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authorJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>2025-07-10 10:08:47 -0700
committerJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>2025-07-11 11:42:38 -0700
commit0cad34fb7c5d12a9b61862744e7130e9ce3bc58f (patch)
treebfc850c82c5a470e1a5f0f4eed8d83b2a4c3be0d /net/wireless/util.c
parenta339dd699a7aa01bce4b38c8d81def310cf2bca0 (diff)
parentc7979c3917fa1326dae3607e1c6a04c12057b194 (diff)
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR (net-6.16-rc6-2). No conflicts. Adjacent changes: drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7925/mcu.c c701574c5412 ("wifi: mt76: mt7925: fix invalid array index in ssid assignment during hw scan") b3a431fe2e39 ("wifi: mt76: mt7925: fix off by one in mt7925_mcu_hw_scan()") drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7996/mac.c 62da647a2b20 ("wifi: mt76: mt7996: Add MLO support to mt7996_tx_check_aggr()") dc66a129adf1 ("wifi: mt76: add a wrapper for wcid access with validation") drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7996/main.c 3dd6f67c669c ("wifi: mt76: Move RCU section in mt7996_mcu_add_rate_ctrl()") 8989d8e90f5f ("wifi: mt76: mt7996: Do not set wcid.sta to 1 in mt7996_mac_sta_event()") net/mac80211/cfg.c 58fcb1b4287c ("wifi: mac80211: reject VHT opmode for unsupported channel widths") 037dc18ac3fb ("wifi: mac80211: add support for storing station S1G capabilities") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/wireless/util.c')
-rw-r--r--net/wireless/util.c52
1 files changed, 50 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/net/wireless/util.c b/net/wireless/util.c
index 5aff11c35303..240c68baa3d1 100644
--- a/net/wireless/util.c
+++ b/net/wireless/util.c
@@ -820,6 +820,52 @@ bool ieee80211_is_valid_amsdu(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 mesh_hdr)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_is_valid_amsdu);
+
+/*
+ * Detects if an MSDU frame was maliciously converted into an A-MSDU
+ * frame by an adversary. This is done by parsing the received frame
+ * as if it were a regular MSDU, even though the A-MSDU flag is set.
+ *
+ * For non-mesh interfaces, detection involves checking whether the
+ * payload, when interpreted as an MSDU, begins with a valid RFC1042
+ * header. This is done by comparing the A-MSDU subheader's destination
+ * address to the start of the RFC1042 header.
+ *
+ * For mesh interfaces, the MSDU includes a 6-byte Mesh Control field
+ * and an optional variable-length Mesh Address Extension field before
+ * the RFC1042 header. The position of the RFC1042 header must therefore
+ * be calculated based on the mesh header length.
+ *
+ * Since this function intentionally parses an A-MSDU frame as an MSDU,
+ * it only assumes that the A-MSDU subframe header is present, and
+ * beyond this it performs its own bounds checks under the assumption
+ * that the frame is instead parsed as a non-aggregated MSDU.
+ */
+static bool
+is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(struct ethhdr *eth, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ enum nl80211_iftype iftype)
+{
+ int offset;
+
+ /* Non-mesh case can be directly compared */
+ if (iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT)
+ return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_dest, rfc1042_header);
+
+ offset = __ieee80211_get_mesh_hdrlen(eth->h_dest[0]);
+ if (offset == 6) {
+ /* Mesh case with empty address extension field */
+ return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_source, rfc1042_header);
+ } else if (offset + ETH_ALEN <= skb->len) {
+ /* Mesh case with non-empty address extension field */
+ u8 temp[ETH_ALEN];
+
+ skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, temp, ETH_ALEN);
+ return ether_addr_equal(temp, rfc1042_header);
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list,
const u8 *addr, enum nl80211_iftype iftype,
const unsigned int extra_headroom,
@@ -861,8 +907,10 @@ void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list,
/* the last MSDU has no padding */
if (subframe_len > remaining)
goto purge;
- /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks */
- if (ether_addr_equal(hdr.eth.h_dest, rfc1042_header))
+ /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks, to be
+ * checked when processing first subframe (offset == 0).
+ */
+ if (offset == 0 && is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(&hdr.eth, skb, iftype))
goto purge;
offset += sizeof(struct ethhdr);