Merge branch 'bpf-additional-use-cases-for-untrusted-ptr_to_mem'

Eduard Zingerman says:

====================
bpf: additional use-cases for untrusted PTR_TO_MEM

This patch set introduces two usability enhancements leveraging
untrusted pointers to mem:
- When reading a pointer field from a PTR_TO_BTF_ID, the resulting
  value is now assumed to be PTR_TO_MEM|MEM_RDONLY|PTR_UNTRUSTED
  instead of SCALAR_VALUE, provided the pointer points to a primitive
  type.
- __arg_untrusted attribute for global function parameters,
  allowed for pointer arguments of both structural and primitive
  types:
  - For structural types, the attribute produces
    PTR_TO_BTF_ID|PTR_UNTRUSTED.
  - For primitive types, it yields
    PTR_TO_MEM|MEM_RDONLY|PTR_UNTRUSTED.

Here are examples enabled by the series:

  struct foo {
    int *arr;
  };
  ...
  p = bpf_core_cast(..., struct foo);
  bpf_for(i, 0, ...) {
    ... p->arr[i] ...       // load at any offset is allowed
  }

  int memcmp(void *a __arg_untrusted, void *b __arg_untrusted, size_t n) {
    bpf_for(i, 0, n)
      if (a[i] - b[i])      // load at any offset is allowed
        return ...;
    return 0;
  }

The patch-set was inspired by Anrii's series [1]. The goal of that
series was to define a generic global glob_match function, capable to
accept any pointer type:

  __weak int glob_match(const char *pat, const char *str);

  char filename_glob[32];

  void foo(...) {
    ...
    task = bpf_get_current_task_btf();
    filename = task->mm->exe_file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
    ... match_glob(filename_glob,  // pointer to map value
                   filename) ...   // scalar
  }

At the moment, there is no straightforward way to express such a
function. This patch-set makes it possible to define it as follows:

  __weak int glob_match(const char *pat __arg_untrusted,
                        const char *str __arg_untrusted);

[1] https://github.com/anakryiko/linux/tree/bpf-mem-cast

Changelog:
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250702224209.3300396-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
v1 -> v2:
- Added safety check in btf_prepare_func_args() to ensure that only
  struct or primitive types could be combined with __arg_untrusted
  (Alexei).
- Removed unnecessary 'continue' btf_check_func_arg_match() (Alexei).
- Added test cases for __arg_untrusted pointers to enum and
  __arg_untrusted combined with non-kernel type (Kumar).
- Added acks from Kumar.
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250704230354.1323244-1-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

2 files changed, 106 insertions, 28 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
index 05fd64a371af..2dd13eea7b0e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
@@ -891,6 +891,12 @@ bool btf_type_is_i64(const struct btf_type *t)
 	return btf_type_is_int(t) && __btf_type_int_is_regular(t, 8);
 }
 
+bool btf_type_is_primitive(const struct btf_type *t)
+{
+	return (btf_type_is_int(t) && btf_type_int_is_regular(t)) ||
+	       btf_is_any_enum(t);
+}
+
 /*
  * Check that given struct member is a regular int with expected
  * offset and size.
@@ -6915,6 +6921,7 @@ enum bpf_struct_walk_result {
 	/* < 0 error */
 	WALK_SCALAR = 0,
 	WALK_PTR,
+	WALK_PTR_UNTRUSTED,
 	WALK_STRUCT,
 };
 
@@ -7156,6 +7163,8 @@ error:
 					*field_name = mname;
 				return WALK_PTR;
 			}
+
+			return WALK_PTR_UNTRUSTED;
 		}
 
 		/* Allow more flexible access within an int as long as
@@ -7228,6 +7237,9 @@ int btf_struct_access(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
 			*next_btf_id = id;
 			*flag = tmp_flag;
 			return PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
+		case WALK_PTR_UNTRUSTED:
+			*flag = MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED;
+			return PTR_TO_MEM;
 		case WALK_SCALAR:
 			return SCALAR_VALUE;
 		case WALK_STRUCT:
@@ -7640,11 +7652,12 @@ cand_cache_unlock:
 }
 
 enum btf_arg_tag {
-	ARG_TAG_CTX	 = BIT_ULL(0),
-	ARG_TAG_NONNULL  = BIT_ULL(1),
-	ARG_TAG_TRUSTED  = BIT_ULL(2),
-	ARG_TAG_NULLABLE = BIT_ULL(3),
-	ARG_TAG_ARENA	 = BIT_ULL(4),
+	ARG_TAG_CTX	  = BIT_ULL(0),
+	ARG_TAG_NONNULL   = BIT_ULL(1),
+	ARG_TAG_TRUSTED   = BIT_ULL(2),
+	ARG_TAG_UNTRUSTED = BIT_ULL(3),
+	ARG_TAG_NULLABLE  = BIT_ULL(4),
+	ARG_TAG_ARENA	  = BIT_ULL(5),
 };
 
