_COUNT; @@ -2082,6 +2359,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv, { struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx; struct sock *sk; + int error; if (!skb->secmark) return NF_ACCEPT; @@ -2091,8 +2369,11 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv, return NF_ACCEPT; ctx = aa_sock(sk); - if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, - skb->secmark, sk)) + rcu_read_lock(); + error = apparmor_secmark_check(rcu_dereference(ctx->label), OP_SENDMSG, + AA_MAY_SEND, skb->secmark, sk); + rcu_read_unlock(); + if (!error) return NF_ACCEPT; return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); @@ -2146,15 +2427,14 @@ static int __init apparmor_nf_ip_init(void) return 0; } -__initcall(apparmor_nf_ip_init); #endif -static char nulldfa_src[] = { +static char nulldfa_src[] __aligned(8) = { #include "nulldfa.in" }; static struct aa_dfa *nulldfa; -static char stacksplitdfa_src[] = { +static char stacksplitdfa_src[] __aligned(8) = { #include "stacksplitdfa.in" }; struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa; @@ -2250,6 +2530,9 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks), &apparmor_lsmid); + /* Inform the audit system that secctx is used */ + audit_cfg_lsm(&apparmor_lsmid, AUDIT_CFG_LSM_SECCTX_SUBJECT); + /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ apparmor_initialized = 1; if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) @@ -2272,9 +2555,16 @@ alloc_out: } DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = { - .name = "apparmor", + .id = &apparmor_lsmid, .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, .enabled = &apparmor_enabled, .blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes, .init = apparmor_init, + .initcall_fs = aa_create_aafs, +#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK) + .initcall_device = apparmor_nf_ip_init, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH + .initcall_late = init_profile_hash, +#endif }; diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c index f2d9c57f8794..c5a91600842a 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/match.c +++ b/security/apparmor/match.c @@ -679,34 +679,35 @@ aa_state_t aa_dfa_matchn_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t start, return state; } -#define inc_wb_pos(wb) \ -do { \ +#define inc_wb_pos(wb) \ +do { \ + BUILD_BUG_ON_NOT_POWER_OF_2(WB_HISTORY_SIZE); \ wb->pos = (wb->pos + 1) & (WB_HISTORY_SIZE - 1); \ - wb->len = (wb->len + 1) & (WB_HISTORY_SIZE - 1); \ + wb->len = (wb->len + 1) > WB_HISTORY_SIZE ? WB_HISTORY_SIZE : \ + wb->len + 1; \ } while (0) /* For DFAs that don't support extended tagging of states */ +/* adjust is only set if is_loop returns true */ static bool is_loop(struct match_workbuf *wb, aa_state_t state, unsigned int *adjust) { - aa_state_t pos = wb->pos; - aa_state_t i; + int pos = wb->pos; + int i; if (wb->history[pos] < state) return false; - for (i = 0; i <= wb->len; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < wb->len; i++) { if (wb->history[pos] == state) { *adjust = i; return true; } - if (pos == 0) - pos = WB_HISTORY_SIZE; - pos--; + /* -1 wraps to WB_HISTORY_SIZE - 1 */ + pos = (pos - 1) & (WB_HISTORY_SIZE - 1); } - *adjust = i; - return true; + return false; } static aa_state_t leftmatch_fb(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t start, diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c index bf8863253e07..523570aa1a5a 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/mount.c +++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c @@ -311,8 +311,7 @@ static int match_mnt_path_str(const struct cred *subj_cred, { struct aa_perms perms = { }; const char *mntpnt = NULL, *info = NULL; - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; int pos, error; AA_BUG(!profile); @@ -371,8 +370,7 @@ static int match_mnt(const struct cred *subj_cred, bool binary) { const char *devname = NULL, *info = NULL; - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; int error = -EACCES; AA_BUG(!profile); @@ -604,8 +602,7 @@ static int profile_umount(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path, char *buffer) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; struct aa_perms perms = { }; const char *name = NULL, *info = NULL; aa_state_t state; @@ -668,8 +665,7 @@ static struct aa_label *build_pivotroot(const struct cred *subj_cred, const struct path *old_path, char *old_buffer) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; const char *old_name, *new_name = NULL, *info = NULL; const char *trans_name = NULL; struct aa_perms perms = { }; diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c index 77413a519117..45cf25605c34 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/net.c +++ b/security/apparmor/net.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd. */ +#include "include/af_unix.h" #include "include/apparmor.h" #include "include/audit.h" #include "include/cred.h" @@ -24,6 +25,12 @@ struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = { { } }; +struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_networkv9[] = { + AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_SFS_AF_MASK), + AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("af_unix", 1), + { } +}; + static const char * const net_mask_names[] = { "unknown", "send", @@ -66,6 +73,42 @@ static const char * const net_mask_names[] = { "unknown", }; +static void audit_unix_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *str, + struct sockaddr_un *addr, int addrlen) +{ + int len = unix_addr_len(addrlen); + + if (!addr || len <= 0) { + audit_log_format(ab, " %s=none", str); + } else if (addr->sun_path[0]) { + audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", str); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, addr->sun_path); + } else { + audit_log_format(ab, " %s=\"@", str); + if (audit_string_contains_control(&addr->sun_path[1], len - 1)) + audit_log_n_hex(ab, &addr->sun_path[1], len - 1); + else + audit_log_format(ab, "%.*s", len - 1, + &addr->sun_path[1]); + audit_log_format(ab, "\""); + } +} + +static void audit_unix_sk_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *str, + const struct sock *sk) +{ + const struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk); + + if (u && u->addr) { + int addrlen; + struct sockaddr_un *addr = aa_sunaddr(u, &addrlen); + + audit_unix_addr(ab, str, addr, addrlen); + } else { + audit_unix_addr(ab, str, NULL, 0); + + } +} /* audit callback for net specific fields */ void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) @@ -73,12 +116,12 @@ void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) struct common_audit_data *sa = va; struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa); - if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) + if (address_family_names[ad->common.u.net->family]) audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"%s\"", - address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]); + address_family_names[ad->common.u.net->family]); else audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"unknown(%d)\"", - sa->u.net->family); + ad->common.u.net->family); if (sock_type_names[ad->net.type]) audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"%s\"", sock_type_names[ad->net.type]); @@ -98,6 +141,19 @@ void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK); } } + if (ad->common.u.net->family == PF_UNIX) { + if (ad->net.addr || !ad->common.u.net->sk) + audit_unix_addr(ab, "addr", + unix_addr(ad->net.addr), + ad->net.addrlen); + else + audit_unix_sk_addr(ab, "addr", ad->common.u.net->sk); + if (ad->request & NET_PEER_MASK) { + audit_unix_addr(ab, "peer_addr", + unix_addr(ad->net.peer.addr), + ad->net.peer.addrlen); + } + } if (ad->peer) { audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer, @@ -105,45 +161,123 @@ void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) } } +/* standard permission lookup pattern - supports early bailout */ +int aa_do_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_policydb *policy, + aa_state_t state, u32 request, + struct aa_perms *p, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) +{ + struct aa_perms perms; + + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(!policy); + + + if (state || !p) + p = aa_lookup_perms(policy, state); + perms = *p; + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, + audit_net_cb); +} + +/* only continue match if + * insufficient current perms at current state + * indicates there are more perms in later state + * Returns: perms struct if early match + */ +static struct aa_perms *early_match(struct aa_policydb *policy, + aa_state_t state, u32 request) +{ + struct aa_perms *p; + + p = aa_lookup_perms(policy, state); + if (((p->allow & request) != request) && (p->allow & AA_CONT_MATCH)) + return NULL; + return p; +} + +static aa_state_t aa_dfa_match_be16(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t state, + u16 data) +{ + __be16 buffer = cpu_to_be16(data); + + return aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, state, (char *) &buffer, 2); +} + +/** + * aa_match_to_prot - match the af, type, protocol triplet + * @policy: policy being matched + * @state: state to start in + * @request: permissions being requested, ignored if @p == NULL + * @af: socket address family + * @type: socket type + * @protocol: socket protocol + * @p: output - pointer to permission associated with match + * @info: output - pointer to string describing failure + * + * RETURNS: state match stopped in. + * + * If @(p) is assigned a value the returned state will be the + * corresponding state. Will not set @p on failure or if match completes + * only if an early match occurs + */ +aa_state_t aa_match_to_prot(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t state, + u32 request, u16 af, int type, int protocol, + struct aa_perms **p, const char **info) +{ + state = aa_dfa_match_be16(policy->dfa, state, (u16)af); + if (!state) { + *info = "failed af match"; + return state; + } + state = aa_dfa_match_be16(policy->dfa, state, (u16)type); + if (state) { + if (p) + *p = early_match(policy, state, request); + if (!p || !*p) { + state = aa_dfa_match_be16(policy->dfa, state, (u16)protocol); + if (!state) + *info = "failed protocol match"; + } + } else { + *info = "failed type match"; + } + + return state; +} + /* Generic af perm */ int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, u32 request, u16 family, - int type) + int type, int protocol) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); - struct aa_perms perms = { }; + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; + struct aa_perms *p = NULL; aa_state_t state; - __be16 buffer[2]; AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX); AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX); + AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile)); if (profile_unconfined(profile)) return 0; - state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_NET); + state = RULE_MEDIATES_NET(rules); if (!state) return 0; - - buffer[0] = cpu_to_be16(family); - buffer[1] = cpu_to_be16((u16) type); - state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state, (char *) &buffer, - 4); - perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state); - aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); - - return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_net_cb); + state = aa_match_to_prot(rules->policy, state, request, family, type, + protocol, &p, &ad->info); + return aa_do_perms(profile, rules->policy, state, request, p, ad); } int aa_af_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, int type, int protocol) { struct aa_profile *profile; - DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(ad, op, NULL, family, type, protocol); + DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(ad, op, subj_cred, NULL, family, type, protocol); return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &ad, request, family, - type)); + type, protocol)); } static int aa_label_sk_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, @@ -157,9 +291,9 @@ static int aa_label_sk_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, AA_BUG(!label); AA_BUG(!sk); - if (ctx->label != kernel_t && !unconfined(label)) { + if (rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label) != kernel_t && !unconfined(label)) { struct aa_profile *profile; - DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, sk); + DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, subj_cred, sk); ad.subj_cred = subj_cred; error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, @@ -187,12 +321,16 @@ int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk) int aa_sock_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, - const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock) + const char *op, u32 request, struct file *file) { + struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data; + AA_BUG(!label); AA_BUG(!sock); AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) + return aa_unix_file_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, file); return aa_label_sk_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, sock->sk); } @@ -223,8 +361,7 @@ static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid, { int i, ret; struct aa_perms perms = { }; - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; if (rules->secmark_count == 0) return 0; @@ -257,7 +394,7 @@ int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request, u32 secid, const struct sock *sk) { struct aa_profile *profile; - DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, sk); + DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, NULL, sk); return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, aa_secmark_perm(profile, request, secid, diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index d0244fab0653..50d5345ff5cb 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -243,6 +243,9 @@ static void free_ruleset(struct aa_ruleset *rules) { int i; + if (!rules) + return; + aa_put_pdb(rules->file); aa_put_pdb(rules->policy); aa_free_cap_rules(&rules->caps); @@ -259,8 +262,6 @@ struct aa_ruleset *aa_alloc_ruleset(gfp_t gfp) struct aa_ruleset *rules; rules = kzalloc(sizeof(*rules), gfp); - if (rules) - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rules->list); return rules; } @@ -277,10 +278,9 @@ struct aa_ruleset *aa_alloc_ruleset(gfp_t gfp) */ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) { - struct aa_ruleset *rule, *tmp; struct rhashtable *rht; - AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, profile); + AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_POLICY, "%s(%p)\n", __func__, profile); if (!profile) return; @@ -299,10 +299,9 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) * at this point there are no tasks that can have a reference * to rules */ - list_for_each_entry_safe(rule, tmp, &profile->rules, list) { - list_del_init(&rule->list); - free_ruleset(rule); - } + for (int i = 0; i < profile->n_rules; i++) + free_ruleset(profile->label.rules[i]); + kfree_sensitive(profile->dirname); if (profile->data) { @@ -331,10 +330,12 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *hname, struct aa_proxy *proxy, gfp_t gfp) { struct aa_profile *profile; - struct aa_ruleset *rules; - /* freed by free_profile - usually through aa_put_profile */ - profile = kzalloc(struct_size(profile, label.vec, 2), gfp); + /* freed by free_profile - usually through aa_put_profile + * this adds space for a single ruleset in the rules section of the + * label + */ + profile = kzalloc(struct_size(profile, label.rules, 1), gfp); if (!profile) return NULL; @@ -343,13 +344,11 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *hname, struct aa_proxy *proxy, if (!aa_label_init(&profile->label, 1, gfp)) goto fail; - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&profile->rules); - /* allocate the first ruleset, but leave it empty */ - rules = aa_alloc_ruleset(gfp); - if (!rules) + profile->label.rules[0] = aa_alloc_ruleset(gfp); + if (!profile->label.rules[0]) goto fail; - list_add(&rules->list, &profile->rules); + profile->n_rules = 1; /* update being set needed by fs interface */ if (!proxy) { @@ -364,6 +363,7 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *hname, struct aa_proxy *proxy, profile->label.flags |= FLAG_PROFILE; profile->label.vec[0] = profile; + profile->signal = SIGKILL; /* refcount released by caller */ return profile; @@ -373,6 +373,41 @@ fail: return NULL; } +static inline bool ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(struct aa_profile *profile, + unsigned char class) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < profile->n_rules; i++) { + if (RULE_MEDIATES(profile->label.rules[i], class)) + return true; + } + return false; +} + +/* set of rules that are mediated by unconfined */ +static int unconfined_mediates[] = { AA_CLASS_NS, AA_CLASS_IO_URING, 0 }; + +/* must be called after profile rulesets and start information is setup */ +void aa_compute_profile_mediates(struct aa_profile *profile) +{ + int c; + + if (profile_unconfined(profile)) { + int *pos; + + for (pos = unconfined_mediates; *pos; pos++) { + if (ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(profile, *pos)) + profile->label.mediates |= ((u64) 1) << AA_CLASS_NS; + } + return; + } + for (c = 0; c <= AA_CLASS_LAST; c++) { + if (ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(profile, c)) + profile->label.mediates |= ((u64) 1) << c; + } +} + /* TODO: profile accounting - setup in remove */ /** @@ -463,7 +498,7 @@ static struct aa_policy *__lookup_parent(struct aa_ns *ns, } /** - * __create_missing_ancestors - create place holders for missing ancestores + * __create_missing_ancestors - create place holders for missing ancestors * @ns: namespace to lookup profile in (NOT NULL) * @hname: hierarchical profile name to find parent of (NOT NULL) * @gfp: type of allocation. @@ -621,13 +656,15 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_null(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name, /* TODO: ideally we should inherit abi from parent */ profile->label.flags |= FLAG_NULL; profile->attach.xmatch = aa_get_pdb(nullpdb); - rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); + rules = profile->label.rules[0]; rules->file = aa_get_pdb(nullpdb); rules->policy = aa_get_pdb(nullpdb); + aa_compute_profile_mediates(profile); if (parent) { profile->path_flags = parent->path_flags; - + /* override/inherit what is mediated from parent */ + profile->label.mediates = parent->label.mediates; /* released on free_profile */ rcu_assign_pointer(profile->parent, aa_get_profile(parent)); profile->ns = aa_get_ns(parent->ns); @@ -833,8 +870,8 @@ bool aa_policy_admin_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, bool capable = policy_ns_capable(subj_cred, label, user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN) == 0; - AA_DEBUG("cap_mac_admin? %d\n", capable); - AA_DEBUG("policy locked? %d\n", aa_g_lock_policy); + AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_POLICY, "cap_mac_admin? %d\n", capable); + AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_POLICY, "policy locked? %d\n", aa_g_lock_policy); return aa_policy_view_capable(subj_cred, label, ns) && capable && !aa_g_lock_policy; @@ -843,11 +880,11 @@ bool aa_policy_admin_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, bool aa_current_policy_view_capable(struct aa_ns *ns) { struct aa_label *label; - bool res; + bool needput, res; - label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); res = aa_policy_view_capable(current_cred(), label, ns); - __end_current_label_crit_section(label); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); return res; } @@ -855,11 +892,11 @@ bool aa_current_policy_view_capable(struct aa_ns *ns) bool aa_current_policy_admin_capable(struct aa_ns *ns) { struct aa_label *label; - bool res; + bool needput, res; - label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(&needput); res = aa_policy_admin_capable(current_cred(), label, ns); - __end_current_label_crit_section(label); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label, needput); return res; } @@ -1068,7 +1105,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label, goto out; /* ensure that profiles are all for the same ns - * TODO: update locking to remove this constaint. All profiles in + * TODO: update locking to remove this constraint. All profiles in * the load set must succeed as a set or the load will * fail. Sort ent list and take ns locks in hierarchy order */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_compat.c b/security/apparmor/policy_compat.c index 423227670e68..cfc2207e5a12 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_compat.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_compat.c @@ -286,10 +286,10 @@ static void remap_dfa_accept(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int factor) AA_BUG(!dfa); - for (state = 0; state < state_count; state++) + for (state = 0; state < state_count; state++) { ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] = state * factor; - kvfree(dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]); - dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2] = NULL; + ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state] = factor > 1 ? ACCEPT_FLAG_OWNER : 0; + } } /* TODO: merge different dfa mappings into single map_policy fn */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c index 1f02cfe1d974..64783ca3b0f2 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static struct aa_ns *alloc_ns(const char *prefix, const char *name) struct aa_ns *ns; ns = kzalloc(sizeof(*ns), GFP_KERNEL); - AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, ns); + AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_POLICY, "%s(%p)\n", __func__, ns); if (!ns) return NULL; if (!aa_policy_init(&ns->base, prefix, name, GFP_KERNEL)) diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index 992b74c50d64..7523971e37d9 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include "include/policy.h" #include "include/policy_unpack.h" #include "include/policy_compat.h" +#include "include/signal.h" /* audit callback for unpack fields */ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) @@ -598,8 +599,8 @@ static bool unpack_secmark(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_ruleset *rules) fail: if (rules->secmark) { for (i = 0; i < size; i++) - kfree(rules->secmark[i].label); - kfree(rules->secmark); + kfree_sensitive(rules->secmark[i].label); + kfree_sensitive(rules->secmark); rules->secmark_count = 0; rules->secmark = NULL; } @@ -716,6 +717,7 @@ static int unpack_pdb(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_policydb **policy, void *pos = e->pos; int i, flags, error = -EPROTO; ssize_t size; + u32 version = 0; pdb = aa_alloc_pdb(GFP_KERNEL); if (!pdb) @@ -733,6 +735,9 @@ static int unpack_pdb(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_policydb **policy, if (pdb->perms) { /* perms table present accept is index */ flags = TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32); + if (aa_unpack_u32(e, &version, "permsv") && version > 2) + /* accept2 used for dfa flags */ + flags |= TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32); } else { /* packed perms in accept1 and accept2 */ flags = TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) | @@ -770,6 +775,21 @@ static int unpack_pdb(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_policydb **policy, } } + /* accept2 is in some cases being allocated, even with perms */ + if (pdb->perms && !pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]) { + /* add dfa flags table missing in v2 */ + u32 noents = pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen; + u16 tdflags = pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_flags; + size_t tsize = table_size(noents, tdflags); + + pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2] = kvzalloc(tsize, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]) { + *info = "failed to alloc dfa flags table"; + goto out; + } + pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_lolen = noents; + pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_flags = tdflags; + } /* * Unfortunately due to a bug in earlier userspaces, a * transition table may be present even when the dfa is @@ -783,9 +803,13 @@ static int unpack_pdb(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_policydb **policy, if (!pdb->dfa && pdb->trans.table) aa_free_str_table(&pdb->trans); - /* TODO: move compat mapping here, requires dfa merging first */ - /* TODO: move verify here, it has to be done after compat mappings */ - + /* TODO: + * - move compat mapping here, requires dfa merging first + * - move verify here, it has to be done after compat mappings + * - move free of unneeded trans table here, has to be done + * after perm mapping. + */ +out: *policy = pdb; return 0; @@ -862,7 +886,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) error = -ENOMEM; goto fail; } - rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); + rules = profile->label.rules[0]; /* profile renaming is optional */ (void) aa_unpack_str(e, &profile->rename, "rename"); @@ -898,6 +922,12 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) (void) aa_unpack_strdup(e, &disconnected, "disconnected"); profile->disconnected = disconnected; + /* optional */ + (void) aa_unpack_u32(e, &profile->signal, "kill"); + if (profile->signal < 1 || profile->signal > MAXMAPPED_SIG) { + info = "profile kill.signal invalid value"; + goto fail; + } /* per profile debug flags (complain, audit) */ if (!aa_unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "flags")) { info = "profile missing flags"; @@ -1101,6 +1131,8 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) goto fail; } + aa_compute_profile_mediates(profile); + return profile; fail: @@ -1215,21 +1247,32 @@ static bool verify_perm(struct aa_perms *perm) static bool verify_perms(struct aa_policydb *pdb) { int i; + int xidx, xmax = -1; for (i = 0; i < pdb->size; i++) { if (!verify_perm(&pdb->perms[i])) return false; /* verify indexes into str table */ - if ((pdb->perms[i].xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK) == AA_X_TABLE && - (pdb->perms[i].xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK) >= pdb->trans.size) - return false; + if ((pdb->perms[i].xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK) == AA_X_TABLE) { + xidx = pdb->perms[i].xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK; + if (xidx >= pdb->trans.size) + return false; + if (xmax < xidx) + xmax = xidx; + } if (pdb->perms[i].tag && pdb->perms[i].tag >= pdb->trans.size) return false; if (pdb->perms[i].label && pdb->perms[i].label >= pdb->trans.size) return false; } - + /* deal with incorrectly constructed string tables */ + if (xmax == -1) { + aa_free_str_table(&pdb->trans); + } else if (pdb->trans.size > xmax + 1) { + if (!aa_resize_str_table(&pdb->trans, xmax + 1, GFP_KERNEL)) + return false; + } return true; } @@ -1243,8 +1286,8 @@ static bool verify_perms(struct aa_policydb *pdb) */ static int verify_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; + if (!rules) return 0; diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c index 5b2ba88ae9e2..cf18744dafe2 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack_test.c @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ #include "include/policy.h" #include "include/policy_unpack.h" +#include <linux/unaligned.h> + #define TEST_STRING_NAME "TEST_STRING" #define TEST_STRING_DATA "testing" #define TEST_STRING_BUF_OFFSET \ @@ -80,7 +82,7 @@ static struct aa_ext *build_aa_ext_struct(struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf, *(buf + 1) = strlen(TEST_U32_NAME) + 1; strscpy(buf + 3, TEST_U32_NAME, e->end - (void *)(buf + 3)); *(buf + 3 + strlen(TEST_U32_NAME) + 1) = AA_U32; - *((__le32 *)(buf + 3 + strlen(TEST_U32_NAME) + 2)) = cpu_to_le32(TEST_U32_DATA); + put_unaligned_le32(TEST_U32_DATA, buf + 3 + strlen(TEST_U32_NAME) + 2); buf = e->start + TEST_NAMED_U64_BUF_OFFSET; *buf = AA_NAME; @@ -103,7 +105,7 @@ static struct aa_ext *build_aa_ext_struct(struct policy_unpack_fixture *puf, *(buf + 1) = strlen(TEST_ARRAY_NAME) + 1; strscpy(buf + 3, TEST_ARRAY_NAME, e->end - (void *)(buf + 3)); *(buf + 3 + strlen(TEST_ARRAY_NAME) + 1) = AA_ARRAY; - *((__le16 *)(buf + 3 + strlen(TEST_ARRAY_NAME) + 2)) = cpu_to_le16(TEST_ARRAY_SIZE); + put_unaligned_le16(TEST_ARRAY_SIZE, buf + 3 + strlen(TEST_ARRAY_NAME) + 2); return e; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c index e3857e3d7c6c..ce40f15d4952 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c +++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c @@ -125,12 +125,14 @@ int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int flags) for (count = 0; (hat < end) && count < 16; ++count) { char *next = hat + strlen(hat) + 1; hats[count] = hat; - AA_DEBUG("%s: (pid %d) Magic 0x%llx count %d hat '%s'\n" + AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN, + "%s: (pid %d) Magic 0x%llx count %d hat '%s'\n" , __func__, current->pid, token, count, hat); hat = next; } } else - AA_DEBUG("%s: (pid %d) Magic 0x%llx count %d Hat '%s'\n", + AA_DEBUG(DEBUG_DOMAIN, + "%s: (pid %d) Magic 0x%llx count %d Hat '%s'\n", __func__, current->pid, token, count, "<NULL>"); return aa_change_hat(hats, count, token, flags); diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c index dcc94c3153d5..8e80db3ae21c 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/resource.c +++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c @@ -89,8 +89,7 @@ static int profile_setrlimit(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; int e = 0; if (rules->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) && new_rlim->rlim_max > @@ -165,9 +164,7 @@ void __aa_transition_rlimits(struct aa_label *old_l, struct aa_label *new_l) * to the lesser of the tasks hard limit and the init tasks soft limit */ label_for_each_confined(i, old_l, old) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&old->rules, - typeof(*rules), - list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = old->label.rules[0]; if (rules->rlimits.mask) { int j; @@ -185,9 +182,7 @@ void __aa_transition_rlimits(struct aa_label *old_l, struct aa_label *new_l) /* set any new hard limits as dictated by the new profile */ label_for_each_confined(i, new_l, new) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&new->rules, - typeof(*rules), - list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = new->label.rules[0]; int j; if (!rules->rlimits.mask) diff --git a/security/apparmor/task.c b/security/apparmor/task.c index c87fb9f4ac18..c9bc9cc69475 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/task.c +++ b/security/apparmor/task.c @@ -228,8 +228,7 @@ static int profile_ptrace_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct aa_label *peer, u32 request, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; struct aa_perms perms = { }; ad->subj_cred = cred; @@ -246,7 +245,7 @@ static int profile_tracee_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) { if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) || - !ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(&tracee->rules, AA_CLASS_PTRACE)) + !label_mediates(&tracee->label, AA_CLASS_PTRACE)) return 0; return profile_ptrace_perm(cred, tracee, tracer, request, ad); @@ -260,7 +259,7 @@ static int profile_tracer_perm(const struct cred *cred, if (profile_unconfined(tracer)) return 0; - if (ANY_RULE_MEDIATES(&tracer->rules, AA_CLASS_PTRACE)) + if (label_mediates(&tracer->label, AA_CLASS_PTRACE)) return profile_ptrace_perm(cred, tracer, tracee, request, ad); /* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */ @@ -324,9 +323,7 @@ int aa_profile_ns_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, ad->request = request; if (!profile_unconfined(profile)) { - struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, - typeof(*rules), - list); + struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0]; aa_state_t state; state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, ad->class); diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c index db759025abe1..40efde233f3a 100644 --- a/security/bpf/hooks.c +++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes bpf_lsm_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { }; DEFINE_LSM(bpf) = { - .name = "bpf", + .id = &bpf_lsmid, .init = bpf_lsm_init, .blobs = &bpf_lsm_blob_sizes }; diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 28d4248bf001..b50479bd0286 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -856,12 +856,6 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap, #define __cap_full(field, cred) \ cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, cred->cap_##field) -static inline bool __is_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) -{ return !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid); } - -static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) -{ return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); } - /* * 1) Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set * @@ -891,7 +885,7 @@ static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, (root_privileged() && __is_suid(root, new) && !__cap_full(effective, new)) || - (!__is_setuid(new, old) && + (uid_eq(new->euid, old->euid) && ((has_fcap && __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) || __cap_gained(ambient, new, old)))) @@ -917,7 +911,7 @@ int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file) /* Process setpcap binaries and capabilities for uid 0 */ const struct cred *old = current_cred(); struct cred *new = bprm->cred; - bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, is_setid; + bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, id_changed; int ret; kuid_t root_uid; @@ -941,9 +935,9 @@ int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file) * * In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs. */ - is_setid = __is_setuid(new, old) || __is_setgid(new, old); + id_changed = !uid_eq(new->euid, old->euid) || !in_group_p(new->egid); - if ((is_setid || __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) && + if ((id_changed || __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) && ((bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) || !ptracer_capable(current, new->user_ns))) { /* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */ @@ -960,7 +954,7 @@ int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file) new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid; /* File caps or setid cancels ambient. */ - if (has_fcap || is_setid) + if (has_fcap || id_changed) cap_clear(new->cap_ambient); /* @@ -993,7 +987,9 @@ int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct file *file) return -EPERM; /* Check for privilege-elevated exec. */ - if (is_setid || + if (id_changed || + !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || + !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid) || (!__is_real(root_uid, new) && (effective || __cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new)))) @@ -1509,7 +1505,7 @@ static int __init capability_init(void) } DEFINE_LSM(capability) = { - .name = "capability", + .id = &capability_lsmid, .order = LSM_ORDER_FIRST, .init = capability_init, }; diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c index dc4df7475081..7fec575d32d6 100644 --- a/security/device_cgroup.c +++ b/security/device_cgroup.c @@ -244,45 +244,40 @@ static void devcgroup_css_free(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css) #define DEVCG_DENY 2 #define DEVCG_LIST 3 -#define MAJMINLEN 13 -#define ACCLEN 4 - -static void set_access(char *acc, short access) +static void seq_putaccess(struct seq_file *m, short access) { - int idx = 0; - memset(acc, 0, ACCLEN); if (access & DEVCG_ACC_READ) - acc[idx++] = 'r'; + seq_putc(m, 'r'); if (access & DEVCG_ACC_WRITE) - acc[idx++] = 'w'; + seq_putc(m, 'w'); if (access & DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD) - acc[idx++] = 'm'; + seq_putc(m, 'm'); } -static char type_to_char(short type) +static void seq_puttype(struct seq_file *m, short type) { if (type == DEVCG_DEV_ALL) - return 'a'; - if (type == DEVCG_DEV_CHAR) - return 'c'; - if (type == DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK) - return 'b'; - return 'X'; + seq_putc(m, 'a'); + else if (type == DEVCG_DEV_CHAR) + seq_putc(m, 'c'); + else if (type == DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK) + seq_putc(m, 'b'); + else + seq_putc(m, 'X'); } -static void set_majmin(char *str, unsigned m) +static void seq_putversion(struct seq_file *m, unsigned int version) { - if (m == ~0) - strcpy(str, "*"); + if (version == ~0) + seq_putc(m, '*'); else - sprintf(str, "%u", m); + seq_printf(m, "%u", version); } static int devcgroup_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup = css_to_devcgroup(seq_css(m)); struct dev_exception_item *ex; - char maj[MAJMINLEN], min[MAJMINLEN], acc[ACCLEN]; rcu_read_lock(); /* @@ -292,18 +287,17 @@ static int devcgroup_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) * This way, the file remains as a "whitelist of devices" */ if (devcgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) { - set_access(acc, DEVCG_ACC_MASK); - set_majmin(maj, ~0); - set_majmin(min, ~0); - seq_printf(m, "%c %s:%s %s\n", type_to_char(DEVCG_DEV_ALL), - maj, min, acc); + seq_puts(m, "a *:* rwm\n"); } else { list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, &devcgroup->exceptions, list) { - set_access(acc, ex->access); - set_majmin(maj, ex->major); - set_majmin(min, ex->minor); - seq_printf(m, "%c %s:%s %s\n", type_to_char(ex->type), - maj, min, acc); + seq_puttype(m, ex->type); + seq_putc(m, ' '); + seq_putversion(m, ex->major); + seq_putc(m, ':'); + seq_putversion(m, ex->minor); + seq_putc(m, ' '); + seq_putaccess(m, ex->access); + seq_putc(m, '\n'); } } rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c index 3913501621fa..ab8d6a2acadb 100644 --- a/security/inode.c +++ b/security/inode.c @@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/magic.h> +#include "lsm.h" + static struct vfsmount *mount; static int mount_count; @@ -112,18 +114,20 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode, struct dentry *dentry; struct inode *dir, *inode; int error; + bool pinned = false; if (!(mode & S_IFMT)) mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | S_IFREG; pr_debug("securityfs: creating file '%s'\n",name); - error = simple_pin_fs(&fs_type, &mount, &mount_count); - if (error) - return ERR_PTR(error); - - if (!parent) + if (!parent) { + error = simple_pin_fs(&fs_type, &mount, &mount_count); + if (error) + return ERR_PTR(error); + pinned = true; parent = mount->mnt_root; + } dir = d_inode(parent); @@ -159,7 +163,6 @@ static struct dentry *securityfs_create_dentry(const char *name, umode_t mode, inode->i_fop = fops; } d_instantiate(dentry, inode); - dget(dentry); inode_unlock(dir); return dentry; @@ -168,7 +171,8 @@ out1: dentry = ERR_PTR(error); out: inode_unlock(dir); - simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count); + if (pinned) + simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count); return dentry; } @@ -279,6 +283,12 @@ struct dentry *securityfs_create_symlink(const char *name, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_create_symlink); +static void remove_one(struct dentry *victim) +{ + if (victim->d_parent == victim->d_sb->s_root) + simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count); +} + /** * securityfs_remove - removes a file or directory from the securityfs filesystem * @@ -291,43 +301,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_create_symlink); * This function is required to be called in order for the file to be * removed. No automatic cleanup of files will happen when a module is * removed; you are responsible here. - */ -void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry) -{ - struct inode *dir; - - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(dentry)) - return; - - dir = d_inode(dentry->d_parent); - inode_lock(dir); - if (simple_positive(dentry)) { - if (d_is_dir(dentry)) - simple_rmdir(dir, dentry); - else - simple_unlink(dir, dentry); - dput(dentry); - } - inode_unlock(dir); - simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_remove); - -static void remove_one(struct dentry *victim) -{ - simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count); -} - -/** - * securityfs_recursive_remove - recursively removes a file or directory * - * @dentry: a pointer to a the dentry of the file or directory to be removed. - * - * This function recursively removes a file or directory in securityfs that was - * previously created with a call to another securityfs function (like - * securityfs_create_file() or variants thereof.) + * AV: when applied to directory it will take all children out; no need to call + * it for descendents if ancestor is getting killed. */ -void securityfs_recursive_remove(struct dentry *dentry) +void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry) { if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(dentry)) return; @@ -336,15 +314,52 @@ void securityfs_recursive_remove(struct dentry *dentry) simple_recursive_removal(dentry, remove_one); simple_release_fs(&mount, &mount_count); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_recursive_remove); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(securityfs_remove); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +#include <linux/spinlock.h> + static struct dentry *lsm_dentry; + static ssize_t lsm_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, lsm_names, - strlen(lsm_names)); + int i; + static char *str; + static size_t len; + static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock); + + /* NOTE: we never free or modify the string once it is set */ + + if (unlikely(!str || !len)) { + char *str_tmp; + size_t len_tmp = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < lsm_active_cnt; i++) + /* the '+ 1' accounts for either a comma or a NUL */ + len_tmp += strlen(lsm_idlist[i]->name) + 1; + + str_tmp = kmalloc(len_tmp, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!str_tmp) + return -ENOMEM; + str_tmp[0] = '\0'; + + for (i = 0; i < lsm_active_cnt; i++) { + if (i > 0) + strcat(str_tmp, ","); + strcat(str_tmp, lsm_idlist[i]->name); + } + + spin_lock(&lock); + if (!str) { + str = str_tmp; + len = len_tmp - 1; + } else + kfree(str_tmp); + spin_unlock(&lock); + } + + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, str, len); } static const struct file_operations lsm_ops = { @@ -353,7 +368,7 @@ static const struct file_operations lsm_ops = { }; #endif -static int __init securityfs_init(void) +int __init securityfs_init(void) { int retval; @@ -372,4 +387,3 @@ static int __init securityfs_init(void) #endif return 0; } -core_initcall(securityfs_init); diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig index 3c45f4f3455f..916d4f2bfc44 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS default n select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE + select CRYPTO select CRYPTO_RSA select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER help diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 0add782e73ba..73d500a375cb 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -1175,10 +1175,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes evm_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { }; DEFINE_LSM(evm) = { - .name = "evm", + .id = &evm_lsmid, .init = init_evm_lsm, .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST, .blobs = &evm_blob_sizes, + .initcall_late = init_evm, }; - -late_initcall(init_evm); diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c index 9b907c2fee60..c26724690cec 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ #include "evm.h" static struct dentry *evm_dir; -static struct dentry *evm_init_tpm; static struct dentry *evm_symlink; #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ADD_XATTRS @@ -286,7 +285,7 @@ static int evm_init_xattrs(void) { evm_xattrs = securityfs_create_file("evm_xattrs", 0660, evm_dir, NULL, &evm_xattr_ops); - if (!evm_xattrs || IS_ERR(evm_xattrs)) + if (IS_ERR(evm_xattrs)) return -EFAULT; return 0; @@ -301,21 +300,28 @@ static int evm_init_xattrs(void) int __init evm_init_secfs(void) { int error = 0; + struct dentry *dentry; - evm_dir = securityfs_create_dir("evm", integrity_dir); - if (!evm_dir || IS_ERR(evm_dir)) + error = integrity_fs_init(); + if (error < 0) return -EFAULT; - evm_init_tpm = securityfs_create_file("evm", 0660, - evm_dir, NULL, &evm_key_ops); - if (!evm_init_tpm || IS_ERR(evm_init_tpm)) { + evm_dir = securityfs_create_dir("evm", integrity_dir); + if (IS_ERR(evm_dir)) { + error = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + + dentry = securityfs_create_file("evm", 0660, + evm_dir, NULL, &evm_key_ops); + if (IS_ERR(dentry)) { error = -EFAULT; goto out; } evm_symlink = securityfs_create_symlink("evm", NULL, "integrity/evm/evm", NULL); - if (!evm_symlink || IS_ERR(evm_symlink)) { + if (IS_ERR(evm_symlink)) { error = -EFAULT; goto out; } @@ -328,7 +334,7 @@ int __init evm_init_secfs(void) return 0; out: securityfs_remove(evm_symlink); - securityfs_remove(evm_init_tpm); securityfs_remove(evm_dir); + integrity_fs_fini(); return error; } diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index 068ac6c2ae1e..8ec1a3436a71 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -42,8 +42,11 @@ void __init integrity_load_keys(void) evm_load_x509(); } -static int __init integrity_fs_init(void) +int __init integrity_fs_init(void) { + if (integrity_dir) + return 0; + integrity_dir = securityfs_create_dir("integrity", NULL); if (IS_ERR(integrity_dir)) { int ret = PTR_ERR(integrity_dir); @@ -58,4 +61,11 @@ static int __init integrity_fs_init(void) return 0; } -late_initcall(integrity_fs_init) +void __init integrity_fs_fini(void) +{ + if (!integrity_dir || !simple_empty(integrity_dir)) + return; + + securityfs_remove(integrity_dir); + integrity_dir = NULL; +} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index f435eff4667f..5149ff4fd50d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -694,6 +694,15 @@ static int ima_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, return 0; } +/* + * ima_reset_appraise_flags - reset ima_iint_cache flags + * + * @digsig: whether to clear/set IMA_DIGSIG flag, tristate values + * 0: clear IMA_DIGSIG + * 1: set IMA_DIGSIG + * -1: don't change IMA_DIGSIG + * + */ static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig) { struct ima_iint_cache *iint; @@ -706,9 +715,9 @@ static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig) return; iint->measured_pcrs = 0; set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); - if (digsig) + if (digsig == 1) set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); - else + else if (digsig == 0) clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); } @@ -794,6 +803,8 @@ static int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); } else if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) && xattr_value_len > 0) { digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG); + } else { + digsig = -1; } if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) { ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); @@ -807,7 +818,7 @@ static int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) { if (evm_revalidate_status(acl_name)) - ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); + ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), -1); return 0; } @@ -815,11 +826,13 @@ static int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, static int ima_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { - int result; + int result, digsig = -1; result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) { - ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); + if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_IMA)) + digsig = 0; + ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); if (result == 1) result = 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index e4a79a9b2d58..012a58959ff0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -116,28 +116,6 @@ void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen) seq_putc(m, *(char *)data++); } -static struct dentry **ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists __ro_after_init; -static struct dentry **binary_securityfs_measurement_lists __ro_after_init; -static int securityfs_measurement_list_count __ro_after_init; - -static void lookup_template_data_hash_algo(int *algo_idx, enum hash_algo *algo, - struct seq_file *m, - struct dentry **lists) -{ - struct dentry *dentry; - int i; - - dentry = file_dentry(m->file); - - for (i = 0; i < securityfs_measurement_list_count; i++) { - if (dentry == lists[i]) { - *algo_idx = i; - *algo = ima_algo_array[i].algo; - break; - } - } -} - /* print format: * 32bit-le=pcr# * char[n]=template digest @@ -160,9 +138,10 @@ int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) algo_idx = ima_sha1_idx; algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; - if (m->file != NULL) - lookup_template_data_hash_algo(&algo_idx, &algo, m, - binary_securityfs_measurement_lists); + if (m->file != NULL) { + algo_idx = (unsigned long)file_inode(m->file)->i_private; + algo = ima_algo_array[algo_idx].algo; + } /* get entry */ e = qe->entry; @@ -256,9 +235,10 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) algo_idx = ima_sha1_idx; algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; - if (m->file != NULL) - lookup_template_data_hash_algo(&algo_idx, &algo, m, - ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists); + if (m->file != NULL) { + algo_idx = (unsigned long)file_inode(m->file)->i_private; + algo = ima_algo_array[algo_idx].algo; + } /* get entry */ e = qe->entry; @@ -396,11 +376,6 @@ out: static struct dentry *ima_dir; static struct dentry *ima_symlink; -static struct dentry *binary_runtime_measurements; -static struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements; -static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count; -static struct dentry *violations; -static struct dentry *ima_policy; enum ima_fs_flags { IMA_FS_BUSY, @@ -417,64 +392,33 @@ static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = { }; #endif -static void __init remove_securityfs_measurement_lists(struct dentry **lists) -{ - int i; - - if (lists) { - for (i = 0; i < securityfs_measurement_list_count; i++) - securityfs_remove(lists[i]); - - kfree(lists); - } -} - static int __init create_securityfs_measurement_lists(void) { - char file_name[NAME_MAX + 1]; - struct dentry *dentry; - u16 algo; - int i; - - securityfs_measurement_list_count = NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip); + int count = NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip); if (ima_sha1_idx >= NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip)) - securityfs_measurement_list_count++; - - ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists = - kcalloc(securityfs_measurement_list_count, sizeof(struct dentry *), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists) - return -ENOMEM; + count++; - binary_securityfs_measurement_lists = - kcalloc(securityfs_measurement_list_count, sizeof(struct dentry *), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!binary_securityfs_measurement_lists) - return -ENOMEM; - - for (i = 0; i < securityfs_measurement_list_count; i++) { - algo = ima_algo_array[i].algo; + for (int i = 0; i < count; i++) { + u16 algo = ima_algo_array[i].algo; + char file_name[NAME_MAX + 1]; + struct dentry *dentry; sprintf(file_name, "ascii_runtime_measurements_%s", hash_algo_name[algo]); dentry = securityfs_create_file(file_name, S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, - ima_dir, NULL, + ima_dir, (void *)(uintptr_t)i, &ima_ascii_measurements_ops); if (IS_ERR(dentry)) return PTR_ERR(dentry); - ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists[i] = dentry; - sprintf(file_name, "binary_runtime_measurements_%s", hash_algo_name[algo]); dentry = securityfs_create_file(file_name, S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, - ima_dir, NULL, + ima_dir, (void *)(uintptr_t)i, &ima_measurements_ops); if (IS_ERR(dentry)) return PTR_ERR(dentry); - - binary_securityfs_measurement_lists[i] = dentry; } return 0; @@ -533,8 +477,7 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) ima_update_policy(); #if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY) - securityfs_remove(ima_policy); - ima_policy = NULL; + securityfs_remove(file->f_path.dentry); #elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); #elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY) @@ -553,14 +496,18 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = { int __init ima_fs_init(void) { + struct dentry *dentry; int ret; - ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists = NULL; - binary_securityfs_measurement_lists = NULL; + ret = integrity_fs_init(); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", integrity_dir); - if (IS_ERR(ima_dir)) - return PTR_ERR(ima_dir); + if (IS_ERR(ima_dir)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(ima_dir); + goto out; + } ima_symlink = securityfs_create_symlink("ima", NULL, "integrity/ima", NULL); @@ -573,59 +520,48 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) if (ret != 0) goto out; - binary_runtime_measurements = - securityfs_create_symlink("binary_runtime_measurements", ima_dir, + dentry = securityfs_create_symlink("binary_runtime_measurements", ima_dir, "binary_runtime_measurements_sha1", NULL); - if (IS_ERR(binary_runtime_measurements)) { - ret = PTR_ERR(binary_runtime_measurements); + if (IS_ERR(dentry)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(dentry); goto out; } - ascii_runtime_measurements = - securityfs_create_symlink("ascii_runtime_measurements", ima_dir, + dentry = securityfs_create_symlink("ascii_runtime_measurements", ima_dir, "ascii_runtime_measurements_sha1", NULL); - if (IS_ERR(ascii_runtime_measurements)) { - ret = PTR_ERR(ascii_runtime_measurements); + if (IS_ERR(dentry)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(dentry); goto out; } - runtime_measurements_count = - securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count", + dentry = securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, &ima_measurements_count_ops); - if (IS_ERR(runtime_measurements_count)) { - ret = PTR_ERR(runtime_measurements_count); + if (IS_ERR(dentry)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(dentry); goto out; } - violations = - securityfs_create_file("violations", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, + dentry = securityfs_create_file("violations", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, &ima_htable_violations_ops); - if (IS_ERR(violations)) { - ret = PTR_ERR(violations); + if (IS_ERR(dentry)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(dentry); goto out; } - ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS, + dentry = securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS, ima_dir, NULL, &ima_measure_policy_ops); - if (IS_ERR(ima_policy)) { - ret = PTR_ERR(ima_policy); + if (IS_ERR(dentry)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(dentry); goto out; } return 0; out: - securityfs_remove(ima_policy); - securityfs_remove(violations); - securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count); - securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements); - securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements); - remove_securityfs_measurement_lists(ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists); - remove_securityfs_measurement_lists(binary_securityfs_measurement_lists); - securityfs_measurement_list_count = 0; securityfs_remove(ima_symlink); securityfs_remove(ima_dir); + integrity_fs_fini(); return ret; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index f99ab1a3b0f0..b703bfc2f470 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/iversion.h> #include <linux/evm.h> +#include <linux/crash_dump.h> #include "ima.h" @@ -38,11 +39,30 @@ int ima_appraise; int __ro_after_init ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; static int hash_setup_done; +static int ima_disabled __ro_after_init; static struct notifier_block ima_lsm_policy_notifier = { .notifier_call = ima_lsm_policy_change, }; +static int __init ima_setup(char *str) +{ + if (!is_kdump_kernel()) { + pr_info("Warning: ima setup option only permitted in kdump"); + return 1; + } + + if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0) + ima_disabled = 1; + else if (strncmp(str, "on", 2) == 0) + ima_disabled = 0; + else + pr_err("Invalid ima setup option: \"%s\" , please specify ima=on|off.", str); + + return 1; +} +__setup("ima=", ima_setup); + static int __init hash_setup(char *str) { struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current(); @@ -1186,6 +1206,12 @@ static int __init init_ima(void) { int error; + /*Note that turning IMA off is intentionally limited to kdump kernel.*/ + if (ima_disabled && is_kdump_kernel()) { + pr_info("IMA functionality is disabled"); + return 0; + } + ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(); ima_init_template_list(); hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH); @@ -1253,10 +1279,10 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes ima_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { }; DEFINE_LSM(ima) = { - .name = "ima", + .id = &ima_lsmid, .init = init_ima_lsm, .order = LSM_ORDER_LAST, .blobs = &ima_blob_sizes, + /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */ + .initcall_late = init_ima, }; - -late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */ diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index c2c2da691123..7b388b66cf80 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ struct ima_file_id { int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset, void *addr, unsigned long count); +int __init integrity_fs_init(void); +void __init integrity_fs_fini(void); #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM 0 #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA 1 diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c index c85febca3343..714c961a00f5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c @@ -75,12 +75,13 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void) return -ENODEV; // Check for known secure boot implementations from OPAL or PLPKS - if (strcmp("ibm,edk2-compat-v1", buf) && strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v1", buf)) { + if (strcmp("ibm,edk2-compat-v1", buf) && strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v1", buf) && + strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v0", buf)) { pr_err("Unsupported secvar implementation \"%s\", not loading certs\n", buf); return -ENODEV; } - if (strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v1", buf) == 0) + if (strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v1", buf) == 0 || strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v0", buf) == 0) /* PLPKS authenticated variables ESL data is prefixed with 8 bytes of timestamp */ offset = 8; diff --git a/security/ipe/Kconfig b/security/ipe/Kconfig index 3c75bf267da4..a110a6cd848b 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Kconfig +++ b/security/ipe/Kconfig @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ menuconfig SECURITY_IPE bool "Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE)" depends on SECURITY && SECURITYFS && AUDIT && AUDITSYSCALL + select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256 select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION select IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY if DM_VERITY diff --git a/security/ipe/audit.c b/security/ipe/audit.c index 9668ecc5acd5..de5fed62592e 100644 --- a/security/ipe/audit.c +++ b/security/ipe/audit.c @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/types.h> -#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/sha2.h> #include "ipe.h" #include "eval.h" @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ #define ACTSTR(x) ((x) == IPE_ACTION_ALLOW ? "ALLOW" : "DENY") -#define IPE_AUDIT_HASH_ALG "sha256" +#define IPE_AUDIT_HASH_ALG "sha256" /* keep in sync with audit_policy() */ #define AUDIT_POLICY_LOAD_FMT "policy_name=\"%s\" policy_version=%hu.%hu.%hu "\ "policy_digest=" IPE_AUDIT_HASH_ALG ":" @@ -182,37 +182,14 @@ static void audit_policy(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *audit_format, const struct ipe_policy *const p) { - SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm); - struct crypto_shash *tfm; - u8 *digest = NULL; + u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; - tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(IPE_AUDIT_HASH_ALG, 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(tfm)) - return; - - desc->tfm = tfm; - - digest = kzalloc(crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!digest) - goto out; - - if (crypto_shash_init(desc)) - goto out; - - if (crypto_shash_update(desc, p->pkcs7, p->pkcs7len)) - goto out; - - if (crypto_shash_final(desc, digest)) - goto out; + sha256(p->pkcs7, p->pkcs7len, digest); audit_log_format(ab, audit_format, p->parsed->name, p->parsed->version.major, p->parsed->version.minor, p->parsed->version.rev); - audit_log_n_hex(ab, digest, crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm)); - -out: - kfree(digest); - crypto_free_shash(tfm); + audit_log_n_hex(ab, digest, sizeof(digest)); } /** diff --git a/security/ipe/fs.c b/security/ipe/fs.c index f40e50bfd2e7..076c111c85c8 100644 --- a/security/ipe/fs.c +++ b/security/ipe/fs.c @@ -12,11 +12,8 @@ #include "policy.h" #include "audit.h" -static struct dentry *np __ro_after_init; static struct dentry *root __ro_after_init; struct dentry *policy_root __ro_after_init; -static struct dentry *audit_node __ro_after_init; -static struct dentry *enforce_node __ro_after_init; /** * setaudit() - Write handler for the securityfs node, "ipe/success_audit" @@ -196,31 +193,30 @@ static const struct file_operations enforce_fops = { * Return: %0 on success. If an error occurs, the function will return * the -errno. */ -static int __init ipe_init_securityfs(void) +int __init ipe_init_securityfs(void) { int rc = 0; struct ipe_policy *ap; + struct dentry *dentry; if (!ipe_enabled) return -EOPNOTSUPP; root = securityfs_create_dir("ipe", NULL); - if (IS_ERR(root)) { - rc = PTR_ERR(root); - goto err; - } + if (IS_ERR(root)) + return PTR_ERR(root); - audit_node = securityfs_create_file("success_audit", 0600, root, + dentry = securityfs_create_file("success_audit", 0600, root, NULL, &audit_fops); - if (IS_ERR(audit_node)) { - rc = PTR_ERR(audit_node); + if (IS_ERR(dentry)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(dentry); goto err; } - enforce_node = securityfs_create_file("enforce", 0600, root, NULL, + dentry = securityfs_create_file("enforce", 0600, root, NULL, &enforce_fops); - if (IS_ERR(enforce_node)) { - rc = PTR_ERR(enforce_node); + if (IS_ERR(dentry)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(dentry); goto err; } @@ -237,20 +233,14 @@ static int __init ipe_init_securityfs(void) goto err; } - np = securityfs_create_file("new_policy", 0200, root, NULL, &np_fops); - if (IS_ERR(np)) { - rc = PTR_ERR(np); + dentry = securityfs_create_file("new_policy", 0200, root, NULL, &np_fops); + if (IS_ERR(dentry)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(dentry); goto err; } return 0; err: - securityfs_remove(np); - securityfs_remove(policy_root); - securityfs_remove(enforce_node); - securityfs_remove(audit_node); securityfs_remove(root); return rc; } - -fs_initcall(ipe_init_securityfs); diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c index 4317134cb0da..71644748ed56 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.c +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c @@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ static int __init ipe_init(void) } DEFINE_LSM(ipe) = { - .name = "ipe", + .id = &ipe_lsmid, .init = ipe_init, .blobs = &ipe_blobs, + .initcall_fs = ipe_init_securityfs, }; diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.h b/security/ipe/ipe.h index fb37513812dd..25cfdb8f0c20 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.h +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.h @@ -23,4 +23,6 @@ struct ipe_bdev *ipe_bdev(struct block_device *b); struct ipe_inode *ipe_inode(const struct inode *inode); #endif /* CONFIG_IPE_PROP_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIG */ +int ipe_init_securityfs(void); + #endif /* _IPE_H */ diff --git a/security/ipe/policy_fs.c b/security/ipe/policy_fs.c index db26032ccbe1..9d92d8a14b13 100644 --- a/security/ipe/policy_fs.c +++ b/security/ipe/policy_fs.c @@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ static const struct ipefs_file policy_subdir[] = { */ void ipe_del_policyfs_node(struct ipe_policy *p) { - securityfs_recursive_remove(p->policyfs); + securityfs_remove(p->policyfs); p->policyfs = NULL; } @@ -485,6 +485,6 @@ int ipe_new_policyfs_node(struct ipe_policy *p) return 0; err: - securityfs_recursive_remove(policyfs); + securityfs_remove(policyfs); return rc; } diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index d4f5fc1e7263..84f39e50ca36 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ # Key management configuration # -config KEYS +menuconfig KEYS bool "Enable access key retention support" select ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY help @@ -21,9 +21,10 @@ config KEYS If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. +if KEYS + config KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE bool "Enable temporary caching of the last request_key() result" - depends on KEYS help This option causes the result of the last successful request_key() call that didn't upcall to the kernel to be cached temporarily in the @@ -41,7 +42,6 @@ config KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE config PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS bool "Enable register of persistent per-UID keyrings" - depends on KEYS help This option provides a register of persistent per-UID keyrings, primarily aimed at Kerberos key storage. The keyrings are persistent @@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ config PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS config BIG_KEYS bool "Large payload keys" - depends on KEYS depends on TMPFS select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305 help @@ -70,7 +69,6 @@ config BIG_KEYS config TRUSTED_KEYS tristate "TRUSTED KEYS" - depends on KEYS help This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, @@ -85,12 +83,10 @@ endif config ENCRYPTED_KEYS tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS" - depends on KEYS select CRYPTO - select CRYPTO_HMAC select CRYPTO_AES select CRYPTO_CBC - select CRYPTO_SHA256 + select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256 select CRYPTO_RNG help This option provides support for create/encrypting/decrypting keys @@ -114,7 +110,6 @@ config USER_DECRYPTED_DATA config KEY_DH_OPERATIONS bool "Diffie-Hellman operations on retained keys" - depends on KEYS select CRYPTO select CRYPTO_KDF800108_CTR select CRYPTO_DH @@ -127,9 +122,11 @@ config KEY_DH_OPERATIONS config KEY_NOTIFICATIONS bool "Provide key/keyring change notifications" - depends on KEYS && WATCH_QUEUE + depends on WATCH_QUEUE help This option provides support for getting change notifications on keys and keyrings on which the caller has View permission. This makes use of pipes to handle the notification buffer and provides KEYCTL_WATCH_KEY to enable/disable watches. + +endif # KEYS diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c index c3367622c683..d46862ab90d6 100644 --- a/security/keys/big_key.c +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*payload) != sizeof(prep->payload.data)); - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 1024 * 1024 || !prep->data) + if (datalen == 0 || datalen > 1024 * 1024 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; /* Set an arbitrary quota */ diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.c index 8fdd76105ce3..2fc6f3a66135 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/ecryptfs_format.c @@ -54,8 +54,7 @@ int ecryptfs_fill_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *auth_tok, auth_tok->version = (((uint16_t)(major << 8) & 0xFF00) | ((uint16_t)minor & 0x00FF)); auth_tok->token_type = ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD; - strncpy((char *)auth_tok->token.password.signature, key_desc, - ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD_SIG_SIZE); + strscpy_pad(auth_tok->token.password.signature, key_desc); auth_tok->token.password.session_key_encryption_key_bytes = ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES; /* diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index 831cb84fd75a..596e7a30bd3c 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ #include <linux/scatterlist.h> #include <linux/ctype.h> #include <crypto/aes.h> -#include <crypto/hash.h> #include <crypto/sha2.h> #include <crypto/skcipher.h> #include <crypto/utils.h> @@ -37,8 +36,6 @@ static const char KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX[] = "trusted:"; static const char KEY_USER_PREFIX[] = "user:"; -static const char hash_alg[] = "sha256"; -static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha256)"; static const char blkcipher_alg[] = "cbc(aes)"; static const char key_format_default[] = "default"; static const char key_format_ecryptfs[] = "ecryptfs"; @@ -54,8 +51,6 @@ static int blksize; #define MIN_DATA_SIZE 20 #define KEY_ENC32_PAYLOAD_LEN 32 -static struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm; - enum { Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update, Opt_err }; @@ -329,26 +324,6 @@ error: return ukey; } -static int calc_hmac(u8 *digest, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen, - const u8 *buf, unsigned int buflen) -{ - struct crypto_shash *tfm; - int err; - - tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { - pr_err("encrypted_key: can't alloc %s transform: %ld\n", - hmac_alg, PTR_ERR(tfm)); - return PTR_ERR(tfm); - } - - err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, key, keylen); - if (!err) - err = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, buf, buflen, digest); - crypto_free_shash(tfm); - return err; -} - enum derived_key_type { ENC_KEY, AUTH_KEY }; /* Derive authentication/encryption key from trusted key */ @@ -357,7 +332,6 @@ static int get_derived_key(u8 *derived_key, enum derived_key_type key_type, { u8 *derived_buf; unsigned int derived_buf_len; - int ret; derived_buf_len = strlen("AUTH_KEY") + 1 + master_keylen; if (derived_buf_len < HASH_SIZE) @@ -374,10 +348,9 @@ static int get_derived_key(u8 *derived_key, enum derived_key_type key_type, memcpy(derived_buf + strlen(derived_buf) + 1, master_key, master_keylen); - ret = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(hash_tfm, derived_buf, derived_buf_len, - derived_key); + sha256(derived_buf, derived_buf_len, derived_key); kfree_sensitive(derived_buf); - return ret; + return 0; } static struct skcipher_request *init_skcipher_req(const u8 *key, @@ -503,10 +476,10 @@ static int datablob_hmac_append(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, goto out; digest = epayload->format + epayload->datablob_len; - ret = calc_hmac(digest, derived_key, sizeof derived_key, - epayload->format, epayload->datablob_len); - if (!ret) - dump_hmac(NULL, digest, HASH_SIZE); + hmac_sha256_usingrawkey(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key), + epayload->format, epayload->datablob_len, + digest); + dump_hmac(NULL, digest, HASH_SIZE); out: memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key)); return ret; @@ -534,9 +507,8 @@ static int datablob_hmac_verify(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, } else p = epayload->format; - ret = calc_hmac(digest, derived_key, sizeof derived_key, p, len); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; + hmac_sha256_usingrawkey(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key), p, len, + digest); ret = crypto_memneq(digest, epayload->format + epayload->datablob_len, sizeof(digest)); if (ret) { @@ -823,7 +795,7 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, size_t datalen = prep->datalen; int ret; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) + if (datalen == 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -884,7 +856,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) if (key_is_negative(key)) return -ENOKEY; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) + if (datalen == 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; buf = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -1011,29 +983,14 @@ static int __init init_encrypted(void) { int ret; - hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(hash_tfm)) { - pr_err("encrypted_key: can't allocate %s transform: %ld\n", - hash_alg, PTR_ERR(hash_tfm)); - return PTR_ERR(hash_tfm); - } - ret = aes_get_sizes(); if (ret < 0) - goto out; - ret = register_key_type(&key_type_encrypted); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - return 0; -out: - crypto_free_shash(hash_tfm); - return ret; - + return ret; + return register_key_type(&key_type_encrypted); } static void __exit cleanup_encrypted(void) { - crypto_free_shash(hash_tfm); unregister_key_type(&key_type_encrypted); } diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index b5d5333ab330..a63c46bb2d14 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static struct key *get_user_register(struct user_namespace *user_ns) if (!reg_keyring) { reg_keyring = keyring_alloc(".user_reg", user_ns->owner, INVALID_GID, - &init_cred, + kernel_cred(), KEY_POS_WRITE | KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ, 0, diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig index 1fb8aa001995..204a68c1429d 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig @@ -5,10 +5,9 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM bool "TPM-based trusted keys" depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS default y - select CRYPTO - select CRYPTO_HMAC - select CRYPTO_SHA1 select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO + select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA1 + select CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS select ASN1_ENCODER select OID_REGISTRY select ASN1 diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c index e2d9644efde1..b1680ee53f86 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, int key_cmd; size_t key_len; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) + if (datalen == 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; orig_datablob = datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) p = key->payload.data[0]; if (!p->migratable) return -EPERM; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) + if (datalen == 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; orig_datablob = datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index 89c9798d1800..636acb66a4f6 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ */ #include <crypto/hash_info.h> +#include <crypto/sha1.h> +#include <crypto/utils.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/parser.h> @@ -14,78 +16,92 @@ #include <linux/err.h> #include <keys/trusted-type.h> #include <linux/key-type.h> -#include <linux/crypto.h> -#include <crypto/hash.h> -#include <crypto/sha1.h> #include <linux/tpm.h> #include <linux/tpm_command.h> #include <keys/trusted_tpm.h> -static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)"; -static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1"; static struct tpm_chip *chip; static struct tpm_digest *digests; -struct sdesc { - struct shash_desc shash; - char ctx[]; +/* implementation specific TPM constants */ +#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2 +#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6 +#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10 + +#define LOAD32(buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])) +#define LOAD32N(buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]) +#define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset])) + +struct osapsess { + uint32_t handle; + unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; }; -static struct crypto_shash *hashalg; -static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg; +/* discrete values, but have to store in uint16_t for TPM use */ +enum { + SEAL_keytype = 1, + SRK_keytype = 4 +}; -static struct sdesc *init_sdesc(struct crypto_shash *alg) +#define TPM_DEBUG 0 + +#if TPM_DEBUG +static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) { - struct sdesc *sdesc; - int size; - - size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(alg); - sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!sdesc) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - sdesc->shash.tfm = alg; - return sdesc; + pr_info("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); + pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); + pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); + pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); } -static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int datalen, - unsigned char *digest) +static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) { - struct sdesc *sdesc; - int ret; + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0); + pr_info("secret:\n"); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); + pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n"); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); +} - sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); - if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { - pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); - return PTR_ERR(sdesc); - } +static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf) +{ + int len; - ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest); - kfree_sensitive(sdesc); - return ret; + pr_info("\ntpm buffer\n"); + len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0); +} +#else +static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) +{ } +static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) +{ +} + +static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf) +{ +} +#endif + static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen, ...) { - struct sdesc *sdesc; + struct hmac_sha1_ctx hmac_ctx; va_list argp; unsigned int dlen; unsigned char *data; - int ret; + int ret = 0; - sdesc = init_sdesc(hmacalg); - if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { - pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg); - return PTR_ERR(sdesc); - } - - ret = crypto_shash_setkey(hmacalg, key, keylen); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; + hmac_sha1_init_usingrawkey(&hmac_ctx, key, keylen); va_start(argp, keylen); for (;;) { @@ -97,46 +113,34 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, ret = -EINVAL; break; } - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen); - if (ret < 0) - break; + hmac_sha1_update(&hmac_ctx, data, dlen); } va_end(argp); if (!ret) - ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest); -out: - kfree_sensitive(sdesc); + hmac_sha1_final(&hmac_ctx, digest); return ret; } /* * calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM */ -int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, +static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1, unsigned char *h2, unsigned int h3, ...) { unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - struct sdesc *sdesc; + struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx; unsigned int dlen; unsigned char *data; unsigned char c; - int ret; + int ret = 0; va_list argp; if (!chip) return -ENODEV; - sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); - if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { - pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); - return PTR_ERR(sdesc); - } - c = !!h3; - ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; + sha1_init(&sha_ctx); va_start(argp, h3); for (;;) { dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); @@ -147,27 +151,22 @@ int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, ret = -EINVAL; break; } - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen); - if (ret < 0) - break; + sha1_update(&sha_ctx, data, dlen); } va_end(argp); if (!ret) - ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); + sha1_final(&sha_ctx, paramdigest); if (!ret) ret = TSS_rawhmac(digest, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0); -out: - kfree_sensitive(sdesc); return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_authhmac); /* * verify the AUTH1_COMMAND (Seal) result from TPM */ -int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, +static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, const uint32_t command, const unsigned char *ononce, const unsigned char *key, @@ -182,7 +181,7 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, unsigned char *authdata; unsigned char testhmac[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - struct sdesc *sdesc; + struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx; unsigned int dlen; unsigned int dpos; va_list argp; @@ -203,51 +202,30 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, continueflag = authdata - 1; enonce = continueflag - TPM_NONCE_SIZE; - sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); - if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { - pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); - return PTR_ERR(sdesc); - } - ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result, - sizeof result); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal, - sizeof ordinal); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; + sha1_init(&sha_ctx); + sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&result, sizeof(result)); + sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&ordinal, sizeof(ordinal)); va_start(argp, keylen); for (;;) { dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); if (dlen == 0) break; dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen); - if (ret < 0) - break; + sha1_update(&sha_ctx, buffer + dpos, dlen); } va_end(argp); - if (!ret) - ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; + sha1_final(&sha_ctx, paramdigest); ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag, 0, 0); if (ret < 0) - goto out; + return ret; - if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) - ret = -EINVAL; -out: - kfree_sensitive(sdesc); - return ret; + if (crypto_memneq(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_checkhmac1); /* * verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM @@ -273,7 +251,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer, unsigned char testhmac1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; unsigned char testhmac2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - struct sdesc *sdesc; + struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx; unsigned int dlen; unsigned int dpos; va_list argp; @@ -296,22 +274,9 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer, enonce1 = continueflag1 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE; enonce2 = continueflag2 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE; - sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); - if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { - pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); - return PTR_ERR(sdesc); - } - ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result, - sizeof result); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal, - sizeof ordinal); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; + sha1_init(&sha_ctx); + sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&result, sizeof(result)); + sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&ordinal, sizeof(ordinal)); va_start(argp, keylen2); for (;;) { @@ -319,42 +284,33 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer, if (dlen == 0) break; dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); - ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen); - if (ret < 0) - break; + sha1_update(&sha_ctx, buffer + dpos, dlen); } va_end(argp); - if (!ret) - ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; + sha1_final(&sha_ctx, paramdigest); ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac1, key1, keylen1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0); if (ret < 0) - goto out; - if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) { - ret = -EINVAL; - goto out; - } + return ret; + if (crypto_memneq(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac2, key2, keylen2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce2, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0); if (ret < 0) - goto out; - if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) - ret = -EINVAL; -out: - kfree_sensitive(sdesc); - return ret; + return ret; + if (crypto_memneq(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; } /* * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function. */ -int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen) +static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen) { struct tpm_buf buf; int rc; @@ -380,7 +336,6 @@ int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen) tpm_put_ops(chip); return rc; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trusted_tpm_send); /* * Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR. @@ -434,7 +389,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, /* * Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session */ -int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) +static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) { int ret; @@ -451,7 +406,6 @@ int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) TPM_NONCE_SIZE); return 0; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(oiap); struct tpm_digests { unsigned char encauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; @@ -498,9 +452,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, /* calculate encrypted authorization value */ memcpy(td->xorwork, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); memcpy(td->xorwork + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, sess.enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - ret = TSS_sha1(td->xorwork, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, td->xorhash); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; + sha1(td->xorwork, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, td->xorhash); ret = tpm_get_random(chip, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); if (ret < 0) @@ -989,40 +941,6 @@ static int trusted_tpm_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) return tpm_get_random(chip, key, key_len); } -static void trusted_shash_release(void) -{ - if (hashalg) - crypto_free_shash(hashalg); - if (hmacalg) - crypto_free_shash(hmacalg); -} - -static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void) -{ - int ret; - - hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) { - pr_info("could not allocate crypto %s\n", - hmac_alg); - return PTR_ERR(hmacalg); - } - - hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) { - pr_info("could not allocate crypto %s\n", - hash_alg); - ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg); - goto hashalg_fail; - } - - return 0; - -hashalg_fail: - crypto_free_shash(hmacalg); - return ret; -} - static int __init init_digests(void) { int i; @@ -1049,15 +967,10 @@ static int __init trusted_tpm_init(void) ret = init_digests(); if (ret < 0) goto err_put; - ret = trusted_shash_alloc(); - if (ret < 0) - goto err_free; ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); if (ret < 0) - goto err_release; + goto err_free; return 0; -err_release: - trusted_shash_release(); err_free: kfree(digests); err_put: @@ -1070,7 +983,6 @@ static void trusted_tpm_exit(void) if (chip) { put_device(&chip->dev); kfree(digests); - trusted_shash_release(); unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); } } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 024be262702f..91656e44b326 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -18,14 +18,6 @@ #include "tpm2key.asn1.h" -static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { - {HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1}, - {HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256}, - {HASH_ALGO_SHA384, TPM_ALG_SHA384}, - {HASH_ALGO_SHA512, TPM_ALG_SHA512}, - {HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256}, -}; - static u32 tpm2key_oid[] = { 2, 23, 133, 10, 1, 5 }; static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, @@ -244,20 +236,13 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; struct tpm_buf buf, sized; int blob_len = 0; - u32 hash; + int hash; u32 flags; - int i; int rc; - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) { - if (options->hash == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) { - hash = tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id; - break; - } - } - - if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map)) - return -EINVAL; + hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash); + if (hash < 0) + return hash; if (!options->keyhandle) return -EINVAL; @@ -387,6 +372,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_options *options, u32 *blob_handle) { + u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL; struct tpm_buf buf; unsigned int private_len; unsigned int public_len; @@ -400,6 +386,9 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, /* old form */ blob = payload->blob; payload->old_format = 1; + } else { + /* Bind for cleanup: */ + blob_ref = blob; } /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */ @@ -464,8 +453,6 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); out: - if (blob != payload->blob) - kfree(blob); tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); if (rc > 0) diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c index 749e2a4dcb13..686d56e4cc85 100644 --- a/security/keys/user_defined.c +++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ int user_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) struct user_key_payload *upayload; size_t datalen = prep->datalen; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) + if (datalen == 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; upayload = kmalloc(sizeof(*upayload) + datalen, GFP_KERNEL); diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c index 6fee7c20f64d..cee2b6f22c83 100644 --- a/security/landlock/fs.c +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c @@ -895,6 +895,7 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed( /* Stops when a rule from each layer grants access. */ if (allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2) break; + jump_up: if (walker_path.dentry == walker_path.mnt->mnt_root) { if (follow_up(&walker_path)) { @@ -1280,7 +1281,7 @@ static void hook_sb_delete(struct super_block *const sb) struct landlock_object *object; /* Only handles referenced inodes. */ - if (!atomic_read(&inode->i_count)) + if (!icount_read(inode)) continue; /* @@ -1295,7 +1296,7 @@ static void hook_sb_delete(struct super_block *const sb) * second call to iput() for the same Landlock object. Also * checks I_NEW because such inode cannot be tied to an object. */ - if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE | I_NEW)) { + if (inode_state_read(inode) & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE | I_NEW)) { spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); continue; } @@ -1334,11 +1335,10 @@ static void hook_sb_delete(struct super_block *const sb) * At this point, we own the ihold() reference that was * originally set up by get_inode_object() and the * __iget() reference that we just set in this loop - * walk. Therefore the following call to iput() will - * not sleep nor drop the inode because there is now at - * least two references to it. + * walk. Therefore there are at least two references + * on the inode. */ - iput(inode); + iput_not_last(inode); } else { spin_unlock(&object->lock); rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/security/landlock/id.c b/security/landlock/id.c index 56f7cc0fc744..838c3ed7bb82 100644 --- a/security/landlock/id.c +++ b/security/landlock/id.c @@ -119,6 +119,12 @@ static u64 get_id_range(size_t number_of_ids, atomic64_t *const counter, #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST +static u8 get_random_u8_positive(void) +{ + /* max() evaluates its arguments once. */ + return max(1, get_random_u8()); +} + static void test_range1_rand0(struct kunit *const test) { atomic64_t counter; @@ -127,9 +133,10 @@ static void test_range1_rand0(struct kunit *const test) init = get_random_u32(); atomic64_set(&counter, init); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(1, &counter, 0), init); - KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ( - test, get_id_range(get_random_u8(), &counter, get_random_u8()), - init + 1); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, + get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter, + get_random_u8()), + init + 1); } static void test_range1_rand1(struct kunit *const test) @@ -140,9 +147,10 @@ static void test_range1_rand1(struct kunit *const test) init = get_random_u32(); atomic64_set(&counter, init); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(1, &counter, 1), init); - KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ( - test, get_id_range(get_random_u8(), &counter, get_random_u8()), - init + 2); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, + get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter, + get_random_u8()), + init + 2); } static void test_range1_rand15(struct kunit *const test) @@ -153,9 +161,10 @@ static void test_range1_rand15(struct kunit *const test) init = get_random_u32(); atomic64_set(&counter, init); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(1, &counter, 15), init); - KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ( - test, get_id_range(get_random_u8(), &counter, get_random_u8()), - init + 16); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, + get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter, + get_random_u8()), + init + 16); } static void test_range1_rand16(struct kunit *const test) @@ -166,9 +175,10 @@ static void test_range1_rand16(struct kunit *const test) init = get_random_u32(); atomic64_set(&counter, init); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(1, &counter, 16), init); - KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ( - test, get_id_range(get_random_u8(), &counter, get_random_u8()), - init + 1); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, + get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter, + get_random_u8()), + init + 1); } static void test_range2_rand0(struct kunit *const test) @@ -179,9 +189,10 @@ static void test_range2_rand0(struct kunit *const test) init = get_random_u32(); atomic64_set(&counter, init); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(2, &counter, 0), init); - KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ( - test, get_id_range(get_random_u8(), &counter, get_random_u8()), - init + 2); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, + get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter, + get_random_u8()), + init + 2); } static void test_range2_rand1(struct kunit *const test) @@ -192,9 +203,10 @@ static void test_range2_rand1(struct kunit *const test) init = get_random_u32(); atomic64_set(&counter, init); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(2, &counter, 1), init); - KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ( - test, get_id_range(get_random_u8(), &counter, get_random_u8()), - init + 3); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, + get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter, + get_random_u8()), + init + 3); } static void test_range2_rand2(struct kunit *const test) @@ -205,9 +217,10 @@ static void test_range2_rand2(struct kunit *const test) init = get_random_u32(); atomic64_set(&counter, init); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(2, &counter, 2), init); - KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ( - test, get_id_range(get_random_u8(), &counter, get_random_u8()), - init + 4); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, + get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter, + get_random_u8()), + init + 4); } static void test_range2_rand15(struct kunit *const test) @@ -218,9 +231,10 @@ static void test_range2_rand15(struct kunit *const test) init = get_random_u32(); atomic64_set(&counter, init); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(2, &counter, 15), init); - KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ( - test, get_id_range(get_random_u8(), &counter, get_random_u8()), - init + 17); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, + get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter, + get_random_u8()), + init + 17); } static void test_range2_rand16(struct kunit *const test) @@ -231,9 +245,10 @@ static void test_range2_rand16(struct kunit *const test) init = get_random_u32(); atomic64_set(&counter, init); KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, get_id_range(2, &counter, 16), init); - KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ( - test, get_id_range(get_random_u8(), &counter, get_random_u8()), - init + 2); + KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, + get_id_range(get_random_u8_positive(), &counter, + get_random_u8()), + init + 2); } #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_KUNIT_TEST */ diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c index bd53c7a56ab9..47dac1736f10 100644 --- a/security/landlock/setup.c +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static int __init landlock_init(void) } DEFINE_LSM(LANDLOCK_NAME) = { - .name = LANDLOCK_NAME, + .id = &landlock_lsmid, .init = landlock_init, .blobs = &landlock_blob_sizes, }; diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c index 33eafb71e4f3..0116e9f93ffe 100644 --- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c +++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c @@ -303,7 +303,6 @@ static int get_path_from_fd(const s32 fd, struct path *const path) if ((fd_file(f)->f_op == &ruleset_fops) || (fd_file(f)->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL) || (fd_file(f)->f_path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) || - d_is_negative(fd_file(f)->f_path.dentry) || IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(fd_file(f)->f_path.dentry))) return -EBADFD; diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c index 68252452b66c..273ffbd6defe 100644 --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c @@ -270,11 +270,6 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void) return 0; } -DEFINE_LSM(loadpin) = { - .name = "loadpin", - .init = loadpin_init, -}; - #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_VERITY enum loadpin_securityfs_interface_index { @@ -434,9 +429,15 @@ static int __init init_loadpin_securityfs(void) return 0; } -fs_initcall(init_loadpin_securityfs); +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_VERITY */ +DEFINE_LSM(loadpin) = { + .id = &loadpin_lsmid, + .init = loadpin_init, +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_VERITY + .initcall_fs = init_loadpin_securityfs, #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_VERITY */ +}; /* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */ module_param(enforce, int, 0); diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c index cf83afa1d879..8d46886d2cca 100644 --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c @@ -161,13 +161,12 @@ static int __init lockdown_secfs_init(void) return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(dentry); } -core_initcall(lockdown_secfs_init); - #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY DEFINE_EARLY_LSM(lockdown) = { #else DEFINE_LSM(lockdown) = { #endif - .name = "lockdown", + .id = &lockdown_lsmid, .init = lockdown_lsm_init, + .initcall_core = lockdown_secfs_init, }; diff --git a/security/lsm.h b/security/lsm.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..81aadbc61685 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/lsm.h @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * LSM functions + */ + +#ifndef _LSM_H_ +#define _LSM_H_ + +#include <linux/printk.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> +#include <linux/lsm_count.h> + +/* LSM debugging */ +extern bool lsm_debug; +#define lsm_pr(...) pr_info(__VA_ARGS__) +#define lsm_pr_cont(...) pr_cont(__VA_ARGS__) +#define lsm_pr_dbg(...) \ + do { \ + if (lsm_debug) \ + pr_info(__VA_ARGS__); \ + } while (0) + +/* List of configured LSMs */ +extern unsigned int lsm_active_cnt; +extern const struct lsm_id *lsm_idlist[]; + +/* LSM blob configuration */ +extern struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes; + +/* LSM blob caches */ +extern struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache; +extern struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache; + +/* LSM blob allocators */ +int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp); +int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task); + +/* LSM framework initializers */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_MMU +int min_addr_init(void); +#else +static inline int min_addr_init(void) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS +int securityfs_init(void); +#else +static inline int securityfs_init(void) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITYFS */ + +#endif /* _LSM_H_ */ diff --git a/security/lsm_init.c b/security/lsm_init.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..05bd52e6b1f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/lsm_init.c @@ -0,0 +1,564 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * LSM initialization functions + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "LSM: " fmt + +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> + +#include "lsm.h" + +/* LSM enabled constants. */ +static __initdata int lsm_enabled_true = 1; +static __initdata int lsm_enabled_false = 0; + +/* Pointers to LSM sections defined in include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h */ +extern struct lsm_info __start_lsm_info[], __end_lsm_info[]; +extern struct lsm_info __start_early_lsm_info[], __end_early_lsm_info[]; + +/* Number of "early" LSMs */ +static __initdata unsigned int lsm_count_early; + +/* Build and boot-time LSM ordering. */ +static __initconst const char *const lsm_order_builtin = CONFIG_LSM; +static __initdata const char *lsm_order_cmdline; +static __initdata const char *lsm_order_legacy; + +/* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */ +static __initdata struct lsm_info *lsm_order[MAX_LSM_COUNT + 1]; +static __initdata struct lsm_info *lsm_exclusive; + +#define lsm_order_for_each(iter) \ + for ((iter) = lsm_order; *(iter); (iter)++) +#define lsm_for_each_raw(iter) \ + for ((iter) = __start_lsm_info; \ + (iter) < __end_lsm_info; (iter)++) +#define lsm_early_for_each_raw(iter) \ + for ((iter) = __start_early_lsm_info; \ + (iter) < __end_early_lsm_info; (iter)++) + +#define lsm_initcall(level) \ + ({ \ + int _r, _rc = 0; \ + struct lsm_info **_lp, *_l; \ + lsm_order_for_each(_lp) { \ + _l = *_lp; \ + if (!_l->initcall_##level) \ + continue; \ + lsm_pr_dbg("running %s %s initcall", \ + _l->id->name, #level); \ + _r = _l->initcall_##level(); \ + if (_r) { \ + pr_warn("failed LSM %s %s initcall with errno %d\n", \ + _l->id->name, #level, _r); \ + if (!_rc) \ + _rc = _r; \ + } \ + } \ + _rc; \ + }) + +/** + * lsm_choose_security - Legacy "major" LSM selection + * @str: kernel command line parameter + */ +static int __init lsm_choose_security(char *str) +{ + lsm_order_legacy = str; + return 1; +} +__setup("security=", lsm_choose_security); + +/** + * lsm_choose_lsm - Modern LSM selection + * @str: kernel command line parameter + */ +static int __init lsm_choose_lsm(char *str) +{ + lsm_order_cmdline = str; + return 1; +} +__setup("lsm=", lsm_choose_lsm); + +/** + * lsm_debug_enable - Enable LSM framework debugging + * @str: kernel command line parameter + * + * Currently we only provide debug info during LSM initialization, but we may + * want to expand this in the future. + */ +static int __init lsm_debug_enable(char *str) +{ + lsm_debug = true; + return 1; +} +__setup("lsm.debug", lsm_debug_enable); + +/** + * lsm_enabled_set - Mark a LSM as enabled + * @lsm: LSM definition + * @enabled: enabled flag + */ +static void __init lsm_enabled_set(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled) +{ + /* + * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use + * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state. + */ + if (!lsm->enabled || + lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true || + lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) { + lsm->enabled = enabled ? &lsm_enabled_true : &lsm_enabled_false; + } else { + *lsm->enabled = enabled; + } +} + +/** + * lsm_is_enabled - Determine if a LSM is enabled + * @lsm: LSM definition + */ +static inline bool lsm_is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm) +{ + return (lsm->enabled ? *lsm->enabled : false); +} + +/** + * lsm_order_exists - Determine if a LSM exists in the ordered list + * @lsm: LSM definition + */ +static bool __init lsm_order_exists(struct lsm_info *lsm) +{ + struct lsm_info **check; + + lsm_order_for_each(check) { + if (*check == lsm) + return true; + } + + return false; +} + +/** + * lsm_order_append - Append a LSM to the ordered list + * @lsm: LSM definition + * @src: source of the addition + * + * Append @lsm to the enabled LSM array after ensuring that it hasn't been + * explicitly disabled, is a duplicate entry, or would run afoul of the + * LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE logic. + */ +static void __init lsm_order_append(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *src) +{ + /* Ignore duplicate selections. */ + if (lsm_order_exists(lsm)) + return; + + /* Skip explicitly disabled LSMs. */ + if (lsm->enabled && !lsm_is_enabled(lsm)) { + lsm_pr_dbg("skip previously disabled LSM %s:%s\n", + src, lsm->id->name); + return; + } + + if (lsm_active_cnt == MAX_LSM_COUNT) { + pr_warn("exceeded maximum LSM count on %s:%s\n", + src, lsm->id->name); + lsm_enabled_set(lsm, false); + return; + } + + if (lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) { + if (lsm_exclusive) { + lsm_pr_dbg("skip exclusive LSM conflict %s:%s\n", + src, lsm->id->name); + lsm_enabled_set(lsm, false); + return; + } else { + lsm_pr_dbg("select exclusive LSM %s:%s\n", + src, lsm->id->name); + lsm_exclusive = lsm; + } + } + + lsm_enabled_set(lsm, true); + lsm_order[lsm_active_cnt] = lsm; + lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt++] = lsm->id; + + lsm_pr_dbg("enabling LSM %s:%s\n", src, lsm->id->name); +} + +/** + * lsm_order_parse - Parse the comma delimited LSM list + * @list: LSM list + * @src: source of the list + */ +static void __init lsm_order_parse(const char *list, const char *src) +{ + struct lsm_info *lsm; + char *sep, *name, *next; + + /* Handle any Legacy LSM exclusions if one was specified. */ + if (lsm_order_legacy) { + /* + * To match the original "security=" behavior, this explicitly + * does NOT fallback to another Legacy Major if the selected + * one was separately disabled: disable all non-matching + * Legacy Major LSMs. + */ + lsm_for_each_raw(lsm) { + if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) && + strcmp(lsm->id->name, lsm_order_legacy)) { + lsm_enabled_set(lsm, false); + lsm_pr_dbg("skip legacy LSM conflict %s:%s\n", + src, lsm->id->name); + } + } + } + + /* LSM_ORDER_FIRST */ + lsm_for_each_raw(lsm) { + if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_FIRST) + lsm_order_append(lsm, "first"); + } + + /* Normal or "mutable" LSMs */ + sep = kstrdup(list, GFP_KERNEL); + next = sep; + /* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */ + while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) { + lsm_for_each_raw(lsm) { + if (!strcmp(lsm->id->name, name) && + lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE) + lsm_order_append(lsm, src); + } + } + kfree(sep); + + /* Legacy LSM if specified. */ + if (lsm_order_legacy) { + lsm_for_each_raw(lsm) { + if (!strcmp(lsm->id->name, lsm_order_legacy)) + lsm_order_append(lsm, src); + } + } + + /* LSM_ORDER_LAST */ + lsm_for_each_raw(lsm) { + if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_LAST) + lsm_order_append(lsm, "last"); + } + + /* Disable all LSMs not previously enabled. */ + lsm_for_each_raw(lsm) { + if (lsm_order_exists(lsm)) + continue; + lsm_enabled_set(lsm, false); + lsm_pr_dbg("skip disabled LSM %s:%s\n", src, lsm->id->name); + } +} + +/** + * lsm_blob_size_update - Update the LSM blob size and offset information + * @sz_req: the requested additional blob size + * @sz_cur: the existing blob size + */ +static void __init lsm_blob_size_update(unsigned int *sz_req, + unsigned int *sz_cur) +{ + unsigned int offset; + + if (*sz_req == 0) + return; + + offset = ALIGN(*sz_cur, sizeof(void *)); + *sz_cur = offset + *sz_req; + *sz_req = offset; +} + +/** + * lsm_prepare - Prepare the LSM framework for a new LSM + * @lsm: LSM definition + */ +static void __init lsm_prepare(struct lsm_info *lsm) +{ + struct lsm_blob_sizes *blobs = lsm->blobs; + + if (!blobs) + return; + + /* Register the LSM blob sizes. */ + blobs = lsm->blobs; + lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred); + lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file); + lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_ib, &blob_sizes.lbs_ib); + /* inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to LSM blobs. */ + if (blobs->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0) + blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head); + lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode); + lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); + lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_key, &blob_sizes.lbs_key); + lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); + lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_perf_event, + &blob_sizes.lbs_perf_event); + lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock); + lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_superblock, + &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); + lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); + lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_tun_dev, &blob_sizes.lbs_tun_dev); + lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_xattr_count, + &blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count); + lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_bdev, &blob_sizes.lbs_bdev); + lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_bpf_map, &blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_map); + lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_bpf_prog, &blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_prog); + lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_bpf_token, &blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_token); +} + +/** + * lsm_init_single - Initialize a given LSM + * @lsm: LSM definition + */ +static void __init lsm_init_single(struct lsm_info *lsm) +{ + int ret; + + if (!lsm_is_enabled(lsm)) + return; + + lsm_pr_dbg("initializing %s\n", lsm->id->name); + ret = lsm->init(); + WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->id->name, ret); +} + +/** + * lsm_static_call_init - Initialize a LSM's static calls + * @hl: LSM hook list + */ +static int __init lsm_static_call_init(struct security_hook_list *hl) +{ + struct lsm_static_call *scall = hl->scalls; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_COUNT; i++) { + /* Update the first static call that is not used yet */ + if (!scall->hl) { + __static_call_update(scall->key, scall->trampoline, + hl->hook.lsm_func_addr); + scall->hl = hl; + static_branch_enable(scall->active); + return 0; + } + scall++; + } + + return -ENOSPC; +} + +/** + * security_add_hooks - Add a LSM's hooks to the LSM framework's hook lists + * @hooks: LSM hooks to add + * @count: number of hooks to add + * @lsmid: identification information for the LSM + * + * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the LSM framework. + */ +void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, + const struct lsm_id *lsmid) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid; + if (lsm_static_call_init(&hooks[i])) + panic("exhausted LSM callback slots with LSM %s\n", + lsmid->name); + } +} + +/** + * early_security_init - Initialize the early LSMs + */ +int __init early_security_init(void) +{ + struct lsm_info *lsm; + + /* NOTE: lsm_pr_dbg() doesn't work here as lsm_debug is not yet set */ + + lsm_early_for_each_raw(lsm) { + lsm_enabled_set(lsm, true); + lsm_order_append(lsm, "early"); + lsm_prepare(lsm); + lsm_init_single(lsm); + lsm_count_early++; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * security_init - Initializes the LSM framework + * + * This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence. + */ +int __init security_init(void) +{ + unsigned int cnt; + struct lsm_info **lsm; + + if (lsm_debug) { + struct lsm_info *i; + + cnt = 0; + lsm_pr("available LSMs: "); + lsm_early_for_each_raw(i) + lsm_pr_cont("%s%s(E)", (cnt++ ? "," : ""), i->id->name); + lsm_for_each_raw(i) + lsm_pr_cont("%s%s", (cnt++ ? "," : ""), i->id->name); + lsm_pr_cont("\n"); + + lsm_pr("built-in LSM config: %s\n", lsm_order_builtin); + + lsm_pr("legacy LSM parameter: %s\n", lsm_order_legacy); + lsm_pr("boot LSM parameter: %s\n", lsm_order_cmdline); + + /* see the note about lsm_pr_dbg() in early_security_init() */ + lsm_early_for_each_raw(i) + lsm_pr("enabled LSM early:%s\n", i->id->name); + } + + if (lsm_order_cmdline) { + if (lsm_order_legacy) + lsm_order_legacy = NULL; + lsm_order_parse(lsm_order_cmdline, "cmdline"); + } else + lsm_order_parse(lsm_order_builtin, "builtin"); + + lsm_order_for_each(lsm) + lsm_prepare(*lsm); + + if (lsm_debug) { + lsm_pr("blob(cred) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred); + lsm_pr("blob(file) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file); + lsm_pr("blob(ib) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ib); + lsm_pr("blob(inode) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode); + lsm_pr("blob(ipc) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); + lsm_pr("blob(key) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_key); + lsm_pr("blob(msg_msg)_size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); + lsm_pr("blob(sock) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock); + lsm_pr("blob(superblock) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); + lsm_pr("blob(perf_event) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_perf_event); + lsm_pr("blob(task) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task); + lsm_pr("blob(tun_dev) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_tun_dev); + lsm_pr("blob(xattr) count %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count); + lsm_pr("blob(bdev) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bdev); + lsm_pr("blob(bpf_map) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_map); + lsm_pr("blob(bpf_prog) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_prog); + lsm_pr("blob(bpf_token) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_token); + } + + if (blob_sizes.lbs_file) + lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache", + blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0, + SLAB_PANIC, NULL); + if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode) + lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache", + blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0, + SLAB_PANIC, NULL); + + if (lsm_cred_alloc((struct cred *)unrcu_pointer(current->cred), + GFP_KERNEL)) + panic("early LSM cred alloc failed\n"); + if (lsm_task_alloc(current)) + panic("early LSM task alloc failed\n"); + + cnt = 0; + lsm_order_for_each(lsm) { + /* skip the "early" LSMs as they have already been setup */ + if (cnt++ < lsm_count_early) + continue; + lsm_init_single(*lsm); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * security_initcall_pure - Run the LSM pure initcalls + */ +static int __init security_initcall_pure(void) +{ + int rc_adr, rc_lsm; + + rc_adr = min_addr_init(); + rc_lsm = lsm_initcall(pure); + + return (rc_adr ? rc_adr : rc_lsm); +} +pure_initcall(security_initcall_pure); + +/** + * security_initcall_early - Run the LSM early initcalls + */ +static int __init security_initcall_early(void) +{ + return lsm_initcall(early); +} +early_initcall(security_initcall_early); + +/** + * security_initcall_core - Run the LSM core initcalls + */ +static int __init security_initcall_core(void) +{ + int rc_sfs, rc_lsm; + + rc_sfs = securityfs_init(); + rc_lsm = lsm_initcall(core); + + return (rc_sfs ? rc_sfs : rc_lsm); +} +core_initcall(security_initcall_core); + +/** + * security_initcall_subsys - Run the LSM subsys initcalls + */ +static int __init security_initcall_subsys(void) +{ + return lsm_initcall(subsys); +} +subsys_initcall(security_initcall_subsys); + +/** + * security_initcall_fs - Run the LSM fs initcalls + */ +static int __init security_initcall_fs(void) +{ + return lsm_initcall(fs); +} +fs_initcall(security_initcall_fs); + +/** + * security_initcall_device - Run the LSM device initcalls + */ +static int __init security_initcall_device(void) +{ + return lsm_initcall(device); +} +device_initcall(security_initcall_device); + +/** + * security_initcall_late - Run the LSM late initcalls + */ +static int __init security_initcall_late(void) +{ + int rc; + + rc = lsm_initcall(late); + lsm_pr_dbg("all enabled LSMs fully activated\n"); + call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_STARTED_ALL, NULL); + + return rc; +} +late_initcall(security_initcall_late); diff --git a/security/lsm_notifier.c b/security/lsm_notifier.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c92fad5d57d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/lsm_notifier.c @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * LSM notifier functions + * + */ + +#include <linux/notifier.h> +#include <linux/security.h> + +static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain); + +int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data) +{ + return blocking_notifier_call_chain(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, + event, data); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_blocking_lsm_notifier); + +int register_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) +{ + return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, + nb); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_blocking_lsm_notifier); + +int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) +{ + return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, + nb); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier); diff --git a/security/lsm_syscalls.c b/security/lsm_syscalls.c index 8440948a690c..5648b1f0ce9c 100644 --- a/security/lsm_syscalls.c +++ b/security/lsm_syscalls.c @@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h> +#include "lsm.h" + /** * lsm_name_to_attr - map an LSM attribute name to its ID * @name: name of the attribute diff --git a/security/min_addr.c b/security/min_addr.c index df1bc643d886..0fde5ec9abc8 100644 --- a/security/min_addr.c +++ b/security/min_addr.c @@ -3,6 +3,9 @@ #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/sysctl.h> +#include <linux/minmax.h> + +#include "lsm.h" /* amount of vm to protect from userspace access by both DAC and the LSM*/ unsigned long mmap_min_addr; @@ -16,10 +19,7 @@ unsigned long dac_mmap_min_addr = CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR; static void update_mmap_min_addr(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR - if (dac_mmap_min_addr > CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) - mmap_min_addr = dac_mmap_min_addr; - else - mmap_min_addr = CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR; + mmap_min_addr = umax(dac_mmap_min_addr, CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR); #else mmap_min_addr = dac_mmap_min_addr; #endif @@ -54,11 +54,10 @@ static const struct ctl_table min_addr_sysctl_table[] = { }, }; -static int __init init_mmap_min_addr(void) +int __init min_addr_init(void) { register_sysctl_init("vm", min_addr_sysctl_table); update_mmap_min_addr(); return 0; } -pure_initcall(init_mmap_min_addr); diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c index 1ba564f097f5..d5fb949050dd 100644 --- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c +++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c @@ -287,6 +287,7 @@ static int __init safesetid_security_init(void) } DEFINE_LSM(safesetid_security_init) = { + .id = &safesetid_lsmid, .init = safesetid_security_init, - .name = "safesetid", + .initcall_fs = safesetid_init_securityfs, }; diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.h b/security/safesetid/lsm.h index d346f4849cea..bf5172e2c3f7 100644 --- a/security/safesetid/lsm.h +++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.h @@ -70,4 +70,6 @@ enum sid_policy_type _setid_policy_lookup(struct setid_ruleset *policy, extern struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setuid_rules; extern struct setid_ruleset __rcu *safesetid_setgid_rules; +int safesetid_init_securityfs(void); + #endif /* _SAFESETID_H */ diff --git a/security/safesetid/securityfs.c b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c index 8e1ffd70b18a..ece259f75b0d 100644 --- a/security/safesetid/securityfs.c +++ b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c @@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static const struct file_operations safesetid_gid_file_fops = { .write = safesetid_gid_file_write, }; -static int __init safesetid_init_securityfs(void) +int __init safesetid_init_securityfs(void) { int ret; struct dentry *policy_dir; @@ -345,4 +345,3 @@ error: securityfs_remove(policy_dir); return ret; } -fs_initcall(safesetid_init_securityfs); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 596d41818577..31a688650601 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -32,24 +32,7 @@ #include <net/flow.h> #include <net/sock.h> -#define SECURITY_HOOK_ACTIVE_KEY(HOOK, IDX) security_hook_active_##HOOK##_##IDX - -/* - * Identifier for the LSM static calls. - * HOOK is an LSM hook as defined in linux/lsm_hookdefs.h - * IDX is the index of the static call. 0 <= NUM < MAX_LSM_COUNT - */ -#define LSM_STATIC_CALL(HOOK, IDX) lsm_static_call_##HOOK##_##IDX - -/* - * Call the macro M for each LSM hook MAX_LSM_COUNT times. - */ -#define LSM_LOOP_UNROLL(M, ...) \ -do { \ - UNROLL(MAX_LSM_COUNT, M, __VA_ARGS__) \ -} while (0) - -#define LSM_DEFINE_UNROLL(M, ...) UNROLL(MAX_LSM_COUNT, M, __VA_ARGS__) +#include "lsm.h" /* * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the @@ -90,23 +73,34 @@ const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX + 1] = { [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", }; -static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain); +bool lsm_debug __ro_after_init; -static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache; -static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache; +unsigned int lsm_active_cnt __ro_after_init; +const struct lsm_id *lsm_idlist[MAX_LSM_COUNT]; -char *lsm_names; -static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __ro_after_init; +struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes; -/* Boot-time LSM user choice */ -static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order; -static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm; +struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache; +struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache; -static __initconst const char *const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM; +#define SECURITY_HOOK_ACTIVE_KEY(HOOK, IDX) security_hook_active_##HOOK##_##IDX -/* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */ -static __initdata struct lsm_info *ordered_lsms[MAX_LSM_COUNT + 1]; -static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive; +/* + * Identifier for the LSM static calls. + * HOOK is an LSM hook as defined in linux/lsm_hookdefs.h + * IDX is the index of the static call. 0 <= NUM < MAX_LSM_COUNT + */ +#define LSM_STATIC_CALL(HOOK, IDX) lsm_static_call_##HOOK##_##IDX + +/* + * Call the macro M for each LSM hook MAX_LSM_COUNT times. + */ +#define LSM_LOOP_UNROLL(M, ...) \ +do { \ + UNROLL(MAX_LSM_COUNT, M, __VA_ARGS__) \ +} while (0) + +#define LSM_DEFINE_UNROLL(M, ...) UNROLL(MAX_LSM_COUNT, M, __VA_ARGS__) #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL #define LSM_HOOK_TRAMP(NAME, NUM) \ @@ -157,512 +151,26 @@ struct lsm_static_calls_table #undef INIT_LSM_STATIC_CALL }; -static __initdata bool debug; -#define init_debug(...) \ - do { \ - if (debug) \ - pr_info(__VA_ARGS__); \ - } while (0) - -static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm) -{ - if (!lsm->enabled) - return false; - - return *lsm->enabled; -} - -/* Mark an LSM's enabled flag. */ -static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1; -static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0; -static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled) -{ - /* - * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use - * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state. - */ - if (!lsm->enabled) { - if (enabled) - lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; - else - lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; - } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) { - if (!enabled) - lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false; - } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) { - if (enabled) - lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; - } else { - *lsm->enabled = enabled; - } -} - -/* Is an LSM already listed in the ordered LSMs list? */ -static bool __init exists_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) -{ - struct lsm_info **check; - - for (check = ordered_lsms; *check; check++) - if (*check == lsm) - return true; - - return false; -} - -/* Append an LSM to the list of ordered LSMs to initialize. */ -static int last_lsm __initdata; -static void __init append_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *from) -{ - /* Ignore duplicate selections. */ - if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) - return; - - if (WARN(last_lsm == MAX_LSM_COUNT, "%s: out of LSM static calls!?\n", from)) - return; - - /* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */ - if (!lsm->enabled) - lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; - ordered_lsms[last_lsm++] = lsm; - - init_debug("%s ordered: %s (%s)\n", from, lsm->name, - is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); -} - -/* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */ -static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm) -{ - /* Skip if the LSM is disabled. */ - if (!is_enabled(lsm)) - return false; - - /* Not allowed if another exclusive LSM already initialized. */ - if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && exclusive) { - init_debug("exclusive disabled: %s\n", lsm->name); - return false; - } - - return true; -} - -static void __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs) -{ - int offset; - - if (*need <= 0) - return; - - offset = ALIGN(*lbs, sizeof(void *)); - *lbs = offset + *need; - *need = offset; -} - -static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed) -{ - if (!needed) - return; - - lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred); - lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file); - lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ib, &blob_sizes.lbs_ib); - /* - * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to - * what the modules might need. - */ - if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0) - blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head); - lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode); - lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); - lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_key, &blob_sizes.lbs_key); - lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); - lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_perf_event, &blob_sizes.lbs_perf_event); - lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock); - lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); - lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); - lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_tun_dev, &blob_sizes.lbs_tun_dev); - lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_xattr_count, - &blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count); - lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_bdev, &blob_sizes.lbs_bdev); -} - -/* Prepare LSM for initialization. */ -static void __init prepare_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) -{ - int enabled = lsm_allowed(lsm); - - /* Record enablement (to handle any following exclusive LSMs). */ - set_enabled(lsm, enabled); - - /* If enabled, do pre-initialization work. */ - if (enabled) { - if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) { - exclusive = lsm; - init_debug("exclusive chosen: %s\n", lsm->name); - } - - lsm_set_blob_sizes(lsm->blobs); - } -} - -/* Initialize a given LSM, if it is enabled. */ -static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) -{ - if (is_enabled(lsm)) { - int ret; - - init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name); - ret = lsm->init(); - WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret); - } -} - -/* - * Current index to use while initializing the lsm id list. - */ -u32 lsm_active_cnt __ro_after_init; -const struct lsm_id *lsm_idlist[MAX_LSM_COUNT]; - -/* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */ -static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin) -{ - struct lsm_info *lsm; - char *sep, *name, *next; - - /* LSM_ORDER_FIRST is always first. */ - for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { - if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_FIRST) - append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " first"); - } - - /* Process "security=", if given. */ - if (chosen_major_lsm) { - struct lsm_info *major; - - /* - * To match the original "security=" behavior, this - * explicitly does NOT fallback to another Legacy Major - * if the selected one was separately disabled: disable - * all non-matching Legacy Major LSMs. - */ - for (major = __start_lsm_info; major < __end_lsm_info; - major++) { - if ((major->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) && - strcmp(major->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0) { - set_enabled(major, false); - init_debug("security=%s disabled: %s (only one legacy major LSM)\n", - chosen_major_lsm, major->name); - } - } - } - - sep = kstrdup(order, GFP_KERNEL); - next = sep; - /* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */ - while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) { - bool found = false; - - for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { - if (strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) { - if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE) - append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin); - found = true; - } - } - - if (!found) - init_debug("%s ignored: %s (not built into kernel)\n", - origin, name); - } - - /* Process "security=", if given. */ - if (chosen_major_lsm) { - for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { - if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) - continue; - if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) == 0) - append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "security="); - } - } - - /* LSM_ORDER_LAST is always last. */ - for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { - if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_LAST) - append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " last"); - } - - /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */ - for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { - if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) - continue; - set_enabled(lsm, false); - init_debug("%s skipped: %s (not in requested order)\n", - origin, lsm->name); - } - - kfree(sep); -} - -static void __init lsm_static_call_init(struct security_hook_list *hl) -{ - struct lsm_static_call *scall = hl->scalls; - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_COUNT; i++) { - /* Update the first static call that is not used yet */ - if (!scall->hl) { - __static_call_update(scall->key, scall->trampoline, - hl->hook.lsm_func_addr); - scall->hl = hl; - static_branch_enable(scall->active); - return; - } - scall++; - } - panic("%s - Ran out of static slots.\n", __func__); -} - -static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred); -static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task); - -static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result); - -static void __init report_lsm_order(void) -{ - struct lsm_info **lsm, *early; - int first = 0; - - pr_info("initializing lsm="); - - /* Report each enabled LSM name, comma separated. */ - for (early = __start_early_lsm_info; - early < __end_early_lsm_info; early++) - if (is_enabled(early)) - pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", early->name); - for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) - if (is_enabled(*lsm)) - pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", (*lsm)->name); - - pr_cont("\n"); -} - -static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) -{ - struct lsm_info **lsm; - - if (chosen_lsm_order) { - if (chosen_major_lsm) { - pr_warn("security=%s is ignored because it is superseded by lsm=%s\n", - chosen_major_lsm, chosen_lsm_order); - chosen_major_lsm = NULL; - } - ordered_lsm_parse(chosen_lsm_order, "cmdline"); - } else - ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin"); - - for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) - prepare_lsm(*lsm); - - report_lsm_order(); - - init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred); - init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file); - init_debug("ib blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ib); - init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode); - init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS - init_debug("key blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_key); -#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ - init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); - init_debug("sock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock); - init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); - init_debug("perf event blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_perf_event); - init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task); - init_debug("tun device blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_tun_dev); - init_debug("xattr slots = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count); - init_debug("bdev blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bdev); - - /* - * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs - */ - if (blob_sizes.lbs_file) - lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache", - blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0, - SLAB_PANIC, NULL); - if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode) - lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache", - blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0, - SLAB_PANIC, NULL); - - lsm_early_cred((struct cred *) current->cred); - lsm_early_task(current); - for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) - initialize_lsm(*lsm); -} - -int __init early_security_init(void) -{ - struct lsm_info *lsm; - - for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { - if (!lsm->enabled) - lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true; - prepare_lsm(lsm); - initialize_lsm(lsm); - } - - return 0; -} - /** - * security_init - initializes the security framework + * lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob + * @file: the file that needs a blob * - * This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence. - */ -int __init security_init(void) -{ - struct lsm_info *lsm; - - init_debug("legacy security=%s\n", chosen_major_lsm ? : " *unspecified*"); - init_debug(" CONFIG_LSM=%s\n", builtin_lsm_order); - init_debug("boot arg lsm=%s\n", chosen_lsm_order ? : " *unspecified*"); - - /* - * Append the names of the early LSM modules now that kmalloc() is - * available - */ - for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) { - init_debug(" early started: %s (%s)\n", lsm->name, - is_enabled(lsm) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); - if (lsm->enabled) - lsm_append(lsm->name, &lsm_names); - } - - /* Load LSMs in specified order. */ - ordered_lsm_init(); - - return 0; -} - -/* Save user chosen LSM */ -static int __init choose_major_lsm(char *str) -{ - chosen_major_lsm = str; - return 1; -} -__setup("security=", choose_major_lsm); - -/* Explicitly choose LSM initialization order. */ -static int __init choose_lsm_order(char *str) -{ - chosen_lsm_order = str; - return 1; -} -__setup("lsm=", choose_lsm_order); - -/* Enable LSM order debugging. */ -static int __init enable_debug(char *str) -{ - debug = true; - return 1; -} -__setup("lsm.debug", enable_debug); - -static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm) -{ - const char *last; - - if (WARN_ON(!list || !lsm)) - return false; - last = strrchr(list, ','); - if (last) - /* Pass the comma, strcmp() will check for '\0' */ - last++; - else - last = list; - return !strcmp(last, lsm); -} - -static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result) -{ - char *cp; - - if (*result == NULL) { - *result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL); - if (*result == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; - } else { - /* Check if it is the last registered name */ - if (match_last_lsm(*result, new)) - return 0; - cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *result, new); - if (cp == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; - kfree(*result); - *result = cp; - } - return 0; -} - -/** - * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. - * @hooks: the hooks to add - * @count: the number of hooks to add - * @lsmid: the identification information for the security module + * Allocate the file blob for all the modules * - * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure. + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. */ -void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, - const struct lsm_id *lsmid) +static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file) { - int i; - - /* - * A security module may call security_add_hooks() more - * than once during initialization, and LSM initialization - * is serialized. Landlock is one such case. - * Look at the previous entry, if there is one, for duplication. - */ - if (lsm_active_cnt == 0 || lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt - 1] != lsmid) { - if (lsm_active_cnt >= MAX_LSM_COUNT) - panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__); - lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt++] = lsmid; - } - - for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { - hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid; - lsm_static_call_init(&hooks[i]); - } - - /* - * Don't try to append during early_security_init(), we'll come back - * and fix this up afterwards. - */ - if (slab_is_available()) { - if (lsm_append(lsmid->name, &lsm_names) < 0) - panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__); + if (!lsm_file_cache) { + file->f_security = NULL; + return 0; } -} - -int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data) -{ - return blocking_notifier_call_chain(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, - event, data); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_blocking_lsm_notifier); - -int register_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) -{ - return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, - nb); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_blocking_lsm_notifier); -int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) -{ - return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain, - nb); + file->f_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL); + if (file->f_security == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier); /** * lsm_blob_alloc - allocate a composite blob @@ -696,47 +204,12 @@ static int lsm_blob_alloc(void **dest, size_t size, gfp_t gfp) * * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. */ -static int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) +int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) { return lsm_blob_alloc(&cred->security, blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp); } /** - * lsm_early_cred - during initialization allocate a composite cred blob - * @cred: the cred that needs a blob - * - * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules - */ -static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred) -{ - int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL); - - if (rc) - panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__); -} - -/** - * lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob - * @file: the file that needs a blob - * - * Allocate the file blob for all the modules - * - * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. - */ -static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file) -{ - if (!lsm_file_cache) { - file->f_security = NULL; - return 0; - } - - file->f_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL); - if (file->f_security == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; - return 0; -} - -/** * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob * @inode: the inode that needs a blob * @gfp: allocation flags @@ -766,7 +239,7 @@ static int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode, gfp_t gfp) * * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. */ -static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task) +int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task) { return lsm_blob_alloc(&task->security, blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL); } @@ -823,31 +296,50 @@ static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp) */ static int lsm_bdev_alloc(struct block_device *bdev) { - if (blob_sizes.lbs_bdev == 0) { - bdev->bd_security = NULL; - return 0; - } - - bdev->bd_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_bdev, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!bdev->bd_security) - return -ENOMEM; + return lsm_blob_alloc(&bdev->bd_security, blob_sizes.lbs_bdev, + GFP_KERNEL); +} - return 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL +/** + * lsm_bpf_map_alloc - allocate a composite bpf_map blob + * @map: the bpf_map that needs a blob + * + * Allocate the bpf_map blob for all the modules + * + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. + */ +static int lsm_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map) +{ + return lsm_blob_alloc(&map->security, blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_map, GFP_KERNEL); } /** - * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob - * @task: the task that needs a blob + * lsm_bpf_prog_alloc - allocate a composite bpf_prog blob + * @prog: the bpf_prog that needs a blob * - * Allocate the task blob for all the modules + * Allocate the bpf_prog blob for all the modules + * + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. */ -static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) +static int lsm_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog *prog) { - int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); + return lsm_blob_alloc(&prog->aux->security, blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_prog, GFP_KERNEL); +} - if (rc) - panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__); +/** + * lsm_bpf_token_alloc - allocate a composite bpf_token blob + * @token: the bpf_token that needs a blob + * + * Allocate the bpf_token blob for all the modules + * + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. + */ +static int lsm_bpf_token_alloc(struct bpf_token *token) +{ + return lsm_blob_alloc(&token->security, blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_token, GFP_KERNEL); } +#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ /** * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob @@ -1775,7 +1267,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security); * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. */ int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, - struct qstr *name, + const struct qstr *name, const struct cred *old, struct cred *new) { return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, dentry, mode, @@ -2181,7 +1673,7 @@ int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, } /** - * security_inode_mkdir() - Check if creation a new director is allowed + * security_inode_mkdir() - Check if creating a new directory is allowed * @dir: parent directory * @dentry: new directory * @mode: new directory mode @@ -2623,6 +2115,36 @@ void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) } /** + * security_inode_file_setattr() - check if setting fsxattr is allowed + * @dentry: file to set filesystem extended attributes on + * @fa: extended attributes to set on the inode + * + * Called when file_setattr() syscall or FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR ioctl() is called on + * inode + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ +int security_inode_file_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct file_kattr *fa) +{ + return call_int_hook(inode_file_setattr, dentry, fa); +} + +/** + * security_inode_file_getattr() - check if retrieving fsxattr is allowed + * @dentry: file to retrieve filesystem extended attributes from + * @fa: extended attributes to get + * + * Called when file_getattr() syscall or FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR ioctl() is called on + * inode + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ +int security_inode_file_getattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct file_kattr *fa) +{ + return call_int_hook(inode_file_getattr, dentry, fa); +} + +/** * security_inode_need_killpriv() - Check if security_inode_killpriv() required * @dentry: associated dentry * @@ -3155,7 +2677,7 @@ int security_file_truncate(struct file *file) * * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. */ -int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) +int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags) { int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); @@ -4312,17 +3834,31 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx); * security_lsmprop_to_secctx() - Convert a lsm_prop to a secctx * @prop: lsm specific information * @cp: the LSM context + * @lsmid: which security module to report * * Convert a @prop entry to security context. If @cp is NULL the * length of the result will be returned. This does mean that the * length could change between calls to check the length and the * next call which actually allocates and returns the @cp. * + * @lsmid identifies which LSM should supply the context. + * A value of LSM_ID_UNDEF indicates that the first LSM suppling + * the hook should be used. This is used in cases where the + * ID of the supplying LSM is unambiguous. + * * Return: Return length of data on success, error on failure. */ -int security_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop, struct lsm_context *cp) +int security_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop, struct lsm_context *cp, + int lsmid) { - return call_int_hook(lsmprop_to_secctx, prop, cp); + struct lsm_static_call *scall; + + lsm_for_each_hook(scall, lsmprop_to_secctx) { + if (lsmid != LSM_ID_UNDEF && lsmid != scall->hl->lsmid->id) + continue; + return scall->hl->hook.lsmprop_to_secctx(prop, cp); + } + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(lsmprop_to_secctx); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_lsmprop_to_secctx); @@ -5684,7 +5220,16 @@ int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) int security_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_token *token, bool kernel) { - return call_int_hook(bpf_map_create, map, attr, token, kernel); + int rc; + + rc = lsm_bpf_map_alloc(map); + if (unlikely(rc)) + return rc; + + rc = call_int_hook(bpf_map_create, map, attr, token, kernel); + if (unlikely(rc)) + security_bpf_map_free(map); + return rc; } /** @@ -5703,7 +5248,16 @@ int security_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr, int security_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_token *token, bool kernel) { - return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_load, prog, attr, token, kernel); + int rc; + + rc = lsm_bpf_prog_alloc(prog); + if (unlikely(rc)) + return rc; + + rc = call_int_hook(bpf_prog_load, prog, attr, token, kernel); + if (unlikely(rc)) + security_bpf_prog_free(prog); + return rc; } /** @@ -5720,7 +5274,16 @@ int security_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr, int security_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr, const struct path *path) { - return call_int_hook(bpf_token_create, token, attr, path); + int rc; + + rc = lsm_bpf_token_alloc(token); + if (unlikely(rc)) + return rc; + + rc = call_int_hook(bpf_token_create, token, attr, path); + if (unlikely(rc)) + security_bpf_token_free(token); + return rc; } /** @@ -5764,6 +5327,8 @@ int security_bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap) void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) { call_void_hook(bpf_map_free, map); + kfree(map->security); + map->security = NULL; } /** @@ -5775,6 +5340,8 @@ void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog) { call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free, prog); + kfree(prog->aux->security); + prog->aux->security = NULL; } /** @@ -5786,6 +5353,8 @@ void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog) void security_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token) { call_void_hook(bpf_token_free, token); + kfree(token->security); + token->security = NULL; } #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig index 61abc1e094a8..5588c4d573f6 100644 --- a/security/selinux/Kconfig +++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig @@ -69,6 +69,17 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE If unsure, keep the default value. +config SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_HASH_BITS + int "SELinux avc hashtable size" + depends on SECURITY_SELINUX + range 9 14 + default 9 + help + This option sets the number of buckets used in the AVC hash table + to 2^SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_HASH_BITS. A higher value helps maintain + shorter chain lengths especially when expanding AVC nodes via + /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_threshold. + config SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG bool "SELinux kernel debugging support" depends on SECURITY_SELINUX diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile index 66e56e9011df..72d3baf7900c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/Makefile +++ b/security/selinux/Makefile @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/selinux -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include ccflags-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG) += -DDEBUG selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o netif.o \ - netnode.o netport.o status.o \ + netnode.o netport.o status.o initcalls.o \ ss/ebitmap.o ss/hashtab.o ss/symtab.o ss/sidtab.o ss/avtab.o \ ss/policydb.o ss/services.o ss/conditional.o ss/mls.o ss/context.o diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index 4b4837a20225..8f77b9a732e1 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -30,13 +30,14 @@ #include "avc.h" #include "avc_ss.h" #include "classmap.h" +#include "hash.h" #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include <trace/events/avc.h> -#define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS 512 -#define AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD 512 -#define AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM 16 +#define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS (1 << CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_HASH_BITS) +#define AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD AVC_CACHE_SLOTS +#define AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM 16 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS #define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) this_cpu_inc(avc_cache_stats.field) @@ -124,7 +125,7 @@ static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_cachep __ro_after_init; static inline u32 avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) { - return (ssid ^ (tsid<<2) ^ (tclass<<4)) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1); + return av_hash(ssid, tsid, (u32)tclass, (u32)(AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1)); } /** @@ -292,27 +293,26 @@ static struct avc_xperms_decision_node struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node; struct extended_perms_decision *xpd; - xpd_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_decision_cachep, - GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN); + xpd_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_decision_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT); if (!xpd_node) return NULL; xpd = &xpd_node->xpd; if (which & XPERMS_ALLOWED) { xpd->allowed = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep, - GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN); + GFP_NOWAIT); if (!xpd->allowed) goto error; } if (which & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) { xpd->auditallow = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep, - GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN); + GFP_NOWAIT); if (!xpd->auditallow) goto error; } if (which & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) { xpd->dontaudit = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep, - GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN); + GFP_NOWAIT); if (!xpd->dontaudit) goto error; } @@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ static struct avc_xperms_node *avc_xperms_alloc(void) { struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node; - xp_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN); + xp_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT); if (!xp_node) return xp_node; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head); @@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void) { struct avc_node *node; - node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN); + node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT); if (!node) goto out; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 595ceb314aeb..712d0b18a30c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -93,7 +93,9 @@ #include <linux/fanotify.h> #include <linux/io_uring/cmd.h> #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h> +#include <linux/memfd.h> +#include "initcalls.h" #include "avc.h" #include "objsec.h" #include "netif.h" @@ -210,12 +212,12 @@ static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event) */ static void cred_init_security(void) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec; + struct cred_security_struct *crsec; /* NOTE: the lsm framework zeros out the buffer on allocation */ - tsec = selinux_cred(unrcu_pointer(current->real_cred)); - tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->avdcache.sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; + crsec = selinux_cred(unrcu_pointer(current->real_cred)); + crsec->osid = crsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; } /* @@ -223,10 +225,10 @@ static void cred_init_security(void) */ static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec; + const struct cred_security_struct *crsec; - tsec = selinux_cred(cred); - return tsec->sid; + crsec = selinux_cred(cred); + return crsec->sid; } static void __ad_net_init(struct common_audit_data *ad, @@ -437,15 +439,15 @@ static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid, struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, const struct cred *cred) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred); + const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(cred); int rc; - rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, + rc = avc_has_perm(crsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); if (rc) return rc; - rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, + rc = avc_has_perm(crsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL); return rc; } @@ -454,9 +456,9 @@ static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid, struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, const struct cred *cred) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred); + const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(cred); int rc; - rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, + rc = avc_has_perm(crsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); if (rc) return rc; @@ -476,7 +478,9 @@ static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb) !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") || (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() && (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") || - !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))); + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))) || + (selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel() && + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "functionfs")); } static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb) @@ -741,7 +745,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") || - !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs")) + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs") || + (selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel() && + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "functionfs"))) sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS; if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || @@ -1784,7 +1790,7 @@ out: * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned. */ static int -selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, +selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct cred_security_struct *crsec, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass, u32 *_new_isid) @@ -1796,11 +1802,11 @@ selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) { *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) && - tsec->create_sid) { - *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid; + crsec->create_sid) { + *_new_isid = crsec->create_sid; } else { const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir); - return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, + return security_transition_sid(crsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass, name, _new_isid); } @@ -1813,7 +1819,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, u16 tclass) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct inode_security_struct *dsec; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 sid, newsid; @@ -1823,7 +1829,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, dsec = inode_security(dir); sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb); - sid = tsec->sid; + sid = crsec->sid; ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; ad.u.dentry = dentry; @@ -1834,7 +1840,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, if (rc) return rc; - rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass, + rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(crsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass, &newsid); if (rc) return rc; @@ -2247,8 +2253,8 @@ static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void) } static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, - const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec, - const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec) + const struct cred_security_struct *old_crsec, + const struct cred_security_struct *new_crsec) { int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS); int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt); @@ -2258,7 +2264,7 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, if (!nnp && !nosuid) return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */ - if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) + if (new_crsec->sid == old_crsec->sid) return 0; /* No change in credentials */ /* @@ -2273,7 +2279,7 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION; if (nosuid) av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION; - rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(old_crsec->sid, new_crsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL); if (!rc) return 0; @@ -2284,8 +2290,8 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset * of the permissions of the current SID. */ - rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, - new_tsec->sid); + rc = security_bounded_transition(old_crsec->sid, + new_crsec->sid); if (!rc) return 0; @@ -2301,8 +2307,8 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec; - struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; + const struct cred_security_struct *old_crsec; + struct cred_security_struct *new_crsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file); @@ -2311,18 +2317,22 @@ static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not * the script interpreter */ - old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); - new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred); + old_crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + new_crsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred); isec = inode_security(inode); + if (WARN_ON(isec->sclass != SECCLASS_FILE && + isec->sclass != SECCLASS_MEMFD_FILE)) + return -EACCES; + /* Default to the current task SID. */ - new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid; - new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid; + new_crsec->sid = old_crsec->sid; + new_crsec->osid = old_crsec->sid; /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */ - new_tsec->create_sid = 0; - new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0; - new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; + new_crsec->create_sid = 0; + new_crsec->keycreate_sid = 0; + new_crsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; /* * Before policy is loaded, label any task outside kernel space @@ -2331,26 +2341,26 @@ static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * (if the policy chooses to set SECINITSID_INIT != SECINITSID_KERNEL). */ if (!selinux_initialized()) { - new_tsec->sid = SECINITSID_INIT; + new_crsec->sid = SECINITSID_INIT; /* also clear the exec_sid just in case */ - new_tsec->exec_sid = 0; + new_crsec->exec_sid = 0; return 0; } - if (old_tsec->exec_sid) { - new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid; + if (old_crsec->exec_sid) { + new_crsec->sid = old_crsec->exec_sid; /* Reset exec SID on execve. */ - new_tsec->exec_sid = 0; + new_crsec->exec_sid = 0; /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */ - rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec); + rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_crsec, new_crsec); if (rc) return rc; } else { /* Check for a default transition on this program. */ - rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, + rc = security_transition_sid(old_crsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL, - &new_tsec->sid); + &new_crsec->sid); if (rc) return rc; @@ -2358,34 +2368,34 @@ static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed * transition. */ - rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec); + rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_crsec, new_crsec); if (rc) - new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid; + new_crsec->sid = old_crsec->sid; } ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = bprm->file; - if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) { - rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, - SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad); + if (new_crsec->sid == old_crsec->sid) { + rc = avc_has_perm(old_crsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, + FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } else { /* Check permissions for the transition. */ - rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(old_crsec->sid, new_crsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad); if (rc) return rc; - rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid, - SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad); + rc = avc_has_perm(new_crsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, + FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad); if (rc) return rc; /* Check for shared state */ if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) { - rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(old_crsec->sid, new_crsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE, NULL); if (rc) @@ -2397,7 +2407,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) { u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid(); if (ptsid != 0) { - rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_crsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); if (rc) @@ -2411,7 +2421,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless the noatsecure permission is granted between the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */ - rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, + rc = avc_has_perm(old_crsec->sid, new_crsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL); bprm->secureexec |= !!rc; @@ -2479,12 +2489,12 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, */ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; + struct cred_security_struct *new_crsec; struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim; int rc, i; - new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred); - if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid) + new_crsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred); + if (new_crsec->sid == new_crsec->osid) return; /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */ @@ -2503,7 +2513,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm) * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK. */ - rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, + rc = avc_has_perm(new_crsec->osid, new_crsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL); if (rc) { /* protect against do_prlimit() */ @@ -2525,12 +2535,12 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm) */ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); u32 osid, sid; int rc; - osid = tsec->osid; - sid = tsec->sid; + osid = crsec->osid; + sid = crsec->sid; if (sid == osid) return; @@ -2901,13 +2911,13 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, } static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, - struct qstr *name, + const struct qstr *name, const struct cred *old, struct cred *new) { u32 newsid; int rc; - struct task_security_struct *tsec; + struct cred_security_struct *crsec; rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old), d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name, @@ -2916,8 +2926,8 @@ static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, if (rc) return rc; - tsec = selinux_cred(new); - tsec->create_sid = newsid; + crsec = selinux_cred(new); + crsec->create_sid = newsid; return 0; } @@ -2925,7 +2935,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; struct xattr *xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count); u32 newsid, clen; @@ -2935,9 +2945,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb); - newsid = tsec->create_sid; + newsid = crsec->create_sid; newsclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); - rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr, newsclass, &newsid); + rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(crsec, dir, qstr, newsclass, &newsid); if (rc) return rc; @@ -2974,10 +2984,18 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, struct common_audit_data ad; struct inode_security_struct *isec; int rc; + bool is_memfd = false; if (unlikely(!selinux_initialized())) return 0; + if (name != NULL && name->name != NULL && + !strcmp(name->name, MEMFD_ANON_NAME)) { + if (!selinux_policycap_memfd_class()) + return 0; + is_memfd = true; + } + isec = selinux_inode(inode); /* @@ -2997,7 +3015,10 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, isec->sclass = context_isec->sclass; isec->sid = context_isec->sid; } else { - isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE; + if (is_memfd) + isec->sclass = SECCLASS_MEMFD_FILE; + else + isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE; rc = security_transition_sid( sid, sid, isec->sclass, name, &isec->sid); @@ -3109,7 +3130,7 @@ static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, static inline void task_avdcache_reset(struct task_security_struct *tsec) { memset(&tsec->avdcache.dir, 0, sizeof(tsec->avdcache.dir)); - tsec->avdcache.sid = tsec->sid; + tsec->avdcache.sid = current_sid(); tsec->avdcache.seqno = avc_policy_seqno(); tsec->avdcache.dir_spot = TSEC_AVDC_DIR_SIZE - 1; } @@ -3133,7 +3154,7 @@ static inline int task_avdcache_search(struct task_security_struct *tsec, if (isec->sclass != SECCLASS_DIR) return -ENOENT; - if (unlikely(tsec->sid != tsec->avdcache.sid || + if (unlikely(current_sid() != tsec->avdcache.sid || tsec->avdcache.seqno != avc_policy_seqno())) { task_avdcache_reset(tsec); return -ENOENT; @@ -3181,6 +3202,8 @@ static inline void task_avdcache_update(struct task_security_struct *tsec, tsec->avdcache.dir[spot].audited = audited; tsec->avdcache.dir[spot].allowed = avd->allowed; tsec->avdcache.dir[spot].permissive = avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE; + tsec->avdcache.permissive_neveraudit = + (avd->flags == (AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE|AVD_FLAGS_NEVERAUDIT)); } /** @@ -3195,6 +3218,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int requested) { int mask; u32 perms; + u32 sid = current_sid(); struct task_security_struct *tsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct avdc_entry *avdc; @@ -3207,10 +3231,13 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int requested) if (!mask) return 0; + tsec = selinux_task(current); + if (task_avdcache_permnoaudit(tsec, sid)) + return 0; + isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, requested & MAY_NOT_BLOCK); if (IS_ERR(isec)) return PTR_ERR(isec); - tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask); rc = task_avdcache_search(tsec, isec, &avdc); @@ -3225,7 +3252,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int requested) struct av_decision avd; /* Cache miss. */ - rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, + rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd); audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc, (requested & MAY_ACCESS) ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0, @@ -3274,6 +3301,13 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) { + struct task_security_struct *tsec; + + tsec = selinux_task(current); + + if (task_avdcache_permnoaudit(tsec, current_sid())) + return 0; + return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR); } @@ -3480,6 +3514,18 @@ static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return -EACCES; } +static int selinux_inode_file_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, + struct file_kattr *fa) +{ + return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR); +} + +static int selinux_inode_file_getattr(struct dentry *dentry, + struct file_kattr *fa) +{ + return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__GETATTR); +} + static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask, unsigned int obj_type) { @@ -3631,7 +3677,7 @@ static void selinux_inode_getlsmprop(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_prop *prop) static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) { struct lsm_prop prop; - struct task_security_struct *tsec; + struct cred_security_struct *crsec; struct cred *new_creds = *new; if (new_creds == NULL) { @@ -3640,10 +3686,10 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) return -ENOMEM; } - tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds); + crsec = selinux_cred(new_creds); /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */ selinux_inode_getlsmprop(d_inode(src), &prop); - tsec->create_sid = prop.selinux.secid; + crsec->create_sid = prop.selinux.secid; *new = new_creds; return 0; } @@ -3669,7 +3715,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, struct kernfs_node *kn) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen; int rc; char *context; @@ -3697,8 +3743,8 @@ static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, if (rc) return rc; - if (tsec->create_sid) { - newsid = tsec->create_sid; + if (crsec->create_sid) { + newsid = crsec->create_sid; } else { u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode); const char *kn_name; @@ -3709,7 +3755,7 @@ static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, q.name = kn_name; q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn_name); - rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, + rc = security_transition_sid(crsec->sid, parent_sid, secclass, &q, &newsid); if (rc) @@ -4120,10 +4166,13 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file) /* task security operations */ static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, - unsigned long clone_flags) + u64 clone_flags) { u32 sid = current_sid(); + struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_task(current); + struct task_security_struct *new_tsec = selinux_task(task); + *new_tsec = *old_tsec; return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL); } @@ -4133,10 +4182,10 @@ static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) { - const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old); - struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); + const struct cred_security_struct *old_crsec = selinux_cred(old); + struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(new); - *tsec = *old_tsec; + *crsec = *old_crsec; return 0; } @@ -4145,10 +4194,10 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, */ static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { - const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old); - struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); + const struct cred_security_struct *old_crsec = selinux_cred(old); + struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(new); - *tsec = *old_tsec; + *crsec = *old_crsec; } static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) @@ -4167,7 +4216,7 @@ static void selinux_cred_getlsmprop(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_prop *prop) */ static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); + struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(new); u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; @@ -4176,10 +4225,10 @@ static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE, NULL); if (ret == 0) { - tsec->sid = secid; - tsec->create_sid = 0; - tsec->keycreate_sid = 0; - tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; + crsec->sid = secid; + crsec->create_sid = 0; + crsec->keycreate_sid = 0; + crsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; } return ret; } @@ -4191,7 +4240,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode); - struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new); + struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(new); u32 sid = current_sid(); int ret; @@ -4201,7 +4250,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) NULL); if (ret == 0) - tsec->create_sid = isec->sid; + crsec->create_sid = isec->sid; return ret; } @@ -4716,15 +4765,15 @@ static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid) /* socket security operations */ -static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, +static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct cred_security_struct *crsec, u16 secclass, u32 *socksid) { - if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) { - *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid; + if (crsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) { + *socksid = crsec->sockcreate_sid; return 0; } - return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, + return security_transition_sid(crsec->sid, crsec->sid, secclass, NULL, socksid); } @@ -4769,7 +4818,7 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms) static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); u32 newsid; u16 secclass; int rc; @@ -4778,17 +4827,17 @@ static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type, return 0; secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); - rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid); + rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(crsec, secclass, &newsid); if (rc) return rc; - return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); + return avc_has_perm(crsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); } static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock)); struct sk_security_struct *sksec; u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); @@ -4796,7 +4845,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, int err = 0; if (!kern) { - err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid); + err = socket_sockcreate_sid(crsec, sclass, &sid); if (err) return err; } @@ -5861,7 +5910,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */ - sk = sk_to_full_sk(skb->sk); + sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb); if (sk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec; @@ -6498,37 +6547,37 @@ static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) static int selinux_lsm_getattr(unsigned int attr, struct task_struct *p, char **value) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec; + const struct cred_security_struct *crsec; int error; u32 sid; u32 len; rcu_read_lock(); - tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p)); + crsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p)); if (p != current) { - error = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tsec->sid, + error = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), crsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL); if (error) goto err_unlock; } switch (attr) { case LSM_ATTR_CURRENT: - sid = tsec->sid; + sid = crsec->sid; break; case LSM_ATTR_PREV: - sid = tsec->osid; + sid = crsec->osid; break; case LSM_ATTR_EXEC: - sid = tsec->exec_sid; + sid = crsec->exec_sid; break; case LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE: - sid = tsec->create_sid; + sid = crsec->create_sid; break; case LSM_ATTR_KEYCREATE: - sid = tsec->keycreate_sid; + sid = crsec->keycreate_sid; break; case LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE: - sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid; + sid = crsec->sockcreate_sid; break; default: error = -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -6553,7 +6602,7 @@ err_unlock: static int selinux_lsm_setattr(u64 attr, void *value, size_t size) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec; + struct cred_security_struct *crsec; struct cred *new; u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid; int error; @@ -6639,11 +6688,11 @@ static int selinux_lsm_setattr(u64 attr, void *value, size_t size) operation. See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */ - tsec = selinux_cred(new); + crsec = selinux_cred(new); if (attr == LSM_ATTR_EXEC) { - tsec->exec_sid = sid; + crsec->exec_sid = sid; } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE) { - tsec->create_sid = sid; + crsec->create_sid = sid; } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_KEYCREATE) { if (sid) { error = avc_has_perm(mysid, sid, @@ -6651,22 +6700,22 @@ static int selinux_lsm_setattr(u64 attr, void *value, size_t size) if (error) goto abort_change; } - tsec->keycreate_sid = sid; + crsec->keycreate_sid = sid; } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE) { - tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid; + crsec->sockcreate_sid = sid; } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_CURRENT) { error = -EINVAL; if (sid == 0) goto abort_change; if (!current_is_single_threaded()) { - error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid); + error = security_bounded_transition(crsec->sid, sid); if (error) goto abort_change; } /* Check permissions for the transition. */ - error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, + error = avc_has_perm(crsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL); if (error) goto abort_change; @@ -6681,7 +6730,7 @@ static int selinux_lsm_setattr(u64 attr, void *value, size_t size) goto abort_change; } - tsec->sid = sid; + crsec->sid = sid; } else { error = -EINVAL; goto abort_change; @@ -6848,14 +6897,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp) static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec; + const struct cred_security_struct *crsec; struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(k); - tsec = selinux_cred(cred); - if (tsec->keycreate_sid) - ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid; + crsec = selinux_cred(cred); + if (crsec->keycreate_sid) + ksec->sid = crsec->keycreate_sid; else - ksec->sid = tsec->sid; + ksec->sid = crsec->sid; return 0; } @@ -7038,14 +7087,14 @@ static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid) if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) { map = file->private_data; - bpfsec = map->security; + bpfsec = selinux_bpf_map_security(map); ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL); if (ret) return ret; } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) { prog = file->private_data; - bpfsec = prog->aux->security; + bpfsec = selinux_bpf_prog_security(prog); ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL); if (ret) @@ -7059,7 +7108,7 @@ static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) u32 sid = current_sid(); struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; - bpfsec = map->security; + bpfsec = selinux_bpf_map_security(map); return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL); } @@ -7069,7 +7118,7 @@ static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) u32 sid = current_sid(); struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; - bpfsec = prog->aux->security; + bpfsec = selinux_bpf_prog_security(prog); return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL); } @@ -7079,73 +7128,38 @@ static int selinux_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr, { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; - bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!bpfsec) - return -ENOMEM; - + bpfsec = selinux_bpf_map_security(map); bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); - map->security = bpfsec; return 0; } -static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) -{ - struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security; - - map->security = NULL; - kfree(bpfsec); -} - static int selinux_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_token *token, bool kernel) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; - bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!bpfsec) - return -ENOMEM; - + bpfsec = selinux_bpf_prog_security(prog); bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); - prog->aux->security = bpfsec; return 0; } -static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog) -{ - struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = prog->aux->security; - - prog->aux->security = NULL; - kfree(bpfsec); -} - static int selinux_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr, const struct path *path) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; - bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!bpfsec) - return -ENOMEM; - + bpfsec = selinux_bpf_token_security(token); bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); - token->security = bpfsec; return 0; } - -static void selinux_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token) -{ - struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = token->security; - - token->security = NULL; - kfree(bpfsec); -} #endif struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { - .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct), + .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct cred_security_struct), + .lbs_task = sizeof(struct task_security_struct), .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct), .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), @@ -7159,6 +7173,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { .lbs_xattr_count = SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS, .lbs_tun_dev = sizeof(struct tun_security_struct), .lbs_ib = sizeof(struct ib_security_struct), + .lbs_bpf_map = sizeof(struct bpf_security_struct), + .lbs_bpf_prog = sizeof(struct bpf_security_struct), + .lbs_bpf_token = sizeof(struct bpf_security_struct), }; #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS @@ -7350,6 +7367,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_file_getattr, selinux_inode_file_getattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_file_setattr, selinux_inode_file_setattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, selinux_inode_set_acl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_get_acl, selinux_inode_get_acl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, selinux_inode_remove_acl), @@ -7510,9 +7529,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free, selinux_bpf_map_free), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free, selinux_bpf_prog_free), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_free, selinux_bpf_token_free), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS @@ -7592,6 +7608,11 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void) /* Set the security state for the initial task. */ cred_init_security(); + /* Inform the audit system that secctx is used */ + audit_cfg_lsm(&selinux_lsmid, + AUDIT_CFG_LSM_SECCTX_SUBJECT | + AUDIT_CFG_LSM_SECCTX_OBJECT); + default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC); if (!default_noexec) pr_notice("SELinux: virtual memory is executable by default\n"); @@ -7613,6 +7634,10 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void) if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET)) panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n"); + if (avc_add_callback(selinux_audit_rule_avc_callback, + AVC_CALLBACK_RESET)) + panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC audit callback\n"); + if (selinux_enforcing_boot) pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n"); else @@ -7640,11 +7665,12 @@ void selinux_complete_init(void) /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label all processes and objects when they are created. */ DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = { - .name = "selinux", + .id = &selinux_lsmid, .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot, .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes, .init = selinux_init, + .initcall_device = selinux_initcall, }; #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) @@ -7706,7 +7732,7 @@ static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = { .exit = selinux_nf_unregister, }; -static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void) +int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void) { int err; @@ -7721,5 +7747,4 @@ static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void) return 0; } -__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init); #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ diff --git a/security/selinux/ibpkey.c b/security/selinux/ibpkey.c index 470481cfe0e8..ea1d9b2c7d2b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ibpkey.c +++ b/security/selinux/ibpkey.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include <linux/list.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> +#include "initcalls.h" #include "ibpkey.h" #include "objsec.h" @@ -218,7 +219,7 @@ void sel_ib_pkey_flush(void) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sel_ib_pkey_lock, flags); } -static __init int sel_ib_pkey_init(void) +int __init sel_ib_pkey_init(void) { int iter; @@ -232,5 +233,3 @@ static __init int sel_ib_pkey_init(void) return 0; } - -subsys_initcall(sel_ib_pkey_init); diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h index d5b0425055e4..85a531ac737b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h @@ -16,6 +16,15 @@ #include <linux/types.h> /** + * selinux_audit_rule_avc_callback - update the audit LSM rules on AVC events. + * @event: the AVC event + * + * Update any audit LSM rules based on the AVC event specified in @event. + * Returns 0 on success, negative values otherwise. + */ +int selinux_audit_rule_avc_callback(u32 event); + +/** * selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure. * @field: the field this rule refers to * @op: the operator the rule uses diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h index 281f40103663..01b5167fee1a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h @@ -65,6 +65,10 @@ static inline u32 avc_audit_required(u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd, int result, u32 auditdeny, u32 *deniedp) { u32 denied, audited; + + if (avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_NEVERAUDIT) + return 0; + denied = requested & ~avd->allowed; if (unlikely(denied)) { audited = denied & avd->auditdeny; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index 5665aa5e7853..3ec85142771f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -179,6 +179,8 @@ const struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { { "anon_inode", { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } }, { "io_uring", { "override_creds", "sqpoll", "cmd", "allowed", NULL } }, { "user_namespace", { "create", NULL } }, + { "memfd_file", + { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", NULL } }, /* last one */ { NULL, {} } }; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/hash.h b/security/selinux/include/hash.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..18956dbef8ff --- /dev/null +++ b/security/selinux/include/hash.h @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ + +#ifndef _SELINUX_HASH_H_ +#define _SELINUX_HASH_H_ + +/* + * Based on MurmurHash3, written by Austin Appleby and placed in the + * public domain. + */ +static inline u32 av_hash(u32 key1, u32 key2, u32 key3, u32 mask) +{ + static const u32 c1 = 0xcc9e2d51; + static const u32 c2 = 0x1b873593; + static const u32 r1 = 15; + static const u32 r2 = 13; + static const u32 m = 5; + static const u32 n = 0xe6546b64; + + u32 hash = 0; + +#define mix(input) \ + do { \ + u32 v = input; \ + v *= c1; \ + v = (v << r1) | (v >> (32 - r1)); \ + v *= c2; \ + hash ^= v; \ + hash = (hash << r2) | (hash >> (32 - r2)); \ + hash = hash * m + n; \ + } while (0) + + mix(key1); + mix(key2); + mix(key3); + +#undef mix + + hash ^= hash >> 16; + hash *= 0x85ebca6b; + hash ^= hash >> 13; + hash *= 0xc2b2ae35; + hash ^= hash >> 16; + + return hash & mask; +} + +#endif /* _SELINUX_HASH_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/initcalls.h b/security/selinux/include/initcalls.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6674cf489473 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/selinux/include/initcalls.h @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * SELinux initcalls + */ + +#ifndef _SELINUX_INITCALLS_H +#define _SELINUX_INITCALLS_H + +int init_sel_fs(void); +int sel_netport_init(void); +int sel_netnode_init(void); +int sel_netif_init(void); +int sel_netlink_init(void); +int sel_ib_pkey_init(void); +int selinux_nf_ip_init(void); + +int selinux_initcall(void); + +#endif diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index 6ee7dc4dfd6e..8fc3de5234ac 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/msg.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> +#include <linux/bpf.h> #include "flask.h" #include "avc.h" @@ -36,22 +37,34 @@ struct avdc_entry { bool permissive; /* AVC permissive flag */ }; -struct task_security_struct { +struct cred_security_struct { u32 osid; /* SID prior to last execve */ u32 sid; /* current SID */ u32 exec_sid; /* exec SID */ u32 create_sid; /* fscreate SID */ u32 keycreate_sid; /* keycreate SID */ u32 sockcreate_sid; /* fscreate SID */ +} __randomize_layout; + +struct task_security_struct { #define TSEC_AVDC_DIR_SIZE (1 << 2) struct { u32 sid; /* current SID for cached entries */ u32 seqno; /* AVC sequence number */ unsigned int dir_spot; /* dir cache index to check first */ struct avdc_entry dir[TSEC_AVDC_DIR_SIZE]; /* dir entries */ + bool permissive_neveraudit; /* permissive and neveraudit */ } avdcache; } __randomize_layout; +static inline bool task_avdcache_permnoaudit(struct task_security_struct *tsec, + u32 sid) +{ + return (tsec->avdcache.permissive_neveraudit && + sid == tsec->avdcache.sid && + tsec->avdcache.seqno == avc_policy_seqno()); +} + enum label_initialized { LABEL_INVALID, /* invalid or not initialized */ LABEL_INITIALIZED, /* initialized */ @@ -163,11 +176,17 @@ struct perf_event_security_struct { }; extern struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes; -static inline struct task_security_struct *selinux_cred(const struct cred *cred) +static inline struct cred_security_struct *selinux_cred(const struct cred *cred) { return cred->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_cred; } +static inline struct task_security_struct * +selinux_task(const struct task_struct *task) +{ + return task->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_task; +} + static inline struct file_security_struct *selinux_file(const struct file *file) { return file->f_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_file; @@ -198,9 +217,9 @@ selinux_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc) */ static inline u32 current_sid(void) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); + const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred()); - return tsec->sid; + return crsec->sid; } static inline struct superblock_security_struct * @@ -237,4 +256,23 @@ selinux_perf_event(void *perf_event) return perf_event + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_perf_event; } +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL +static inline struct bpf_security_struct * +selinux_bpf_map_security(struct bpf_map *map) +{ + return map->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_map; +} + +static inline struct bpf_security_struct * +selinux_bpf_prog_security(struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + return prog->aux->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_prog; +} + +static inline struct bpf_security_struct * +selinux_bpf_token_security(struct bpf_token *token) +{ + return token->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_token; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h index 7405154e6c42..231d02227e59 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h @@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ enum { POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM, POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD, POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_WILDCARD, + POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL, + POLICYDB_CAP_MEMFD_CLASS, __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX }; #define POLICYDB_CAP_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX - 1) diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h index d8962fcf2ff9..454dab37bda3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h @@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ const char *const selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX] = { "netlink_xperm", "netif_wildcard", "genfs_seclabel_wildcard", + "functionfs_seclabel", + "memfd_class", }; /* clang-format on */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 278c144c22d6..5d1dad8058b1 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -47,10 +47,11 @@ #define POLICYDB_VERSION_GLBLUB 32 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_COMP_FTRANS 33 /* compressed filename transitions */ #define POLICYDB_VERSION_COND_XPERMS 34 /* extended permissions in conditional policies */ +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_NEVERAUDIT 35 /* neveraudit types */ /* Range of policy versions we understand*/ #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE -#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_COND_XPERMS +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_NEVERAUDIT /* Mask for just the mount related flags */ #define SE_MNTMASK 0x0f @@ -202,10 +203,15 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_netlink_xperm(void) selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM]); } -static inline bool selinux_policycap_netif_wildcard(void) +static inline bool selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel(void) { return READ_ONCE( - selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD]); + selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL]); +} + +static inline bool selinux_policycap_memfd_class(void) +{ + return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_MEMFD_CLASS]); } struct selinux_policy_convert_data; @@ -260,6 +266,7 @@ struct extended_perms { /* definitions of av_decision.flags */ #define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE 0x0001 +#define AVD_FLAGS_NEVERAUDIT 0x0002 void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd, diff --git a/security/selinux/initcalls.c b/security/selinux/initcalls.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f6716a1d38c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/selinux/initcalls.c @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * SELinux initcalls + */ + +#include <linux/init.h> + +#include "initcalls.h" + +/** + * selinux_initcall - Perform the SELinux initcalls + * + * Used as a device initcall in the SELinux LSM definition. + */ +int __init selinux_initcall(void) +{ + int rc = 0, rc_tmp = 0; + + rc_tmp = init_sel_fs(); + if (!rc && rc_tmp) + rc = rc_tmp; + + rc_tmp = sel_netport_init(); + if (!rc && rc_tmp) + rc = rc_tmp; + + rc_tmp = sel_netnode_init(); + if (!rc && rc_tmp) + rc = rc_tmp; + + rc_tmp = sel_netif_init(); + if (!rc && rc_tmp) + rc = rc_tmp; + + rc_tmp = sel_netlink_init(); + if (!rc && rc_tmp) + rc = rc_tmp; + +#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) + rc_tmp = sel_ib_pkey_init(); + if (!rc && rc_tmp) + rc = rc_tmp; +#endif + +#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) + rc_tmp = selinux_nf_ip_init(); + if (!rc && rc_tmp) + rc = rc_tmp; +#endif + + return rc; +} diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c index 78afbecdbe57..e24b2cba28ea 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netif.c +++ b/security/selinux/netif.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> +#include "initcalls.h" #include "security.h" #include "objsec.h" #include "netif.h" @@ -265,7 +266,7 @@ static struct notifier_block sel_netif_netdev_notifier = { .notifier_call = sel_netif_netdev_notifier_handler, }; -static __init int sel_netif_init(void) +int __init sel_netif_init(void) { int i; @@ -280,5 +281,3 @@ static __init int sel_netif_init(void) return 0; } -__initcall(sel_netif_init); - diff --git a/security/selinux/netlink.c b/security/selinux/netlink.c index 1760aee712fd..eb40e4603475 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netlink.c +++ b/security/selinux/netlink.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include <net/net_namespace.h> #include <net/netlink.h> +#include "initcalls.h" #include "security.h" static struct sock *selnl __ro_after_init; @@ -105,7 +106,7 @@ void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno) selnl_notify(SELNL_MSG_POLICYLOAD, &seqno); } -static int __init selnl_init(void) +int __init sel_netlink_init(void) { struct netlink_kernel_cfg cfg = { .groups = SELNLGRP_MAX, @@ -117,5 +118,3 @@ static int __init selnl_init(void) panic("SELinux: Cannot create netlink socket."); return 0; } - -__initcall(selnl_init); diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c index 5d0ed08d46e5..9b3da5ce8d39 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netnode.c +++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include <net/ip.h> #include <net/ipv6.h> +#include "initcalls.h" #include "netnode.h" #include "objsec.h" @@ -290,7 +291,7 @@ void sel_netnode_flush(void) spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock); } -static __init int sel_netnode_init(void) +int __init sel_netnode_init(void) { int iter; @@ -304,5 +305,3 @@ static __init int sel_netnode_init(void) return 0; } - -__initcall(sel_netnode_init); diff --git a/security/selinux/netport.c b/security/selinux/netport.c index 6fd7da4b3576..9e62f7285e81 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netport.c +++ b/security/selinux/netport.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include <net/ip.h> #include <net/ipv6.h> +#include "initcalls.h" #include "netport.h" #include "objsec.h" @@ -218,7 +219,7 @@ void sel_netport_flush(void) spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netport_lock); } -static __init int sel_netport_init(void) +int __init sel_netport_init(void) { int iter; @@ -232,5 +233,3 @@ static __init int sel_netport_init(void) return 0; } - -__initcall(sel_netport_init); diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index e67a8ce4b64c..d98fbc4d068f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ /* selinuxfs pseudo filesystem for exporting the security policy API. Based on the proc code and the fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c code. */ +#include "initcalls.h" #include "flask.h" #include "avc.h" #include "avc_ss.h" @@ -506,6 +507,7 @@ static int sel_make_policy_nodes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi, { int ret = 0; struct dentry *tmp_parent, *tmp_bool_dir, *tmp_class_dir; + struct renamedata rd = {}; unsigned int bool_num = 0; char **bool_names = NULL; int *bool_values = NULL; @@ -539,9 +541,14 @@ static int sel_make_policy_nodes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi, if (ret) goto out; - lock_rename(tmp_parent, fsi->sb->s_root); + rd.old_parent = tmp_parent; + rd.new_parent = fsi->sb->s_root; /* booleans */ + ret = start_renaming_two_dentries(&rd, tmp_bool_dir, fsi->bool_dir); + if (ret) + goto out; + d_exchange(tmp_bool_dir, fsi->bool_dir); swap(fsi->bool_num, bool_num); @@ -549,12 +556,17 @@ static int sel_make_policy_nodes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi, swap(fsi->bool_pending_values, bool_values); fsi->bool_dir = tmp_bool_dir; + end_renaming(&rd); /* classes */ + ret = start_renaming_two_dentries(&rd, tmp_class_dir, fsi->class_dir); + if (ret) + goto out; + d_exchange(tmp_class_dir, fsi->class_dir); fsi->class_dir = tmp_class_dir; - unlock_rename(tmp_parent, fsi->sb->s_root); + end_renaming(&rd); out: sel_remove_old_bool_data(bool_num, bool_names, bool_values); @@ -1072,6 +1084,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: %s (%d) wrote to /sys/fs/selinux/user!" " This will not be supported in the future; please update your" " userspace.\n", current->comm, current->pid); + ssleep(5); length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY, SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER, @@ -1202,7 +1215,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filep)->i_sb->s_fs_info; - char *page = NULL; + char buffer[4]; ssize_t length; ssize_t ret; int cur_enforcing; @@ -1216,27 +1229,19 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, fsi->bool_pending_names[index])) goto out_unlock; - ret = -ENOMEM; - page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!page) - goto out_unlock; - cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(index); if (cur_enforcing < 0) { ret = cur_enforcing; goto out_unlock; } - length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing, - fsi->bool_pending_values[index]); + length = scnprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%d %d", !!cur_enforcing, + !!fsi->bool_pending_values[index]); mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex); - ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length); -out_free: - free_page((unsigned long)page); - return ret; + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, buffer, length); out_unlock: mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex); - goto out_free; + return ret; } static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, @@ -2097,8 +2102,6 @@ err: pr_err("SELinux: %s: failed while creating inodes\n", __func__); - selinux_fs_info_free(sb); - return ret; } @@ -2131,7 +2134,7 @@ static struct file_system_type sel_fs_type = { struct path selinux_null __ro_after_init; -static int __init init_sel_fs(void) +int __init init_sel_fs(void) { struct qstr null_name = QSTR_INIT(NULL_FILE_NAME, sizeof(NULL_FILE_NAME)-1); @@ -2175,5 +2178,3 @@ static int __init init_sel_fs(void) return err; } - -__initcall(init_sel_fs); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c index c2c31521cace..d12ca337e649 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c @@ -20,48 +20,15 @@ #include <linux/errno.h> #include "avtab.h" #include "policydb.h" +#include "hash.h" static struct kmem_cache *avtab_node_cachep __ro_after_init; static struct kmem_cache *avtab_xperms_cachep __ro_after_init; -/* Based on MurmurHash3, written by Austin Appleby and placed in the - * public domain. - */ static inline u32 avtab_hash(const struct avtab_key *keyp, u32 mask) { - static const u32 c1 = 0xcc9e2d51; - static const u32 c2 = 0x1b873593; - static const u32 r1 = 15; - static const u32 r2 = 13; - static const u32 m = 5; - static const u32 n = 0xe6546b64; - - u32 hash = 0; - -#define mix(input) \ - do { \ - u32 v = input; \ - v *= c1; \ - v = (v << r1) | (v >> (32 - r1)); \ - v *= c2; \ - hash ^= v; \ - hash = (hash << r2) | (hash >> (32 - r2)); \ - hash = hash * m + n; \ - } while (0) - - mix(keyp->target_class); - mix(keyp->target_type); - mix(keyp->source_type); - -#undef mix - - hash ^= hash >> 16; - hash *= 0x85ebca6b; - hash ^= hash >> 13; - hash *= 0xc2b2ae35; - hash ^= hash >> 16; - - return hash & mask; + return av_hash((u32)keyp->target_class, (u32)keyp->target_type, + (u32)keyp->source_type, mask); } static struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c index 383fd2d70878..1382eb3bfde1 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c @@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ int hashtab_init(struct hashtab *h, u32 nel_hint) h->htable = NULL; if (size) { - h->htable = kcalloc(size, sizeof(*h->htable), GFP_KERNEL); + h->htable = kcalloc(size, sizeof(*h->htable), + GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!h->htable) return -ENOMEM; h->size = size; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index 9ea971943713..91df3db6a88c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -160,6 +160,11 @@ static const struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = { .sym_num = SYM_NUM, .ocon_num = OCON_NUM, }, + { + .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_NEVERAUDIT, + .sym_num = SYM_NUM, + .ocon_num = OCON_NUM, + }, }; static const struct policydb_compat_info * @@ -531,6 +536,7 @@ static void policydb_init(struct policydb *p) ebitmap_init(&p->filename_trans_ttypes); ebitmap_init(&p->policycaps); ebitmap_init(&p->permissive_map); + ebitmap_init(&p->neveraudit_map); } /* @@ -852,6 +858,7 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p) ebitmap_destroy(&p->filename_trans_ttypes); ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps); ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map); + ebitmap_destroy(&p->neveraudit_map); } /* @@ -2538,6 +2545,12 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp) goto bad; } + if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEVERAUDIT) { + rc = ebitmap_read(&p->neveraudit_map, fp); + if (rc) + goto bad; + } + rc = -EINVAL; info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers); if (!info) { @@ -3723,6 +3736,12 @@ int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp) return rc; } + if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEVERAUDIT) { + rc = ebitmap_write(&p->neveraudit_map, fp); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + num_syms = info->sym_num; for (i = 0; i < num_syms; i++) { struct policy_data pd; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h index 25650224b6e7..89a180b1742f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h @@ -300,6 +300,8 @@ struct policydb { struct ebitmap permissive_map; + struct ebitmap neveraudit_map; + /* length of this policy when it was loaded */ size_t len; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 7becf3808818..13fc712d5923 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -1153,6 +1153,14 @@ void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type)) avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE; + /* neveraudit domain? */ + if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->neveraudit_map, scontext->type)) + avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_NEVERAUDIT; + + /* both permissive and neveraudit => allow */ + if (avd->flags == (AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE|AVD_FLAGS_NEVERAUDIT)) + goto allow; + tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid); if (!tcontext) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", @@ -1172,6 +1180,8 @@ void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, policydb->allow_unknown); out: rcu_read_unlock(); + if (avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_NEVERAUDIT) + avd->auditallow = avd->auditdeny = 0; return; allow: avd->allowed = 0xffffffff; @@ -1208,6 +1218,14 @@ void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type)) avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE; + /* neveraudit domain? */ + if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->neveraudit_map, scontext->type)) + avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_NEVERAUDIT; + + /* both permissive and neveraudit => allow */ + if (avd->flags == (AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE|AVD_FLAGS_NEVERAUDIT)) + goto allow; + tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid); if (!tcontext) { pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", @@ -1225,6 +1243,8 @@ void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, NULL); out: rcu_read_unlock(); + if (avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_NEVERAUDIT) + avd->auditallow = avd->auditdeny = 0; return; allow: avd->allowed = 0xffffffff; @@ -1909,11 +1929,17 @@ retry: goto out_unlock; } /* Obtain the sid for the context. */ - rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid); - if (rc == -ESTALE) { - rcu_read_unlock(); - context_destroy(&newcontext); - goto retry; + if (context_equal(scontext, &newcontext)) + *out_sid = ssid; + else if (context_equal(tcontext, &newcontext)) + *out_sid = tsid; + else { + rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid); + if (rc == -ESTALE) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + context_destroy(&newcontext); + goto retry; + } } out_unlock: rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -3544,6 +3570,13 @@ struct selinux_audit_rule { struct context au_ctxt; }; +int selinux_audit_rule_avc_callback(u32 event) +{ + if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) + return audit_update_lsm_rules(); + return 0; +} + void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) { struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule; @@ -3794,25 +3827,6 @@ out: return match; } -static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event) -{ - if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) - return audit_update_lsm_rules(); - return 0; -} - -static int __init aurule_init(void) -{ - int err; - - err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET); - if (err) - panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err); - - return err; -} -__initcall(aurule_init); - #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL /** * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index 90ec4ef1b082..61d56b0c2be1 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM; ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX; - ctx->ctx_len = str_len; + ctx->ctx_len = str_len + 1; memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, &uctx[1], str_len); ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = '\0'; rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len, diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index 759343a6bbae..9b9eb262fe33 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -276,6 +276,20 @@ struct smk_audit_info { }; /* + * Initialization + */ +#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER) +int smack_nf_ip_init(void); +#else +static inline int smack_nf_ip_init(void) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif +int init_smk_fs(void); +int smack_initcall(void); + +/* * These functions are in smack_access.c */ int smk_access_entry(char *, char *, struct list_head *); diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index adf1c542d213..a0bd4919a9d9 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -5006,7 +5006,7 @@ static int smack_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, const char *name) } static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, - struct qstr *name, + const struct qstr *name, const struct cred *old, struct cred *new) { @@ -5358,16 +5358,30 @@ static __init int smack_init(void) /* initialize the smack_known_list */ init_smack_known_list(); + /* Inform the audit system that secctx is used */ + audit_cfg_lsm(&smack_lsmid, + AUDIT_CFG_LSM_SECCTX_SUBJECT | + AUDIT_CFG_LSM_SECCTX_OBJECT); + return 0; } +int __init smack_initcall(void) +{ + int rc_fs = init_smk_fs(); + int rc_nf = smack_nf_ip_init(); + + return rc_fs ? rc_fs : rc_nf; +} + /* * Smack requires early initialization in order to label * all processes and objects when they are created. */ DEFINE_LSM(smack) = { - .name = "smack", + .id = &smack_lsmid, .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, .blobs = &smack_blob_sizes, .init = smack_init, + .initcall_device = smack_initcall, }; diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c index 8fd747b3653a..17ba578b1308 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static struct pernet_operations smack_net_ops = { .exit = smack_nf_unregister, }; -static int __init smack_nf_ip_init(void) +int __init smack_nf_ip_init(void) { if (smack_enabled == 0) return 0; @@ -76,5 +76,3 @@ static int __init smack_nf_ip_init(void) printk(KERN_DEBUG "Smack: Registering netfilter hooks\n"); return register_pernet_subsys(&smack_net_ops); } - -__initcall(smack_nf_ip_init); diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index b1e5e62f5cbd..405ace6db109 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -2978,7 +2978,7 @@ static struct vfsmount *smackfs_mount; * Returns true if we were not chosen on boot or if * we were chosen and filesystem registration succeeded. */ -static int __init init_smk_fs(void) +int __init init_smk_fs(void) { int err; int rc; @@ -3021,5 +3021,3 @@ static int __init init_smk_fs(void) return err; } - -__initcall(init_smk_fs); diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h index 0e8e2e959aef..3b2a97d10a5d 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/common.h +++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h @@ -924,6 +924,8 @@ struct tomoyo_task { /********** Function prototypes. **********/ +int tomoyo_interface_init(void); + bool tomoyo_address_matches_group(const bool is_ipv6, const __be32 *address, const struct tomoyo_group *group); bool tomoyo_compare_number_union(const unsigned long value, diff --git a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c index 7e69747b2f77..33933645f5b9 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c @@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static void __init tomoyo_create_entry(const char *name, const umode_t mode, * * Returns 0. */ -static int __init tomoyo_interface_init(void) +int __init tomoyo_interface_init(void) { struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain; struct dentry *tomoyo_dir; @@ -269,5 +269,3 @@ static int __init tomoyo_interface_init(void) tomoyo_load_builtin_policy(); return 0; } - -fs_initcall(tomoyo_interface_init); diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c index d6ebcd9db80a..c66e02ed8ee3 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes tomoyo_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { * Returns 0. */ static int tomoyo_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, - unsigned long clone_flags) + u64 clone_flags) { struct tomoyo_task *old = tomoyo_task(current); struct tomoyo_task *new = tomoyo_task(task); @@ -612,9 +612,10 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void) } DEFINE_LSM(tomoyo) = { - .name = "tomoyo", + .id = &tomoyo_lsmid, .enabled = &tomoyo_enabled, .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR, .blobs = &tomoyo_blob_sizes, .init = tomoyo_init, + .initcall_fs = tomoyo_interface_init, }; diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c index 3d064dd4e03f..38b21ee0c560 100644 --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c @@ -476,6 +476,6 @@ static int __init yama_init(void) } DEFINE_LSM(yama) = { - .name = "yama", + .id = &yama_lsmid, .init = yama_init, }; |