 /* Process BTF of a function to produce high-level expectation of function
@@ -7752,6 +7765,8 @@ int btf_prepare_func_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
 				tags |= ARG_TAG_CTX;
 			} else if (strcmp(tag, "trusted") == 0) {
 				tags |= ARG_TAG_TRUSTED;
+			} else if (strcmp(tag, "untrusted") == 0) {
+				tags |= ARG_TAG_UNTRUSTED;
 			} else if (strcmp(tag, "nonnull") == 0) {
 				tags |= ARG_TAG_NONNULL;
 			} else if (strcmp(tag, "nullable") == 0) {
@@ -7812,6 +7827,38 @@ int btf_prepare_func_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
 			sub->args[i].btf_id = kern_type_id;
 			continue;
 		}
+		if (tags & ARG_TAG_UNTRUSTED) {
+			struct btf *vmlinux_btf;
+			int kern_type_id;
+
+			if (tags & ~ARG_TAG_UNTRUSTED) {
+				bpf_log(log, "arg#%d untrusted cannot be combined with any other tags\n", i);
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+
+			ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, NULL);
+			if (btf_type_is_void(ref_t) || btf_type_is_primitive(ref_t)) {
+				sub->args[i].arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED;
+				sub->args[i].mem_size = 0;
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			kern_type_id = btf_get_ptr_to_btf_id(log, i, btf, t);
+			if (kern_type_id < 0)
+				return kern_type_id;
+
+			vmlinux_btf = bpf_get_btf_vmlinux();
+			ref_t = btf_type_by_id(vmlinux_btf, kern_type_id);
+			if (!btf_type_is_struct(ref_t)) {
+				tname = __btf_name_by_offset(vmlinux_btf, t->name_off);
+				bpf_log(log, "arg#%d has type %s '%s', but only struct or primitive types are allowed\n",
+					i, btf_type_str(ref_t), tname);
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			sub->args[i].arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED;
+			sub->args[i].btf_id = kern_type_id;
+			continue;
+		}
 		if (tags & ARG_TAG_ARENA) {
 			if (tags & ~ARG_TAG_ARENA) {
 				bpf_log(log, "arg#%d arena cannot be combined with any other tags\n", i);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 0f6cc2275695..1e567fff6f23 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2796,22 +2796,33 @@ static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno);
 }
 
-static void mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
-			    struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno,
-			    enum bpf_reg_type reg_type,
-			    struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id,
-			    enum bpf_type_flag flag)
+static int mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+			   struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno,
+			   enum bpf_reg_type reg_type,
+			   struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id,
+			   enum bpf_type_flag flag)
 {
-	if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
+	switch (reg_type) {
+	case SCALAR_VALUE:
 		mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno);
-		return;
+		return 0;
+	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
+		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno);
+		regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | flag;
+		regs[regno].btf = btf;
+		regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id;
+		if (type_may_be_null(flag))
+			regs[regno].id = ++env->id_gen;
+		return 0;
+	case PTR_TO_MEM:
+		mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno);
+		regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_MEM | flag;
+		regs[regno].mem_size = 0;
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		verifier_bug(env, "unexpected reg_type %d in %s\n", reg_type, __func__);
+		return -EFAULT;
 	}
-	mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno);
-	regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | flag;
-	regs[regno].btf = btf;
-	regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id;
-	if (type_may_be_null(flag))
-		regs[regno].id = ++env->id_gen;
 }
 
 #define DEF_NOT_SUBREG	(0)
@@ -5965,6 +5976,7 @@ static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
 	struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx];
 	int class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
 	struct bpf_reg_state *val_reg;
+	int ret;
 
 	/* Things we already checked for in check_map_access and caller:
 	 *  - Reject cases where variable offset may touch kptr
@@ -5998,8 +6010,11 @@ static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
 		/* We can simply mark the value_regno receiving the pointer
 		 * value from map as PTR_TO_BTF_ID, with the correct type.
 		 */
-		mark_btf_ld_reg(env, cur_regs(env), value_regno, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, kptr_field->kptr.btf,
-				kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, btf_ld_kptr_type(env, kptr_field));
+		ret = mark_btf_ld_reg(env, cur_regs(env), value_regno, PTR_TO_BTF_ID,
+				      kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id,
+				      btf_ld_kptr_type(env, kptr_field));
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
 	} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
 		val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno);
 		if (!register_is_null(val_reg) &&
@@ -7298,8 +7313,11 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		clear_trusted_flags(&flag);
 	}
 
-	if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
-		mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id, flag);
+	if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
+		ret = mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id, flag);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -7353,13 +7371,19 @@ static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 
 	/* Simulate access to a PTR_TO_BTF_ID */
 	memset(&map_reg, 0, sizeof(map_reg));
-	mark_btf_ld_reg(env, &map_reg, 0, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id, 0);
+	ret = mark_btf_ld_reg(env, &map_reg, 0, PTR_TO_BTF_ID,
+			      btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id, 0);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
 	ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, &map_reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag, NULL);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
-	if (value_regno >= 0)
-		mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, btf_vmlinux, btf_id, flag);
+	if (value_regno >= 0) {
+		ret = mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, btf_vmlinux, btf_id, flag);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -10413,6 +10437,12 @@ static int btf_check_func_arg_match(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog,
 				bpf_log(log, "R%d is not a scalar\n", regno);
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
+		} else if (arg->arg_type & PTR_UNTRUSTED) {
+			/*
+			 * Anything is allowed for untrusted arguments, as these are
+			 * read-only and probe read instructions would protect against
+			 * invalid memory access.
+			 */
 		} else if (arg->arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) {
 			ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, ARG_DONTCARE);
 			if (ret < 0)
@@ -23122,11 +23152,12 @@ static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
 				__mark_dynptr_reg(reg, BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL, true, ++env->id_gen);
 			} else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) {
 				reg->type = PTR_TO_MEM;
-				if (arg->arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL)
-					reg->type |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
+				reg->type |= arg->arg_type &
+					     (PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED | MEM_RDONLY);
 				mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i);
 				reg->mem_size = arg->mem_size;
-				reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
+				if (arg->arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL)
+					reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
 			} else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
 				reg->type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
 				if (arg->arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL)